Addison v. Addison
| Decision Date | 15 March 1965 |
| Citation | 62 Cal.2d 558,43 Cal.Rptr. 97,399 P. 2d 897 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 399 P.2d 897, 14 A.L.R.3d 391 Leona ADDISON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Morton Cutler ADDISON, Defendant and Appellant. L. A. 27167. |
Mosk & Rudman, Norman G. Rudman and M. B. Frieden, Hollywood, for plaintiff and appellant.
Brock & Shapero, Robert L. Brock and Edwin S. Saul, Hollywood, for defendant and appellant.
Plaintiff Leona Addison (hereafter referred to as Leona) was granted an interlocutory decree of divorce from defendant Morton Addison (hereafter referred to as Morton) on the ground of his adultery. As part of that judgment the trial court held, inter alia, that the only community property was the household furniture and furnishings, 1 and that Morton was to pay the current income tax liabilities for both Leona and himself, holding his wife harmless from such claims. 2 Both parties have appealed, Leona on the question of the extent of the community property, and Morton on his obligation to pay, without recoupment, the current income tax obligations.
At the time of their marriage in Illinois in 1939, Morton, having previously engaged in the used car business, had a net worth which he estimated as being between $15,000 and $20,000. Leona, however, testified that her husband's net worth was almost nothing at the time of their marriage. In 1949 the Addisons moved to California bringing with them cash and other personal property valued at $143,000 which had been accumulated as a result of Morton's various Illinois business enterprises. Since that time Morton has participated in several California businesses.
On February 20, 1961, Leona filed for divorce and requested an equitable division of the marital property. On trial, Leona asserted two theories in support of her claim of property rights. The first was based upon statements Morton allegedly made to her indicating that she had a proprietary interest in property standing in his name alone, i. e., the theory of oral transmutation. In addition, Leona attempted to apply the recently enacted quasi-community property legislation 3 by contending that the property presently held in Morton's name was acquired by the use of property brought from Illinois and that that property would have been community property had it been originally acquired while the parties were domiciled in California.
The trial court found no oral transmutation of Morton's separate property into community property, a finding amply supported by the record, and held the quasi-community property legislation to be unconstitutional. 4
The trial court, as noted above, did find the household furniture and furnishings to be community property and, pursuant to Civil Code section 146, awarded them to Leona. In addition, the court found that the residence of the parties was held in joint tenancy and thus each owned an undivided one-half separate interest therein. Finally, all other property which had been in Morton's name alone was found to be his sole and separate property.
The sociological problem to which the quasi-community property legislation addresses itself has been an area of considerable legislative and judicial activity in this state. One commentator has expressed this thought as follows: (Comment (1935) 8 So.Cal.L.Rev. 221, 222.)
The problem arises as a result of California's attempts to apply community property concepts to the foreign, and radically different (in hypotheses) common-law theory of matrimonial rights. In fitting the common-law system into our community property scheme the process is of two steps. First, property acquired by a spouse while domiciled in a common-law state is characterized as separate property. (Estate of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031, 88 A.L.R. 856.) Second, the rule of tracing is invoked so that all property later acquired in exchange for the common-law separate property is likewise deemed separate property. 5 (Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302.) Thus, the original property, and all property subsequently acquired through use of the original property is classified as the separate property of the acquiring spouse.
One attempt to solve the problem was the 1917 amendment to Civil Code section 164 which had the effect of classifying all personal property wherever situated and all real property located in California into California community property if that property would not have been the separate property of one of the spouses had that property been acquired while the parties were domiciled in California. 6 Insofar as the amendment attempted to affect personal property brought to California which was the separate property of one of the spouses while domiciled outside this state Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal.2d 1, 33 P.2d 1, 92 A.L.R. 1343, held the section was unconstitutional. The amendment's effect upon real property located in California was never tested but generally was considered to be a dead letter as the section was never again invoked on the appellate level. 7
Another major attempt to alter the rights in property acquired prior to California domicile was the passage of Probate Code section 201.5. 8 This section gave to the surviving spouse one half of all the personal property wherever situated and the real property located in California which would not have been the separate property of the acquiring spouse had it been acquired while domiciled in California. As a succession statute, its constitutionality was upheld on the theory that the state of domicile of the decedent at the time of his death has full power to control rights of succession. (In re Miller, 31 Cal.2d 191, 196, 187 P.2d 722.) In other words, no one has a vested right to succeed to another's property rights, and no one has a vested right in the distribution of his estate upon his death. Hence succession rights may be constitutionally altered. This theory was a basis of the dissent in Thornton.
In the present case, it is contended that Estate of Thornton, supra, 1 Cal.2d 1, 33 P.2d 1, is controlling and that the current legislation, by authority of Thornton, must be held to be unconstitutional. Thornton involved a situation of a husband and wife moving to California and bringing with them property acquired during their former domicile in Montana. Upon the husband's death, his widow sought to establish her community property rights in his estate as provided by the then recent amendment to Civil Code section 164. 9 The majority held the section unconstitutional on the theory that upon acquisition of the property the husband obtained vested rights which could not be altered without violation of his privileges and immunities as a citizen and also that (Estate of Thornton, supra, 1 Cal.2d 1, 5, 33 P.2d 1, 3, 92 A.L.R. 1343.)
The underlying rationale of the majority was the same in Thornton as it had been since Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228, 36 L.R.A. 497, which established, by a concession of counsel, that changes in the community property system which affected 'vested interests' could not constitutionally be applied retroactively but must be limited to prospective application.
Langdon, J., in his dissent in Thornton, conceded the correctness of the vested right theory but argued that the statute was merely definitional, giving no rights to anyone except as provided by other legislation. Therefore, the widow would only be acquiring rights pursuant to a right of succession as granted by statute. As to the constitutionality of this application of amended Civil Code section 164 he declared: 'It is a rule of almost universal acceptance that the rights of testamentary disposition and of succession are wholly subject to statutory control, and may be enlarged, limited, or abolished without infringing upon the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.' (Estate of Thornton, supra, 1 Cal.2d 1, 7, 33 P.2d 1, 3.) The majority refused to construe amended Civil Code section 164 in this limited fashion.
The constitutional doctrine announced in Estate of Thornton, supra, has been questioned. Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor in his concurring opinion in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal.2d 613, at p. 623, 145 P.2d 312, at page 318, had the following to say:
The underlying theory of Thornton has also been questioned by several legal authorities in this field. (Armstrong, 'Prospective' Application of Changes in Community Property Control Rule of Property or Constitutional Necessity? (1945) 33 Cal.L.Rev. 476; Schreter, 'Quasi-Community Property' in the Conflict of Laws (1962) 50 Cal.L.Rev. 206; Comment, Community and Separate Property: Constitutionality of Legislation Decreasing Husband's Power of Control Over Property Already Acquired (1938) 27 Cal.L.Rev. 49, 51-55; see also Comment (1927) 15 Cal.L.Rev. 399.)
Thus, the correctness of the rule of Thornton is open to challenge. But...
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