Adamson v. Port of Bellingham

• Decision Date: 14 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-35314, No. 16-35368,16-35314
• Citation: 907 F.3d 1122
• Parties: Shannon C. ADAMSON and Nicholas Adamson, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PORT OF BELLINGHAM, a Washington Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Shannon C. Adamson and Nicholas Adamson, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Port of Bellingham, a Washington Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

907 F.3d 1122

Shannon C. ADAMSON and Nicholas Adamson, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.PORT OF BELLINGHAM, a Washington Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

Shannon C. Adamson and Nicholas Adamson, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Port of Bellingham, a Washington Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35314

No. 16-35368

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 11, 2018 Seattle, Washington

Filed August 14, 2018

Michael Barr King (argued), Jason W. Anderson, and Rory D. Cosgrove, Carney Badley Spellman P.S., Seattle, Washington; Frank J. Chmelik and Seth A. Woolson, Chmelik Sitkin & Davis P.S., Bellingham, Washington; for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Philip A. Talmadge (argued), Talmadge/Fitzpatrick/Tribe, Seattle, Washington; James Jacobsen and Joseph Stacey, Stacey & Jacobsen LLP, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges, and John R. Tunheim,^* Chief District Judge.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

A crew member employed by the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) was seriously injured while attempting to operate a permanent passenger ramp extending from the Port of Bellingham’s terminal building to an AMHS ferry. Because the permanent passenger ramp in this case is an extension of the land, and the Admiralty Extension Act (AEA), 46 U.S.C. § 30101, does not apply to an injury caused by land-based equipment, we affirm the district court’s ruling that maritime law does not apply.¹

I

AMHS, an entity of the State of Alaska, currently operates commercial ferries at 36 ports that it owns or leases. In 1988, the Port successfully submitted a proposal to AMHS to construct a marine terminal for AMHS’s use in Bellingham, Washington. The Port designed the Bellingham Cruise Terminal (BCT) to meet AMHS’s requirements. Per AMHS’s specifications, the BCT included a passenger ramp and a vehicle ramp to load and unload ferries.

As part of the BCT’s design, the passenger ramp is an integral part of the structure of the ferry berth facilities. See Appendix, p.2. The passenger ramp is built into the terminal building, with one end extending approximately 75 feet over the dock. See Appendix, p.2. A retractable "apron" connects the end of the ramp to a vessel. See Appendix, p.1. The ramp is controlled by 3/4-inch thick wire cables, which extend from a steel tower on the BCT dock to the far end of the ramp. The ramp is locked in place by pins that slot into two long bars. In order to change the ramp’s position, an operator uses the ramp’s control panel to unlock the pins and then raise and lower the cables. Attempting to lower the ramp when it is in the locked position creates slack in the cables. If the operator creates such slack and then unlocks the pins, the ramp will drop until the cables catch the slack.

The Port leased portions of the BCT facilities to AMHS under a 20-year lease agreement, beginning in 1989 when the BCT was completed. In 2009, the Port and AMHS renewed the lease for another 15 years.

On November 2, 2012, Shannon Adamson was working as a crew member on the AMHS ferry M/V Columbia, which had docked at the BCT that morning. Adamson was asked to lower the passenger ramp to load passengers from the terminal to the ferry. While she was operating the ramp, it fell 15 feet, breaking the cables and collapsing all the way to the pier. Adamson suffered serious injuries from the incident.

Adamson filed this suit against the Port in federal district court under diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the Port negligently caused her injuries under maritime law.² In its answer, the Port asserted as an affirmative defense that negligent supervision and training by AMHS personnel, including the crew of the M/V Columbia, was partly responsible for Adamson’s injuries. The Port then moved for partial summary judgment, arguing in part that maritime law did not apply to Adamson’s claims. The district court agreed, and subsequently denied Adamson’s motion for reconsideration. The case proceeded under Washington state law. After a ten-day trial in March and April 2016, a jury found the Port liable under various Washington law theories of negligence. The district court denied the Port’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.

The Port timely appealed the jury verdict and the district court’s denial of its post-trial motions. Adamson timely cross appealed, arguing that the district court’s ruling that maritime law did not apply was erroneous.

II

Pursuant to Adamson’s cross appeal, we consider here whether the district court correctly applied Washington law rather than maritime law.³ We review de novo a district court’s determination that maritime jurisdiction, and therefore substantive maritime law, does not extend to a tort claim. H20 Houseboat Vacations Inc. v. Hernandez , 103 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1996). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

A

We begin by reviewing the legal framework for determining whether maritime law applies to a tort claim.⁴

Plaintiffs may bring maritime law claims under either diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.⁵

Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law , 404 U.S. 202, 204, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971). Under either jurisdictional statute, "federal maritime law govern[s]" if the claim comes "within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred on the district courts by the Constitution and the jurisdictional statutes." Id. ; see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique , 358 U.S. 625, 628, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). In other words, if the district court could have maritime jurisdiction over a tort claim, "[s]ubstantive maritime law controls" the claim, "whatever the forum or asserted basis of jurisdiction." Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp. , 982 F.2d 363, 366 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992).

Maritime law applies to a tort if two conditions are met. First, the "location" test requires us to determine "whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water." In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC , 570 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. , 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995) ). While this test historically served "as the exclusive test of admiralty tort jurisdiction," the Supreme Court has recognized an additional requirement: a nexus to maritime activity. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland , 409 U.S. 249, 261, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). The nexus requirement avoids sweeping into admiralty jurisdiction wholly unrelated torts, such as airplane crashes over water. Id. at 268, 93 S.Ct. 493. Thus, maritime torts must also satisfy a "connection" test, which requires that the tort have a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC , 570 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson , 457 U.S. 668, 674, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982) ). Here, the Port agrees that Adamson’s tort claim bears the requisite connection to maritime activity, so we focus on the locality where the asserted tort occurred.

B

For purposes of maritime law, "[p]iers and docks [have been] consistently deemed extensions of land; injuries inflicted to or on them were held not compensable under the maritime law." Victory Carriers , 404 U.S. at 206–07, 92 S.Ct. 418 (footnote omitted). Structures such as "bridges, shore docks, protection piling, piers, etc., pertained to the land" because they were "connected with the shore and immediately concerned commerce upon land." Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co. , 208 U.S. 316, 321, 28 S.Ct. 414, 52 L.Ed. 508 (1908). "None of these structures were aids to navigation in the maritime sense, but extensions of the shore and aids to commerce on land as such." Id. ; see also Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 395 U.S. 352, 360, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969) (concluding that admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to accidents on artificial islands because "the accidents had no more connection with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on piers"); Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co. , 119 U.S. 625, 627, 7 S.Ct. 336, 30 L.Ed. 501 (1887) (explaining that a fixed structure, such as a dry-dock, is not used for the purpose of navigation any more so than a wharf or warehouse that projects upon water).

While piers and docks are considered extensions of the land, a gangway or gangplank is part of a vessel; thus, injuries on gangplanks are deemed to have occurred on navigable waters. The Admiral Peoples , 295 U.S. 649, 651–52, 55 S.Ct. 885, 79 L.Ed. 1633 (1935).⁶ In The Admiral Peoples , the steamship owner had placed a 2-foot by 18-foot plank from the vessel to the dock, and a passenger was injured in a fall from the plank. Id. at 650, 55 S.Ct. 885. The Admiral Peoples reasoned that the gangplank at issue "was a part of the vessel’s equipment which was placed in position to enable its passengers to reach the shore," and that "[i]t was no less a part of the vessel because in its extension to the dock it projected over the land." Id. at 651–52, 55 S.Ct. 885. While the plaintiff "was on the gangplank, she had not yet left the vessel," id. at 652, 55 S.Ct. 885, and therefore, the plaintiff’s injury was within maritime jurisdiction, id. ; see also Victory Carriers , 404 U.S. at 207, 92 S.Ct. 418 (noting that while piers and docks are extensions of land, maritime law applied to gangplanks, which "served as a rough dividing line between the state and maritime regimes").

In light of The Admiral Peoples ’s gangplank rule, we have deemed gangplank incidents to be subject to admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law. See The Shangho , 88 F.2d 42, 42 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding that maritime law applied to a longshoreman’s claim that...