Addison v. New England Commercial Travelers' Ass'n
| Decision Date | 29 June 1887 |
| Citation | 144 Mass. 591,12 N.E. 407 |
| Parties | ADDISON v. NEW ENGLAND COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS' ASS'N. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
J.B. Richardson, for Margaret Addison.
The objects of this association are set out in its charter, and in chapter 204, Acts 1877, (Pub.St. c. 115, § 8.) Chapter 195, Acts 1882, cannot affect the contract made in 1878. American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580 592, 5 N.E. 634. The contract made by James Addison with the association was for the benefit only of his "widow orphans, and other dependents of" his. It was not within the scheme of the association to make provision for the benefit of estates, or of heirs, which is the same thing. Elsey v. Odd Fellows' Mut. Relief Ass'n, 142 Mass. 224, 7 N.E. 844; Briggs v. Earl, 139 Mass 473, 1 N.E. 847. "My heirs," therefore, was not a legal or proper designation of a beneficiary. It is not a designation at all of a "person or persons," as required by the constitution and by-laws. Elsey v. Odd Fellows' Mut. Relief Ass'n, supra. Or if, under any circumstances, it could be held to be a designation, (if there was no other,) it is certainly not to control or vary the definite designation of "wife or daughters," made in the application. In his answers to the questions on the application, Mr. Addison's attention was probably not called at first to the duty of particularly designating the person or persons to whom he wished the loss paid. He was not, in the first question, asked to do that; but, when his attention was called to the duty of particularly designating them, he says, "Wife or daughters." But if you read it with the words "to my heirs," reading them all together, it is merely as if he had said, "I will have it paid to my heirs; that is, I mean by that, my wife or daughters." The words on the certificate and stub were not the acts of the deceased. Certainly the wife is not excluded. Sweet v. Dutton, 109 Mass. 589; Lavery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 389, 9 N.E. 747.
The question of "dependency" is an important one decisive, we think, in favor of Mrs. Addison. She was at all times dependent upon the deceased. Mrs. Pratt was not dependent upon him at the time when the question of dependency is to be inquired into, viz., the time of his death, or when the money is payable. Briggs v. Earl, 139 Mass. 473, 1 N.E. 847. It is clear that the questions of orphanage and of minority of children are referable to the time of the death of a member, not to the time of his becoming a member of the association. See Briggs v. Earl, supra. The place of Mr. Addison was to support his wife, and, after the death of one daughter, and the marriage of the other, there was no other person whom it was his place to support. Is it not to be presumed that Mr. Addison intended that this fund should go to the support of her whom it was his legal and social duty to provide for? And she is the only person now left whom it can be claimed was a beneficiary. Ballou v. Gile, 50 Wis. 614, 7 N.W. 561. There is no authority for reading "and" for "or" in this designation; the context does not require it. The word "heirs" (even if it can be brought in to aid Mr. McDonald's claim) does not require the money to be given to two or more persons, as the learned court thought. "Wife or daughters" does not mean both. On this point it is like Whitcher v. Penley, 9 Beav. 477; Crooke v. De Vandes, 9 Ves. 197; Turner v. Moor, 6 Ves. 557; Montagu v. Nucella, 1 Russ. 165. It is hardly conceivable that Mr. Addison meant that this money, or any part of it, should go in the way it will, if given to Mr. McDonald. We submit that such disposition of it would defeat the benevolent and charitable objects of the association, and the intention of the parties to the contract. Upon all considerations, the objects of the association, the actual designation by the deceased, his declared intention, the presumption of his intention from his duty to her, and her circumstances, and upon all the considerations of dependency, and the death of both the daughters, this money should now be paid to Mrs. Addison. If not in her own right, then to her as administratrix.
Geo. Fred. Williams, for James McDonald, administrator of Mary E. Pratt.
The designation. The constitution of the association, art. 1, § 2, provides that the directors shall pay the death loss "to the person or persons previously designated by the deceased upon his application for membership, upon the books of the association, and upon his certificate of membership." The reference in art. 10, § 1, to the payment of the death loss to "such person or persons as the deceased may have designated to receive the same," must refer to the constitutional designation, which appears not only in the application, but also upon the books of the association, and upon his certificate of membership. The only designation, therefore, is of "my heir;" for nothing else appears in the books or the certificate, nor should the answer of the applicant to the second question stated in the report modify this designation. It is manifest that the first question contemplated the naming of a person by name, and the second was intended merely to satisfy the association that the person or persons named were within the classes who might properly be designated. The answer to the second question was not intended, therefore, to have any effect as a designation, and the fact that the "wife or daughters" were not named in the record or certificate shows that such description was not intended as a designation. The construction of the designation "my heirs" should not, therefore, be affected by the subsequent answer; the construction must be of the contract into which the association entered, which was to pay to "my heirs." Elsey v. Odd Fellows' Mut. Relief Ass'n, 142 Mass. 224, 7 N.E. 844; Barton v. Provident Mut. Relief Ass'n, 63 N.H. 535, 537, 3 Atl.Rep. 627; Com. v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, 102 Ind. 262, 1 N.E. 571.
It is evident that the applicant intended his death loss to be paid to the persons upon whom the law would cast his estate. It was as to this fund a declaration of intestacy. The word "or" was not unnatural, and its use only shows that he intended not to qualify the legal meaning of the word "heirs." The word "heirs" signifies to laymen those who take an estate by inheritance; yet few assume to define who they are. When this applicant attempted to define the persons, he meant to say either "wife and daughters, whichever the law makes my heirs," or "wife and daughters, if they be all alive at my death." It would be manifestly absurd to use the word "or" to exclude as heirs the daughters who were the only persons who were "heirs" beyond peradventure. The word "or" is often construed to mean "and," in order to carry the intention into effect. Fairfield v. Morgan, 2 Bos. & P. 38; Right v. Day, 16 East, 67; Arnold v. Buffum, 2 Mason, 208; Ray v. Enslin, 2...
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