Adams v. United States, Case No. 4:03–cv–00049–BLW.
| Decision Date | 06 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:03–cv–00049–BLW. |
| Parties | Timm ADAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Douglas L. Abbott, Peter C. Houtsma, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO, Amanda K. Brailsford, Steven B. Andersen, Tracy Jack Crane, Walter H. Bithell, Holland and Hart, D. Blair Clark, Law Offices of D. Blair Clark PLLC, Boise, ID, for Plaintiffs.
Deborah A. Ferguson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Conrad Aiken, Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Boise, ID, Geoffrey Charles Cook, Environmental Tort Litigation, Christina M. Falk, Anthony Matthew Garza, Brian E. Bowcut, Gay Elizabeth Kang, Henry Thomas Miller, Ina L. Strichartz, Jonathan Richard Waldron, Julia B. Ruckman, Margaret Jane Mahoney, Michele Susan Greif, Sarah Williams, Taheerah Kalimah El-Amin, Wagner DuPont Jackson, United States Department of Justice, David Clifford Belt, United States Postal Service, Office of General Counsel, Kathryn Naegeli Boling, Scott R. Grubman, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
The Court has before it defendant DuPont's Fifth Set of Motions for Summary Judgment re Plaintiffs' Fraud, Assumed Duty, and Other Claims (Dkt. 1990, 1990–17). This order focuses on DuPont's request for summary judgment of all claims asserted by Fife Dairy, LLC, Randy Fife, Jean Fife, Sam Fife, Sam Fife and Jenny Fife (collectively, “Fife Dairy”).
Fife Dairy's damages claim relates to its corn and hay crops for 2001, 2002, and 2003. See Expert Report (Dkt. 1990–18), at 1–2. The dairy did not grow hay and corn to sell to others; rather it grew these crops to feed its dairy cows. Id. The corn was ensiled, meaning it was converted to livestock feed, or silage. Id. Fife Dairy asserts that its cows generated less milk during 2001 to 2003 because they were fed corn silage that was grown on fields contaminated with Oust. Id. Fife Dairy also claims that its hay crop was damaged by Oust. Individual plaintiff Randy Fife further claims that in 2003, he was forced to sell a piece of land—Metz Field—in an effort to pay off debts caused by Oust losses and keep Fife Dairy in business. Id.
One of the principal purposes of summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims ....” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. Direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir.1988). And a court is not obligated to take the non-movant's version of events as true when the account is blatantly contradicted by video evidence. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000). This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. Id. at 256–57. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show “by her affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file” that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
However, the Court is “not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.2001). Instead, the “party opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court's] attention to specific triable facts.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.2003).
DuPont contends that the Court should dismiss all of Fife Dairy's claims because the dairy routinely discarded test reports regarding the nutritional value of its silage. DuPont contends that these test reports are “the very records that would allow DuPont to effectively refute a central premise of [Fife Dairy's] claims against it: that decreased nutritional value of silage caused a drop in milk production.” Reply (Dkt. 2063–9), at 4. Alternatively, DuPont seeks an adverse-inference jury instruction.
During the time the Fifes operated the dairy, they regularly tested the nutritional value of silage. The Fifes conducted tests as early as 1995, when they began operating the dairy, and continued testing until the dairy closed. See Fife Dec. (Dkt. 2013–12) ¶ 2. As Randy Fife explained, “these were not tests for Oust damages, but rather were for the purpose of determining the correct ratio of feed mixture for optimum health of the dairy herd to maximize milk production.” Id. Further, when a new feed ratio, as determined by a test, was put in place, the dairy's standard practice was to throw away the old recommendation “so you would not get it mixed up with the new one.” Id. ¶ 3.
Federal trial courts have the “inherent discretionary power to make appropriate evidentiary rulings in response to destruction or spoliation of relevant evidence.” Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir.1993); see also Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (2006). Courts may sanction parties for destruction of evidence in three ways. In re Napster Copyright Litig., 462 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1066 (N.D.Cal.2006) ().
The third sanction—dismissal—is available when “a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings” because “courts have inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 958. The Ninth Circuit has described the dismissal sanction as “harsh” and requires district courts to consider the following factors: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. The defendants bear the burden of producing evidence suggesting that the destroyed evidence was relevant to their claims and would have been used at trial if not destroyed. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988).
Under this standard, dismissal is not warranted. Mr. Fife has offered a logical, innocent explanation as to why the test reports were regularly discarded. He also explained that during 2001 to 2003, he did not yet appreciate the fact that these the test reports might be relevant to a later-filed lawsuit. In this regard, the Court disagrees with DuPont's assertion that the following testimony “clearly” establishes that Fife Dairy “had ‘some notice that the documents were potentially relevant to the litigation before thy were destroyed,’ ” Reply re Fife Dairy (Dkt. 2063–9), at 4 (quoting Leon, 464 F.3d at 959):
Q. Specifically about 2001, after that corn silage had been ensiled and you're doing testing on it, was there anything about what you had observed with your corn silage crop up until that point that led you to think maybe I ought to test this more than normal to make sure that it's all right to give to my herd?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you act on that?
A. Yes.
Q. How?
A. By having tests.
Q. More tests than you normally would?
A. When you put the corn in the pit and it's immature, water runs out of it in a big stream. You have a big body there where it's immature. There's so much moisture in, it runs out. You know the feed is not—no good. We knew the kernels—you brought up a line, milk line. Milk line tells you if the corn's mature or not. That's what it's for. It was not there. Our corn was not mature. It wasn't going to get mature.
...
Q. Let's pick back up where you left off about a stream coming out of the pit. Specifically my question was: What did you do to act on that impulse or that idea that you should test more often than normal?
A. We knew our corn was immature, so then Dr. John would come, and we worked really hard on our ration. In the milking business and the farming business, in any business, you don't want to wait until the cow's dry...
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