Adirondack Hydro Development Corp., Matter of

• Decision Date: 16 June 1994
• Citation: 613 N.Y.S.2d 459,205 A.D.2d 925
• Parties: In the Matter of the Acquisition of Real Property by the ADIRONDACK HYDRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Adirondack Hydro Development Corporation, Respondent; Warrensburg Board and Paper Corporation, Appellant, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 459

613 N.Y.S.2d 459

205 A.D.2d 925

In the Matter of the Acquisition of Real Property by the

ADIRONDACK HYDRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.

Adirondack Hydro Development Corporation, Respondent;

Warrensburg Board and Paper Corporation, Appellant, et al.,

Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

June 16, 1994.

Cohen, Dax, Koenig & Wiles P.C. (John W. Dax, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Hallenbeck, Lascell & Pineo (Robert A. Feldman, of counsel), Rochester, for Adirondack Hydro Development Corp., respondent.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and CREW, CASEY, WEISS and YESAWICH, JJ.

CREW, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Dier, J.), entered March 5, 1993 in Warren County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to EDPL article 5, determined the compensation due claimant as a result of petitioner's acquisition of real property.

Petitioner commenced this condemnation proceeding pursuant to EDPL article 5 to acquire certain property located in the Town of Warrensburg, Warren County. It appears that petitioner was vested with the power of eminent domain pursuant to the Federal Power Act (16 USC § 814) and acquired the land and accompanying flowage rights for the purpose of developing and operating a hydroelectric power plant. Following petitioner's acquisition of the premises, claimant filed a claim seeking compensation for the appropriation of its property. At the conclusion of the nonjury trial that followed, Supreme Court determined that the value of the highest and best use of the property at the time of the taking was $191,500. This appeal by claimant followed.

Initially, we reject claimant's assertion that the appraisal report offered by petitioner's expert was fundamentally flawed. Although the parties' respective experts utilized different valuation approaches, with petitioner's expert essentially arriving at a value based upon comparable sales and claimant's expert calculating the property's value based upon its income potential, there is no indication in the record that petitioner's methodology was unsound. Petitioner's expert testified that the sales he used for comparison were arms' length transactions, and claimant has failed to demonstrate that these sales failed to reflect the then-prevailing market conditions.

As to Supreme Court's acceptance of the testimony and appraisal report offered by petitioner's expert as its basis for arriving at a valuation figure, there can be no serious dispute that in a nonjury trial, evaluating the credibility of the respective witnesses and determining which of the proffered evidence was most credible are matters committed to the trial court's sound discretion (see generally, Brooks v. Cheon, 142 A.D.2d 867, 868, 531 N.Y.S.2d 64). Hence, we have no quarrel with Supreme Court's initial decision to credit the testimony and report offered by petitioner's expert. Having done so, however, Supreme Court was, in our view, required to address in its written decision the admitted errors contained in petitioner's...