Addison v. State

Decision Date22 February 2012
Docket NumberNo. 49S05–1105–CR–267.,49S05–1105–CR–267.
PartiesJoey ADDISON, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Ruth Ann Johnson, Ellen M. O'Connor, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05–1006–CR–354

RUCKER, Justice.

We grant transfer in this case to explore whether and to what extent a defendant's race-based Batson claim may be reviewed on appeal where at trial the defendant failed to rebut the State's proffered race-neutral reason for striking a black venireperson.

Facts and Procedural History

On the evening of December 19, 2008, in response to a noise he heard in front of his house, forty-year-old Joey Addison walked outside, found Gerrod Scott Scales walking near two parked cars in front of Addison's home, shot Scales fourteen times with two handguns, stated “Now what you motherf* * *ers think about that?,” and turned and calmly walked back into his home—all while dressed in a tuxedo. Once inside, Addison sat down on the bed, placed the handguns beside him, and calmly came to the door minutes later when police arrived. Addison appeared “pretty spacey” to police after the shootings and told the interviewing detective he was “bullet proof.” Tr. at 471. In subsequent interviews with court-appointed psychiatrists, Addison declared that the FBI had reprogrammed his brain and that he had been sending text messages to the FBI to inform them of his movements.

Until shortly before the shooting, Addison's neighbors knew him as a kind and outgoing person. He frequently socialized with his neighbors. He worked as a part-time security guard at a gas station and employed himself and neighborhood youth by doing construction, painting, mowing, and similar jobs. Addison graduated from high school, had earned 106 hours of college credit, and had no prior criminal record. Addison was a large man and kept his long hair braided, but those who knew him noticed a dramatic change in his appearance and behavior beginning in early to mid 2008. Over a period of several months, Addison lost approximately 120 pounds, shaved his head bald, stopped working, stopped eating, and stopped socializing with his friends and neighbors. He believed that the renters in the home across the street from him were keeping him under surveillance and that there were surveillance cameras in the street lamps outside his home. Addison believed there had been 75 attempts on his life between July and December of 2008, that he was hooked up to a lie detector machine, and that the FBI was sending him messages and instructions through daily events.

On December 22, 2008, the State charged Addison with Count I murder, and Count II carrying a handgun without a license. The State subsequently dismissed Count II after proof of Addison's valid handgun permit. On January 27, 2009, Addison filed a notice of insanity defense and the trial court appointed two psychiatrists to evaluate him. After delays largely attributable to a finding that Addison lacked present comprehension to assist counsel in his defense, jury selection for Addison's trial began on April 19, 2010. The venirepersons were questioned in groups of fourteen, and the parties made their strikes after each group had been questioned. Because “the issue of insanity might develop a lot of side issues,” the trial judge allowed both sides flexibility concerning the normal time limit of thirty minutes per side for questioning of prospective jurors. Tr. at 9.

After both the prosecution and the defense had questioned the first panel of fourteen venirepersons, the parties approached the bench with their challenges to this group. On its own motion, the trial court excused one venireperson for cause. The State exercised its peremptory challenges to remove five venirepersons, three of which were against the only three African Americans on the panel—venirepersons Pettigrew, Henderson, and Turner. See Tr. at 89. Addison, an African American, lodged a Batson objection, noting that the State “just now struck all three blacks that were on the panel.” Tr. at 88. The trial court temporarily excused the jurors to hear the parties' arguments. The State agreed “that there is a prima facie case of a pattern on the State's part and so the State is required to articulate a non-race specific reason” for the strikes. Tr. at 90. The State articulated reasons for the strikes, and Addison conceded that two of the strikes were permissible but argued the third was not. Tr. at 91. (“Judge, I'll give them the first two, Ms. Pettigrew and Mr. Henderson,1 but there [is] absolutely no reason to cut Mr. Turner.”). In explaining its reason for striking venireperson Turner, the State declared,

And as for Mr. Turner, he indicated, when asked what he would like on making a determination (indiscernible) [on the insanity defense,] was he going to go by what the professionals say[?] And he—when asked what else would contribute to making his decision, he had trouble articulating anything other than, well, I'll just go by whatever the professionals say, which obviously in this case, would present a problem for the State.Tr. at 91. Addison responded:

There is—all of his other responses—it seemed to me that once they get—the State often does, once they get a question they don't like from a black juror, they fail to follow-up on that. I don't think there was any clear follow-up on that. When I asked the questions [on the insanity defense] of the—generally of the jurors to consider other factors, they seemed all in agreement. So I'll give him the first two, but I think they don't ... state any race neutral reason on Mr. Turner.

Tr. at 92. When pressed by the trial court as to why its reason was race-neutral, the State replied,

Because of what he said and the reason we removed him had absolutely nothing to do with his race. It had to do with the fact that when he's—when the question was put to him about how he's going to make a determination about—at the time we were talking about insanity, that generally we were talking about someone's ability to determine the wrongfulness of their actions. All he did was to articulate is, “Well, I'd just go with the doctors. I'd just go with the doctors.” And could not add any more to his analysis or what he'd look at than that, which leaves the State extreme—extremely [sic] misgivings about somebody who has that much deference to the doctors, where as some other jurors articulated, you know, that's—it's just a piece—things to look at and went to other things right off the bat.

Tr. at 93. The trial court then declared, “Well, I do think the State's articulated race neutral reasons for striking all three jurors, so I'm going to deny the Batson motion.” Tr. at 93–94.

The court then seated the remaining eight members of the panel as jurors. Voir dire of the second panel of fourteen venirepersons followed, and two of these were stricken for cause. The parties then exercised eight peremptory strikes, one of which was a prosecution strike against the only African American on the second panel, venireperson Swanigan. Addison lodged a Batson objection and the court again heard arguments outside the presence of the jury. The State explained that it had misgivings about venireperson Swanigan because he had previously served as a juror in a homicide/feticide trial that resulted in a not guilty verdict. See Tr. at 137 (“I'm suspicious of any juror who[ ] acquitted in a jury trial....”). Addison essentially replied that the reason was not race-neutral. See Tr. at 138–39 (“Judge, that is not a sufficient enough reason to strike this juror in the face of—the fact that three other jurors have now been stricken that are black.”). After the arguments concluded, the trial court overruled Addison's objection to the strike of venireperson Swanigan. The trial court seated the remaining four panel members as jurors. A final group of seven venirepersons was then questioned, and the trial court seated two alternate jurors from that group, completing the jury selection process.

A two-day jury trial ensued. The evidence included testimony of the two psychiatrists appointed by the trial court to examine Addison. Both concluded that at the time of the offense, Addison suffered a mental disease that rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. In essence they concluded Addison was insane. However the jury rejected his insanity defense and found Addison guilty but mentally ill. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence for murder: forty-five years in the Department of Corrections. Addison appealed raising two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge; and (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the deposition of a defense witness. The Court of Appeals rejected the Batson claim but agreed the trial court erred in excluding the deposition from evidence. However, finding this error harmless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an unpublished memorandum decision. See Addison v. State, 49A05–1006–CR–354, 2011 WL 535543 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 16, 2011). Having previously granted transfer thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we now reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to Addison's Batson claim. We summarily affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion concerning Addison's remaining claim. Additional facts are set forth below as necessary.

Discussion
A. The Batson Framework

“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is...

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