Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles
| Decision Date | 31 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 52748-2,52748-2 |
| Citation | 107 Wn.2d 503,730 P.2d 1327 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Lincoln Lane ADDLEMAN, Jr., William Gene Scribner, Sr., Joseph Charles Huston, Albert Charles Brown, Jerry William Crane, Michael Leroy Carson, Richard Albert Fitzgerald, Harrold A. Self, Berry Wayne Gross, Thomas Keys, Mark Brian Aycock, James Edward Dunmore, Melvin Harris Briggs, Timothy Sullivan, Monty Edward Triplett, Manuel David Rosalez, David Martin Rhoad, Gallan R. Fridell, Buddy Lee Baker, Charles David Marsteller, Wade E. Kirk, Francis Louie, Jr., Donald D. Rickard, Fred L. Casillas, Mitchell Wayne Frank, Nathaniel Lacy, Willis Stanmore, Kenneth Bernhardt, Sidney B. Sparks, Donald R. Plunkett, Jr., Jon W. Martin, Ross De Spenza, Herman D. Hartzog, James Arthur Huston, Clifton Cook, Clifton James Briceno, Ronald Melvin Fraser, Andrew William Gardee, Robert W. Sheaffer, Gerald Allen Dauenhauer, William Alan Regan, John Charles Kurth, Jack McNutt, Appellants, v. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS AND PAROLES, Walt Hubbard, Thomas Manning, William E. Henry, Roxanne Park, Former Governor John Spellman, and Their Agents, Employees, Attorneys, and Their Successors, et al., Respondents. |
Lincoln Lane Addleman, Jr., Walla Walla, pro se.
John Ziegler, Waitsburg, John Midgley, Wolfe, Lobsenz & Cullen, James Lobsenz, Seattle, for appellants.
Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Kathleen D. Spong, Paul Silver, Aaron K. Owada, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Deborah J. Phillips, Robert Lasnik, Deputy Co. Prosecutors, Seattle, Michael Redman, Washington Assn. of Prosecuting Attys., Olympia, amici curiae for respondents Washington Ass'n of Prosecuting Attorneys.
We accepted certified review of consolidated habeas corpus petitions alleging the original RCW 9.95.009 has (1) an ex post facto infirmity due to its abolition of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles in 1988 and (2) statutory construction problems and equal protection problems resulting from interpretations in two Court of Appeals opinions. Recently enacted legislation corrects the ex post facto concern and clarifies the statute's intent remedying the equal protection concerns.
On August 2, 1984, appellant Lincoln Lane Addleman filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in Walla Walla County Superior Court. Subsequently, numerous other Washington State Penitentiary inmates filed nearly identical complaints prepared by Addleman. All complaints appear to have been treated as habeas corpus petitions.
Substantively, appellants seek application of the standard sentence ranges in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) to their crimes which were committed prior to the SRA's effective date of June 30, 1984. Appellants also allege ex post facto infirmities by the abolition of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles in 1988.
Factually, the complaints alleged each inmate (1) had been convicted of one or more felonies before July, 1984; (2) had received before July 1984 a minimum term from the Board greater than predicted would be imposed under the SRA; and (3) was entitled to have the Board reset the term of confinement pursuant to the SRA which the Board refused to do.
The Board filed a response to Addleman's complaint. On January 25, 1985 the Walla Walla County Superior Court denied the consolidated petitions relying on In re Blair, 38 Wash.App. 670, 688 P.2d 532 (1984) and In re Townsend, 38 Wash.App. 727, 688 P.2d 547 (1984).
Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, Division Three, which certified the case to this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.030. By commissioner ruling, certification was accepted on May 28, 1986.
Appellants make a three-pronged challenge to RCW 9.95.009. RCW 9.95.009 is section 24 of the SRA and addresses the continued existence and duties of the Board under the SRA. One challenge is directed at RCW 9.95.009(1), and alleges an ex post facto infirmity by the abolition of the Board in 1988. Two challenges are directed at RCW 9.95.009(2): a statutory construction argument and an equal protection argument. In the 1986 Session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed (with one minor veto not relevant here) Substitute House Bill 1400 (Laws of 1986, ch. 224, p. 726) which substantially amends RCW 9.95.009. The analysis of each issue will begin with an explanation of the pertinent subsection of RCW 9.95.009 as originally enacted, followed by a discussion of the appellants' challenge, and conclude by addressing the effect of the new legislation on the challenge.
The first issue is whether RCW 9.95.009(1) violates ex post facto prohibitions by its abolition of the Board in July 1988. RCW 9.95.009(1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) On July 1, 1988, the board of prison terms and paroles shall cease to exist. Prior to that time, the board's membership shall be reduced ...
Appellants argue correctly that abolition of the Board in 1988 would violate ex post facto prohibitions because of the Board's duties toward those sentenced before 1984 who will still be incarcerated after July 1988. Under the 1935 parole board act, the Board is authorized among other things to waive certain mandatory minimum terms by a two-thirds vote, RCW 9.95.040, to recompute minimum terms at any time, RCW 9.95.052, and to grant "good time" credits, RCW 9.95.070 and .110. Removing the body that implements these mechanisms which shorten time in prison violates constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws.
For a law to be ex post facto, two critical elements must be presented: "it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it." (Footnotes omitted.) Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). In Weaver, eligibility for good time credits of 5, 10, and 15 days depending on length of stay were statutorily reduced to 3, 6, or 9 days and applied to persons convicted before the amendment. The court found ex post facto prohibitions violated because the good time credit was a determinant of the prison sentence which was altered by the amendment to the prisoner's disadvantage. Because "the new provision constricts the inmate's opportunity to earn early release, and thereby makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment", it "runs afoul of the prohibition against ex post facto laws." Weaver, at 35-36, 101 S.Ct. at 968.
The same can be said here. In essence, without the Board to perform its above enumerated functions, the punishment is changed, and a greater punishment than annexed to the crime when committed is inflicted. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).
New legislation, however, solves the ex post facto problem. Section 6 of chapter 224 of the Laws of 1986 amends RCW 9.95.009(1) to read "On July 1, 1986, the board of prison terms and paroles shall be redesignated as the indeterminate sentencing review board." This legislation also adds a new section, which states:
The legislature finds that a process for review of duration of confinement and release decisions for persons convicted of crimes committed before July 1, 1984, must be available after the board of prison terms and parolesceases to exist. A transitional agency, the indeterminate sentence review board, is created to review such decisions until 1992 when all of the functions, powers, and duties previously performed by the indeterminate sentence review board will be transferred to the superior courts of the state of Washington.
Laws of 1986, ch. 224, § 1, p. 726. The amended and additional sections insure that a body will exist to review as necessary the prison terms and paroles of persons incarcerated prior to July 1, 1984. The Legislature in the SRA did not repeal the parole system but only made it inapplicable to those committing felonies after 1984. RCW 9.95.900. The Legislature had until 1988 to establish a mechanism whereby the still applicable functions of the Board for pre-July 1, 1984 prisoners could be performed. Appellants in their supplemental brief concede that their ex post facto argument was not ripe and is cured by the statutory amendments.
The second issue is whether RCW 9.95.009(2) as a matter of statutory construction or constitutional right mandates that SRA sentence ranges be applied to persons convicted and sentenced prior to July 1, 1984. RCW 9.95.009(2), as originally enacted, provided in pertinent part:
(2) Prior to its expiration and after July 1, 1984, the board shall continue its functions with respect to persons incarcerated for crimes committed prior to July 1, 1984. The board shall consider the standard ranges and standards adopted pursuant to RCW 9.94A.040, and shall attempt to make decisions reasonably consistent with those ranges and standards.
Two Court of Appeals opinions and one Supreme Court opinion have addressed this section. In re Blair, 38 Wash.App. 670, 688 P.2d 532 (1984); In re Townsend, 38 Wash.App. 727, 688 P.2d 547 (1984). In re Myers, 105 Wash.2d 257, 714 P.2d 303 (1986). In Blair, the petitioner sought immediate release from imprisonment because if his pre-July 1, 1984 crime had been scored under the SRA he would have served his determinate sentence. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the SRA directly applies only to those who commit crimes on or after July 1, 1984. Blair, 38 Wash.App. at 673-74, 688 P.2d 532. To the extent that the Blair court, however, implied that prison sentences of those who committed crimes before July 1, 1984 did not need to be conformed to SRA standard ranges, Blair, at 674, 688 P.2d 532, it erred. RCW 9.95.009(2) explicitly mandates that the Board make decisions reasonably consistent with the SRA. Blair incorrectly ignored the language of RCW 9.95.009(2) and rendered the section meaningless. Also, the petitioner in Blair misinterpreted the effect of SRA sentence conformance. Conformance of...
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