Adams v. Wright, 57474
| Decision Date | 23 July 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 57474,57474 |
| Citation | 403 So.2d 391 |
| Parties | Paul Norman ADAMS, et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. William F. WRIGHT, Jr., Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Elsie T. Apthorp, and Jacqueline R. Griffin, of Dempsey & Slaughter, Orlando, for appellants/cross-appellees.
William L. Ross, Jr. of the Law Office of William L. Ross, Jr., New Smyrna Beach, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Craig B. Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for amicus curiae.
This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Volusia County which held that section 768.043, Florida Statutes (1977) 1 concerning remittitur and additur actions arising out of the operation of motor vehicles, is constitutional. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972).
For clarity we refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court; appellants as defendants and appellee as plaintiff.
The facts of this case are relatively simple and straightforward. The plaintiff sought punitive and compensatory damages for injuries he sustained while riding in an automobile driven by defendant, Paul Adams, owned by defendant, Ira Adams, and insured by defendant, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $8,500.00. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, alleging inter alia, that the verdict was inadequate. The trial court denied this motion but granted plaintiff's motion for additur. The defendant would not agree to the additur so the trial judge ordered a new trial pursuant to section 768.043, Florida Statutes (1977), solely for the purpose of determining plaintiff's damages. This appeal is from that order.
In addition, plaintiff filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court's failure to give certain instructions, to admit certain expert testimony, and to grant plaintiff's motion for a new trial because the verdict was inadequate. As to the matters alleged in the cross-appeal, it is the opinion of this Court that no reversible error has been committed by the trial court. We therefore turn to the main issue in this case, whether section 768.043, Florida Statutes (1977), is constitutional.
Section 768.043 prescribes a remedy whereby a trial judge is empowered to modify a verdict in a motor vehicle liability suit which is clearly excessive or inadequate. Subsection (2) of the statute provides the criteria to be considered by the trial judge in determining whether the verdict is excessive or inadequate. (See footnote 1.)
Defendants argue that the methods established by section 768.043 for review of a jury verdict are procedural in that they set forth a procedure for a trial judge to equitably revise a jury verdict at the trial level. Such a procedural enactment, they argue, amounts to a legislative intrusion into the rule-making province of the judiciary.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the right of a litigant to pursue an additur under section 768.043 is a substantive right, and may properly be provided by the legislature.
While the specific issue now before us is one of first impression, the question of whether a rule or statute relates to substantive law or to practice and procedure is one which constantly arises. "The entire area of substance and procedure may be described as a 'twilight zone' and a statute or rule will be characterized as substantive or procedural according to the nature of the problem for which a characterization must be made." In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla.1972) (concurring opinion of Adkins, J.). The distinction between substance and procedure was discussed further:
Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion. "Practice and procedure" may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product thereof.
Examination of many authorities leads me to conclude that substantive law includes those rules and principles which fix and declare the primary rights of individuals as respects their persons and their property. As to the term "procedure," I conceive it to include the administration of the remedies available in cases of invasion of primary rights of individuals. The term "rules of practice and procedure" includes all rules governing the parties, their counsel and the Court throughout the progress of the case from the time of its initiation until final judgment and its execution.
To give effect to the evident legislative intent in promulgating section 768.043, we construe the statute as being remedial in nature, granting authority to the trial judge to modify a clearly excessive or inadequate verdict in a motor vehicle liability suit. A remedial statute is "designed to correct an existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good." It is also defined as "(a) statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong, where he had none, or a different one, before." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979.
Subsection (3) of section 768.043 provides as follows:
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to vest the trial courts of this state with the discretionary authority to review the amounts of damages awarded by a trier of fact, in light of a standard of excessiveness or inadequacy. The Legislature recognizes that the reasonable actions of a jury are a fundamental precept of American jurisprudence and that such actions should be disturbed or modified (only) with caution and discretion. However, it is further recognized that a review by the courts in accordance with the standards set forth in this section provides an additional element of soundness and logic to our judicial system and is in the best interests of the citizens of Florida.
(Footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
We therefore hold that section 768.043, Florida Statutes (1977), is a remedial statute designed to protect the substantive rights of litigants in motor vehicle-related suits. We also hold, contrary to defendants' contention, that there is no conflict between the statute and Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.530. 2 Rule 1.530 delineates the procedures for granting a new trial. Section 768.043 in no way alters or conflicts with Rule 1.530. The statute merely provides an alternative means of redress for an existing grievance of a litigant.
Defendants next contend that the statute substantially abridges the right to a jury trial. We disagree. The statute clearly provides for a new trial in the event the party adversely affected by the remittitur or additur does not agree with the remittitur or additur. In other words, the complaining party need not accept the decision of the judge with respect to remittitur or additur. The party may have the matter of damages submitted to another jury. Defendants' attack on the constitutionality of the statute is without merit.
The second prong of defendants' attack on the ruling of the trial court is based on a claim that the court abused its discretion in granting the motion for additur and ordering a new trial. A careful reading of the record and of the criteria set forth in the statute leads us to agree. Paragraph (2) of the trial judge's order holding the statute constitutional, and granting a new trial provides:
(2) (T)he verdict returned by the Jury in the amount of $8,500.00 as reviewed by the standards enumerated in section 768.043, Florida Statutes, is clearly inadequate in light of the facts and circumstances presented to the Jury and does not bear a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered by the Plaintiff; in making this finding the undersigned notes that no defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk existed which could diminish the Plaintiff's recovery, that he is a young man who, according to uncontroverted evidence, will suffer significant impairment in the use of his mouth for the rest of his life, with embarrassment and mental anguish as a result thereof(.)
It is the opinion of this Court that the order for a new trial is deficient because it does not contain reference to the record in support of its conclusion that additur of the jury award is necessary to cure the inadequacy of the verdict (the basis for requiring new trial). We, therefore, have made an independent review of the record in search of support of that conclusion, and we find none. As we held in Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla.1978), superior vantage point does not give a trial judge unbridled discretion to order a new trial. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla.1970).
Our review of the record in this instance does not support the conclusion of the trial judge that additur is necessary to cure an inadequacy in the jury verdict.
We therefore affirm that part of the trial judge's order upholding the constitutionality of section 768.043, Florida Statutes (1977), and reverse that portion of the order finding the jury award inadequate and providing for additur in the amount of $16,500.00, and providing for a new trial only on the issue of damages awardable to the plaintiff.
It is so ordered.
Although I hesitate to enter the procedural-substantive fray, I find it impossible to resist these better instincts when confronted with Florida's remittitur/additur statute. According to the weight of authority across the country this statute is procedural and is therefore invalid because it usurps the...
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