Adamson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co

• Decision Date: 19 December 1930
• Docket Number: No. 20599.,20599.
• Citation: 157 S.E. 104,42 Ga.App. 587
• Parties: ADAMSON. v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

42 Ga.App. 587

157 S.E. 104

ADAMSON.

v.METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 20599.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Dec. 19, 1930.

Rehearing Granted Jan. 13, 1931. Adhered to Feb. 17, 1931.

Syllabus by the Court.

"The word 'permanent' does not always mean forever or lasting forever, but its meaning is to be construed according to its nature and in its relation to the subject-matter of the contract."

The court erred in sustaining the general demurrer and dismissing the petition.

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of "Permanency; Permanent, " see Words and Phrases.]

Error from City Court of Atlanta; Hugh M. Dorsey, Judge.

Suit by Sollie B. Adamson against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Reversed.

Paul S. Etheridge & Son and Morgan S. Belser, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Smith, Hammond, Smith & Bloodworth and Wm. H. Smith, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

BLOODWORTH, J.

Sollie B. Adamson sued the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, alleging that on April 28, 1927, he entered into a contract of life insurance with said company, and simultaneously with the issuance of said life insurance policy, which was for $5,000, he entered into a contract with said company which the company called a "supplemental contract, " and which was attached to and made a part of the original policy hereinbefore referred to; and by the terms of said supplemental contract, and in consideration of an additional sum of $16.05 payable annually, the company agreed "that upon receipt by the company at its home office in the City of New York of due proof, on forms which will be furnished by the company, on request that the insured has, while said policy and this supplemental contract are in full force, and prior to the anniversary date of said policy nearest to the sixtieth birthday of the insured, become totally and permanently disabled, as the result of bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of said policy, so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit, and that such disability has already continued uninterruptedly for a period of at least three months, it will, during the continuance of such disability. 1. Waive the payment of such premium falling due under said policy and this Supplemental Contract, and 2. Pay to the insured, or a person designated by him for the purpose, or if such disability is due to, or is accompanied by mental incapacity, to the beneficiary of record under said policy, a monthly income of $10 for each $1000 of insurance, or of committed value or installments, if any, under said policy."

Petitioner sued for $363.30, the same being for two items; one a premium of $163.30, which had fallen due during the insured's disability, and the payment of which the defendant had agreed to waive, but which the defendant demanded of the insured, and which he paid under protest and in order to keep his policy from lapsing; the other being $50 a month for four months, due him under the contract. Petitioner alleged that he was wholly incapacitated for four months; that he furnished proof of his disability "after his said disability had continued uninterruptedly for a period of more than three months, " as provided by the terms of the policy; and that he was "wholly unable to engage in any work, occupation or business suitable to one of his experience, training and qualifications." The pleadings clearly show that he was wholly disabled at the time that he filed proof of his disability. The defendant demurred to the petition, the demurrer was sustained, and the petition dismissed, and upon this ruling the plaintiff assigns error. It is undisputed that the plaintiff held the insurance policy, including the supplemental contract, and the petition alleged that, while these were both of full force, "he became totally and permanently disabled as the result of bodily injury or disease originating after the issuance of said policy, so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performingany...