Addison v. Dixie Chevrolet Co.

Decision Date24 May 1965
Docket NumberNo. 18352,18352
Citation246 S.C. 86,142 S.E.2d 442
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesDavid ADDISON, Respondent, v. DIXIE CHEVROLET COMPANY and Royal Indemnity Company, Appellants.

Willcox, Hardee, Houck, Palmer & O'Farrell, Florence, for appellants.

Yarborough & Nettles, Florence, for respondent.

LIONEL K. LEGGE, Acting Justice.

On June 8, 1960, respondent was seriously burned by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment in an automobile body shop on the premises of Dixie Chevrolet Company in the City of Florence, South Carolina. His claim for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act was allowed by the Hearing Commissioner, whose award was affirmed by a majority of the Full Commission. This appeal is from a circuit court order affirming the Commission's award.

Appellants state the questions involved as follows:

'1. Did the Industrial Commission make proper findings of fact?

2. Did the lower court give proper consideration to the record in determining that the South Carolina Industrial Commission had jurisdiction of this claim?

3. Was the respondent an employee of appellant Dixie Chevrolet Company?'

In 1951 Mr. O. D. Smith and others formed a corporation under the name of Dixie Chevrolet, Incorporated, which purchased the Chevrolet dealership in Florence and thereafter operated it until September 1, 1959, when Mr. Smith bought out the stock of his associates and formed a new corporation under the name of Dixie Chevrolet Company, of which he was, and is, the President and principal stockholder. As an integral part of its business, in connection with its sales and mechanical departments, Dixie Chevrolet, Incorporated, operated on the same premises a body shop, its foreman being Mr. Frank Burn. Shortly after the transfer of ownership from Dixie Chevrolet, Incorporated, to Dixie Chevrolet Company, Mr. Smith decided to close out the operation of the body shop, which had been unprofitable; and for a period of less than thirty days body work was discontinued, the shop continuing in use for other purposes, such as greasing and cleaning cars. During that period Burn worked in the parts department. On October 1, 1959, Dixie Chevrolet Company and Burn entered into an oral agreement whereby it was agreed that Burn would take over the body shop and operate it himself, paying to Dixie Chevrolet Company a monthly rental of two hundred dollars for the use of the portion of the premises occupied by the body shop, including the equipment, other than a wash rack, a grease rack and a clean-up stall, which Dixie Chevrolet Company reserved for its own use. It was agreed between them that Burn would do all new car warranty work at 'flat rate labor'; that all parts used on the warranty jobs would be 'at net or furnished by Dixie Chevrolet Company'; and that on all work on used cars owned by Dixie Chevrolet Company Burn would allow a discount of twenty-five per cent on parts and fifteen per cent on labor, unless otherwise agreed upon on any particular job.

Dixie Chevrolet Company employed more than fifteen persons; its workmen's compensation carrier was Royal Indemnity Company. Burn, operating the body shop under the name of Dixie Body Shop, employed fewer than fifteen persons, and was not so covered.

Respondent, a young and practically illiterate Negro, was employed by Burn in June, 1956, as a helper in the body shop of Dixie Chevrolet, Incorporated. During the brief interval in September, 1959, when actual body work was discontinued, respondent was not discharged or laid off, but continued to work in the body shop, and he continued to do so after Burn took over its operation. During the whole period of his employment, from June, 1956, to the time of his injury in June, 1960, he did substantially the same work, in the same place, and under the same 'boss', Mr. Burn, who had hired him in the first place and who regularly handed him his pay check throughout the entire period of his employment. His testimony that he could write a little but could not read is corroborated by that of Dr. J. G. Sylvester, who attended him during his hospitalization of more than eight months.

Appellants' contention of non-employment rests upon the corporate transactions before...

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4 cases
  • Holliday v. Personal Products Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 9 d1 Setembro d1 1996
    ...called upon to respond in damages" for the alleged tort of another such division. Taylor, 374 A.2d at 1224. Addison v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 246 S.C. 86, 142 S.E.2d 442 (S.C.1965) and Holloway v. G.O. Cooley & Sons, 208 S.C. 234, 37 S.E.2d 666 (1946), are unpersuasive because they did not ad......
  • Kissiah v. Respiratory Prods.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 5 d4 Junho d4 2008
    ...issue was not jurisdictional; its determination by the Commission, being adequately supported by the evidence, was conclusive. Id. at 91-92, 142 S.E.2d at 444. We find under Dixie, the present case does not involve a jurisdictional issue. Accordingly, this court can reverse or modify the Co......
  • Chavis v. Watkins
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 13 d2 Abril d2 1971
    ...with Watkins, his rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act against his regular employer were unabridged. Addison v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 246 S.C. 86, 142 S.E.2d 442 (1965). "Employment, like any other contract, presupposes understanding. The new relation cannot be thrust upon the servant......
  • Wilson v. Georgetown County
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 5 d3 Janeiro d3 1994
    ...upon which jurisdiction is dependent. McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 280 S.C. 466, 313 S.E.2d 38 (1984); Addison v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 246 S.C. 86, 142 S.E.2d 442 (1965). Therefore, the circuit court applied the proper standard of Next, the County asserts that there was no subject ......

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