Adel v. Parkhurst, 83-102
Decision Date | 17 May 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-102,83-102 |
Parties | Trevor ADEL, Appellant (Defendant), v. Vannis PARKHURST and Dale Parkhurst, Appellees (Plaintiffs). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Franklin D. Bayless and Charles J. Szlenker, Trierweiler, Bayless, Barrett & McCartney, Cheyenne, for appellant.
John R. Hursh and Holly Brown, Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for appellees.
Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.
In deciding this case we must revisit the essentials of proof of punitive damages, in this instance in the context of a default judgment. We also must answer a question about our jurisdiction to review the judgment in the absence of a motion to set aside the default judgment in accordance with Rule 55(c), W.R.C.P., and a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. The district court approved the entry of default made in accordance with Rule 55(a), W.R.C.P., and, after denying a Motion to Vacate Entry of Default, held a hearing on damages which was conducted pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P. The court then entered judgment for the plaintiffs (appellees in this court) in which they were awarded actual damages in the amount of $1,514.26 and punitive damages in the amount of $50,000. We affirm the default judgment, modifying the award of liquidated damages, but we reverse the award of punitive damages.
In his brief the appellant summarizes his arguments as follows:
The appellees' summary of their arguments in opposition is stated in their brief in this way:
Adel was first introduced to the appellee Vannis Parkhurst in Riverton in 1981 by a mutual acquaintance. The mutual acquaintance suggested that the Parkhursts use Adel's services in connection with the preparation of their federal income tax returns because he was a really sharp consultant. The Parkhursts operate an automobile parts store in Riverton. A consultation did occur later in 1981 in Riverton between the Parkhursts and Adel which resulted in the preparation of an amended tax return for Dale Parkhurst for the calendar year 1980. The Parkhursts then decided to have Adel, a certified public accountant practicing in Maryland, prepare their tax returns for the year 1981. In February of 1982 the appropriate records to permit him to prepare the 1981 federal income tax returns were sent by the Parkhursts to Adel in Maryland. Adel never did complete these returns. When the Parkhursts expressed concern about the due date with respect to the filing of their returns an extension for filing was obtained by Adel. He also obtained a subsequent extension, but when the returns were not forthcoming as that deadline approached, Vannis Parkhurst traveled to Maryland and picked up the supporting documents for the preparation of tax returns. Ultimately they were prepared by an accountant practicing in the Riverton area who testified that he was able to accomplish them in a day's time. Because of the late payments due to the extensions, the Parkhursts had to pay penalties and interest on the balances of their federal taxes for 1981. The interest and penalties paid amounted to $875.38 for Vannis Parkhurst and $659.11 for Dale Parkhurst.
Approximately two months after the filing of the federal income tax returns for 1981 the plaintiffs instituted this action. They sought recovery upon theories of negligence, breach of contract, and misrepresentation. They asserted as actual damages the penalties and interest which each had to pay; Vannis Parkhurst's expenses for the trip to Maryland ($686.57); lost sales and wages; and the cost of telephone calls to Adel ($59.95). In addition each sought exemplary damages in the amount of $250,000.
Initially Adel appeared pro se, entered a special appearance, and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over him, claiming that the action was brought in Wyoming based only upon a single telephone call. The district court responded to that motion by entering an ex parte order dismissing the action. The Parkhursts then moved to set aside the order entered by the court and advised the court by affidavit of events within the State of Wyoming which were more than sufficient under our law to justify personal jurisdiction over Adel. See Markby v. St. Anthony Hospital Systems, Wyo., 647 P.2d 1068 (1982). The district court then set aside its order dismissing the action and ordered that Adel's answer should be filed "not later than noon Friday, February 25, 1983." Adel responded by a motion for stay of proceedings and reconsideration of order, again asserting his position that there was no justification for personal jurisdiction because of the isolated nature of his contacts with Wyoming. No action was taken by the court upon this pleading, and after the expiration of the court's deadline for Adel's answer the Parkhursts moved for entry of default which the clerk of the district court did enter. Adel then obtained Wyoming counsel who filed an answer and a motion to vacate entry of default. In the meantime the district court had set the matter for hearing on damages. Ultimately the court denied the motion to vacate the entry of default and conducted the hearing on damages. Following that hearing the court entered its judgment awarding actual damages to the Parkhursts of $1,514.26 and $50,000 in punitive damages. Adel has taken his appeal from that judgment.
The Parkhursts contend that this court is foreclosed from a review of the default judgment and must affirm the judgment entered because Adel did not seek relief pursuant to Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. The rules relied upon provide as follows:
The Parkhursts rely upon the holding of this court in Robison v. Sales and Use Tax Division, State Tax Commission, Wyo., 524 P.2d 82 (1974), and the discussion of the failure to urge a position in connection with a motion to set aside a default judgment found in U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 121 (1983). We agree with the general contention of nonreviewability of a default judgment entered in accordance with the provisions of Rule 55, W.R.C.P., in the absence of an appropriate motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. In the absence of such a motion there is nothing before the district court which would suggest to it in any way that the default judgment was not entered in accordance with law. Even when an appropriate motion for such relief is filed the district court is called upon to exercise its discretion. In the absence of an adequate showing of a meritorious defense presented to the district court in connection with an appropriate motion for relief, the policy of attaching finality to judgments entered in accordance with proper procedure would control and there could be found no abuse of discretion. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., Inc., Wyo., 639 P.2d 1385 (1982). In this instance Adel did file a Motion to Vacate Entry of Default and an Answer at the same time. The motion did not justify relief for any of the grounds found in Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., and did not otherwise...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC
...evidence of a defendant's wealth or financial condition an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained." Id. (quoting Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 892 (Wyo.1984)); see also Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1129–31 (Wyo.1981)(explaining the "New York approach" of bifurcating trials wher......
-
Adams v. Murakami
...relief in the form of punitive damages in the absence of proof of the wealth or financial condition of the defendant." (Adel v. Parkhurst (Wyo.1984) 681 P.2d 886, 892.) An example demonstrates the wisdom of Neal, supra, 21 Cal.3d 910, 148 Cal.Rptr. 389, 582 P.2d 980. Assume that no evidence......
-
Barney v. Suggs
...before the appellate court which could suggest that the trial court erred in its application of the law to the facts. Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 889 (Wyo.1984). The trial court "cannot be said to have committed an error when * * * [its] judgment was never called into exercise, and the......
-
Herman v. Sunshine Chemical Specialties, Inc.
...consideration of defendant's financial condition); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1219 (Utah 1983) (same); Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 892 (Wyo.1984) (same). Other scholars have suggested that consideration of wealth may be unconstitutional. See Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffrie......