Addison v. Salyer

• Decision Date: 25 November 1946
• Docket Number: No. 3087.,3087.
• Parties: ADDISON et al. v. SALYER.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

40 S.E.2d. 260

185 Va. 644

ADDISON et al.

v.SALYER.

No. 3087.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 25, 1946.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Russell County; Ezra T. Carter, Judge.

Petition before trial justice by J. O. Sal-yer against Marjorie D. Addison and another wherein an attachment was asked and a judgment was subsequently entered for plaintiff in the sum of $240 and it was ordered that the property seized under the attachment be sold to satisfy it. An appeal was allowed and the defendants filed an appeal bond with Joel Campbell as surety and on trial of the appeal of the attachment a juror was withdrawn and the others discharged and the case was ordered to be transferred to the equity side of the court where the plaintiff procured leave to file a bill in chancery as an amendment to or substitute for the petition for attachment previously issued by the trial justice in which reformation of deed was asked and that complainant recover $240.50 against defendants and surety, and the defendants filed an answer and a cross bill. From a decree for plaintiff against the defendants and their surety in the sum of $240.50 after reforming the deed, the defendants appeal.

Decree reversed and proceedings dismissed.

Before HOLT, C. J., and HUDGINS, GREGORY, EGGLESTON, SPRAT-LEY, and BUCHANAN, JJ.

A. T. Griffith, of Lebanon, for appellants.

No appearance for appellee.

HUDGINS, Justice.

On April 17, 1940, J. O. Salyer filed a petition for an attachment before the trial justice of Russell county, in which it was alleged that Marjorie D. Addison and Stanley Addison, the principal defendants, were indebted to him in the sum of $300; that they were removing, or about to remove, out of the State with intent to change their domicile; and that they were assigning and disposing of their estate, or the greater part thereof, with intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors. Attachments were issued, served upon the defendants and levied on a truck and a stock of merchandise owned by defendants. On April 30, 1940, the trial justice entered a judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $240 and ordered the property seized under the attachment to be sold to satisfy the same. On the same day an appeal was allowed, with Joel Campbell as surety on defendants' appeal bond.

On September 3, 1940, the two defendants named in the attachment presented a petition before the circuit court for a writ of prohibition against the trial justice, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to try the claim asserted against them because it involved title to real estate. No decision was rendered on this petition.

On December 10, 1940, a jury was sworn to try the appeal of the attachment. After plaintiff had introduced a part of his evidence, he moved to declare a mistrial and to transfer the case to the equity side. Over the objection of defendants, this motion was sustained, one juror was withdrawn, the others were discharged, and the case was order to be transferred to the equity side of the court.

Pursuant to this order, plaintiff filed a bill in chancery as an amendment to, or substitute for, the petition for the attachment previously filed before the trial justice, in which bill it was alleged (1) that plaintiff had purchased from defendants 16.1 acres of land for the purchase price of $65 per acre; (2) that the description in the deed was not accurate and did not describe the land actually purchased; and (3) that a correct survey of the tract involved showed that it contained only 12.4 acres, a shortage of 3.7 acres, for which plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum of $240.50. The bill recited the institution of the attachment proceedings before the trial justice, the levy of the attachment on defendants' property, the judgment of the trial justice for plaintiff in the attachment proceedings, the appeal from this judgment by defendants, the execution of a forthcoming bond in the sum of $600 with Joel Campbell as surety, the surrender of the attached property to defendants, and the order of the circuit court transferring the case to the equity side.

The prayer of the bill was "that said defendants (including Joel Campbell) may be required to answer this bill, they now being before said court;" that the deed be reformed and a correct description inserted; and that plaintiff recover of defendants, including Joel Campbell, the sum of $240.50, with the costs of the attachment proceedings.

To this bill defendants filed a demurrer, challenging its sufficiency on various grounds, and, without waiving their demurrer, filed an answer and cross-bill. The final decree, entered on August 9, 1945, declared that plaintiff in the attachment proceedings was entitled to have his deed reformed in accordance with his prayer. In addition, judgment was entered for him against the defendants, including Joel Campbell, in the sum of $240.50, with interest from the date of the deed and all costs. From this decree this appeal was allowed.

Defendants, in their various assignments of error, challenge the jurisdiction of the trial justice to hear and determine the matter in the first instance.

The trial justice courts are the successors to the justice of the peace courts which were abolished in 1930. The language of the statutes conferring jurisdiction on the trial justices is substantially the same as the language of the statutes that fixed and determined the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, except that the maximum amount recoverable in certain classes of actions has been increased. Code 1942 (Michie), sees. 4987fl (c) and 6015.

This court has held repeatedly that a justice of the peace has limited jurisdiction, and that, since he derives all his jurisdictional authority from the statute, he "can only exercise such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on him." See Wall v. American Bank & Trust Co, 159 Va. 871, 167 S.E. 425, 426, and cases cited. The statement is equally applicable to a trial justice.

Since 1808 this court has consistently held that a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction in cases involving title to real property. See Miller v. Marshall, 1 Va. Cas. 158, 3 Va. 158; Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Grat. 528, 56 Va. 528, 542; Martin v. Richmond, 108 Va. 765, 62 S.E. 800; 31 Am.Jur. 725, 726; Annotation 115 A.L.R. 504.

The question raised in Richmond v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688, 77 S.E. 470, was whether or not a police justice of the city of Richmond had jurisdiction to try a person charged with encroachment upon the street in violation of a city ordinance where such person claimed title to the land involved. The trial court followed the decision in Martin v. Richmond, supra, and decided that the police justice had no jurisdiction. On appeal it was held that the 1910 amendment, Acts 1910, p. 424, to section 4106 of the Code of 1887 expressly granted to police justices and justices of the peace authority to try such offenses, but the principle applicable to courts of limited jurisdiction was reiterated; namely, that such courts "can only exercise such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred." [114 Va. 688, 77 S.E. 473.]

When it appeared from the evidence before the trial justice that the plaintiff in the attachment based his claim upon the loss of acreage in, and an inaccurate description of, the tract of land described in his deed, it became the duty of the trial justice to dismiss the case from its docket.

On appeal the defendants raised the question before and after the jury were sworn. When the want of jurisdiction of the trial justice appeared to the circuit court, it should have sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss, as "the action of the justice of the peace in issuing the warrant was null and void, and could not confer jurisdiction upon any court to try the case." (Italics supplied.) Wall v. American Bank & Trust Co., supra. "Any act of a tribunal beyond its jurisdiction is null and void, and of no effect whatever, whether without its territorial jurisdiction or beyond its powers." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pettyjohn, 88 Va. 296, 298, 13 S.E. 431, 432.

An appeal in a civil case from a judgment of a trial justice, as an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case, is tried de novo before the circuit or...