Blackmon v. State

• Decision Date: 15 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 48A02–1505–CR–270.,48A02–1505–CR–270.
• Parties: Billy Deon BLACKMON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

47 N.E.3d 1225

Billy Deon BLACKMON, Appellant–Defendant

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 48A02–1505–CR–270.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 15, 2015.

David W. Stone IV, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Brian Reitz, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

CRONE

, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Billy Deon Blackmon appeals his conviction for class D felony resisting law enforcement following a jury trial. He argues that the trial court clearly erred in rejecting his claim that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror based on the juror's race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The prosecutor gave two reasons for his peremptory strike, one of which was demeanor-based. The trial court allowed the peremptory strike without explicitly stating which of the prosecutor's reasons it found to be credible and not racially motivated. On appeal, Blackmon argues that because one of the reasons was demeanor-based and the trial court failed to find that it was credible, we have no basis from which to defer to the trial court on this reason. He also argues that the second reason was a pretext for racial discrimination. Therefore, he argues that his conviction must be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial.

[2] Given the circumstances present here, we reject Blackmon's contention that the trial court was required to explicitly credit the prosecutor's demeanor-based reason. We conclude that the prosecutor's second reason is suspicious and raises an inference of discriminatory motive. However, we conclude that reversal of Blackmon's conviction is not required because it is clear that the prosecutor would have struck the juror based on the demeanor-based reason alone.

[3] Blackmon also asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient, and therefore we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In September 2013, Anderson Police Officer Michael Lee was assigned to serve a writ of body attachment on Blackmon. Around 12:48 a.m., Officer Lee, accompanied by deputy prosecutor Dan Kopp, drove to a parking lot near Blackmon's suspected location. Anderson Police Officers Chris Barnett and Mike Williams arrived to assist Officer Lee. The house where Blackmon was suspected to be was located on a dead-end street. The officers believed that a police car would not be able to approach the house without being seen, so Kopp, who was in plain clothes, walked to the house to see if Blackmon's white Chevrolet Trailblazer was parked there. Kopp told the officers that the lights were on in the house but he did not see the Trailblazer.

[5] The officers decided to proceed to the house on foot. Officers Barnett and Williams walked to the front of the house while Officer Lee and Kopp walked to the back of the residence. Officers Barnett and Williams knocked on the front door. A female answered and told them that Blackmon was not there, which they related to Officer Lee who was still behind the house.

[6] Officer Lee heard a vehicle in the alley behind the house. The vehicle, a white Trailblazer, was moving toward the house at “a little higher speed than normal for somebody driving down an alley.” Tr. at 141. The Trailblazer turned quickly into an area behind the house that looked like it was frequently used as a parking spot. Officer Lee was standing “right in front of” that parking spot. Id. at 140. The Trailblazer stopped with its headlights “right on” Officer Lee, who was in full police uniform. Id. at 141. Officer Lee stepped aside to get “out of direct line with the vehicle and drew [his] handgun.” Id. He backed up four or five steps and shined the light attached to his pistol into the driver's door window, which was rolled down. Officer Lee, who was about ten feet from the car, made “direct eye contact” with Blackmon. Id. at 142. Officer Lee recognized Blackmon from photographs he had looked at earlier that evening.

[7] Blackmon put the car in reverse and started to back out of the parking spot. Officer Lee shouted, “Stop! Police!” Id. He took a few steps toward the car as it was backing up, called Blackmon by name, and again told him to stop. Id. Blackmon drove down the alley and turned onto the street.

[8] Officer Lee saw the direction Blackmon was driving, radioed other officers in the area, and gave them a description of the vehicle. A few minutes later, police spotted the Trailblazer eight or nine blocks away parked in the yard of an abandoned house. The keys were still in the ignition. No one was in the abandoned house. Officer Lee discovered that the Trailblazer was registered to Blackmon's mother.

[9] The State charged Blackmon with class D felony resisting law enforcement. A jury convicted him as charged. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1—The trial court did not err in denying Blackmon's Batson claim.

[10] In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)

, the United States Supreme Court held, “Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” A defendant's claim that the State has used a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race is commonly known as a Batson claim. Equal protection rights under Batson have been substantially expanded. See Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind.2008)

(observing that Batson has been extended to prohibit criminal defendants from using peremptory challenges to strike a juror solely on the basis of race) (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ), cert. denied;

Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind.2012) (“The exclusion of even a sole prospective juror based on race, ethnicity, or gender violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.”) (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) ); Ashabraner v. Bowers, 753 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ind.2001) (observing that Batson applies to civil cases) (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) ). Under Batson, a race-based peremptory challenge also violates the equal protection rights of the juror, and therefore Batson prohibits parties from using racially-based peremptory challenges regardless of the race of the opposing party. Ashabraner, 753 N.E.2d at 666–67.

[11] Here, during jury selection, the State used its peremptory challenges in the first round to strike three potential jurors, including one of only two African–Americans in the fourteen-person venire.¹ Blackmon raised a Batson claim, and the parties engaged in the following discussion.

Defense counsel: [I]t is a Batson record that I would like to make. [W]e had in the jury box for selection, two (2) African[–]Americans. We had [Juror 3] and [Juror 14]. [Juror 14] has been selected as a juror. [Juror 3] was excused by exercise of a [peremptory] challenge by the State and, again, just requesting that the record be made on that and inquiring as to the rationale beyond her dismissal.

Court: [Defense counsel] indicated that in the original fourteen (14) jurors that we had up in the jury box for possible selection on the first round, we did have two (2) African[–]Americans and that was [Juror 3], and then [Juror 14]. As [defense counsel] indicated, [Juror 14] has now been seated as a juror in this case and [Juror 3] was struck by the exercise of a [peremptory] challenge by the State. Does the State wish to offer an explanation as to the reason for the [peremptory] on [Juror 3]?

Prosecutor: The State did not exercise a [peremptory] due to race or gender. The State exercised a [peremptory] because I did not see [Juror 3] actively engaged in the dialogue both when [defense counsel] and myself were asking questions to the entire group. Some people were nodding or shaking their heads. People were raising their hands. The only time she answered questions when was [sic] she was asked them directly. She just wasn't very engaged. I didn't really want to put her on the jury to begin with. Then after getting back to the table and confirming Officer Lee, he indicated that he believed [Juror 3] might know Linda Mitchell as well, who's a witness. And, and that was I guess the final straw and decided to exercise a [peremptory].

Defense counsel: And, and just for purposes of the record, I would note that [Juror 9 and Juror 12] I believe it was likewise, were not very responsive or engaged, it seemed, equally with [Juror 3]. And also would note that [Juror 3] did not identify or react to Linda Mitchell's name at any time. [W]hen her name was mentioned in sort of the mini opening that we gave as introduction.

Prosecutor: Well, I'm not sure I'd agree with the characterization of the other jurors....

Court: .... And make sure, maybe, we make clear, then, for the record itself in the context of this challenge that Mr. Blackmon is an African[–]American gentlemen as well that is in the courtroom.^{[ 2 ]} .... The Court is not persuaded that the Defendant has established that there has been a purposeful discrimination in this—in exercising [the prosecutor's] [peremptory] challenge.

Tr. at 108–10 (verbal pauses removed for clarity).

[12] Blackmon argues that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge and that reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial is the proper remedy. “Upon appellate review, a trial court's decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory is given great deference, and will be set aside only if found to be clearly erroneous.” Forrest v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Ind.2001)

. When a party raises a race-based Batson claim, three steps are...