Adkins v. State

• Decision Date: 05 March 1993
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 146
• Citation: 639 So.2d 515
• Parties: Ricky Dale ADKINS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 515

639 So.2d 515

Ricky Dale ADKINS v. STATE.

7 Div. 146.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 5, 1993.

As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing

May 28, 1993.

D. Michael Barrett, Birmingham, Talmadge H. Fambrough, Pell City, and Charlotta Norby, Atlanta, GA, for petitioner.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Gilda Branch Williams and William D. Little, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

ON RETURN TO REMAND

TAYLOR, Judge.

The appellant, Ricky Dale Adkins, was convicted of three counts of murder, made capital because the murder occurred during the course of a rape, a robbery, and a kidnapping. Sections 13A-5-40(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to death by electrocution.

We affirmed the appellant's conviction in Adkins v. State, 600 So.2d 1054 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). Between the time of our affirmance and the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in this case, Ex parte Adkins, 600 So.2d 1067 (Ala.1992), the United States Supreme Court in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), expanded the holding of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), to white defendants. The appellant in this case is a white male; following Powers, the Alabama Supreme Court remanded this case so that a Batson hearing could be held. We then remanded this cause to the Circuit Court for St. Clair County. Adkins v. State, 600 So.2d 1072 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). That court held a Batson hearing and has filed its findings with this court.

The trial court's findings show that the state struck 9 of the 11 black prospective jurors on the venire. One black ultimately sat on the jury. The court found that a prima facie showing of discrimination had been made and it held a hearing at which the prosecutor gave the following reasons for striking the 9 black prospective jurors:

Prospective juror number 59--This juror was struck because he came forward and asked that he be excused from serving on the jury. He was 61 years old and had ulcers.

Prospective juror number 39--This juror was struck because he answered during the voir dire that he knew about the case and because he was also single.

Prospective juror number 8--This juror was struck because she stated that she knew about the case. The prosecutor also had information that she was married to or lived with an individual he had prosecuted.

Prospective juror number 52--This juror was struck because of his age and because he was single. He also appeared inattentive and seemed disinterested during voir dire.

Prospective juror number 36--This juror was struck because she was 53 and single. She was also unemployed and asked to be excused from serving on the jury because she had high blood pressure.

Prospective juror number 31--This juror was struck because she was single and because she was known to associate with a former local chief of police who had been forced to resign.

Prospective juror number 56--This juror was struck because he was 86 years old and because he indicated that he knew defense counsel.

Prospective juror number 14--This juror was struck because she was single and because she worked for the Department of Human Resources (DHR) and the district attorney's office had frequent dealings with her in her capacity as a DHR employee.

Prospective juror number 60--This juror was struck because her father had a federal conviction for a drug-related crime.

After a careful review of the reasons given by the prosecutor and after examining the testimony taken at the Batson hearing, we find that no Batson violation occurred here.

Initially we observe that the St. Clair County District Attorney's office does not have a history of discriminatory striking. The primary reason given for striking 5 of the 9 black prospective jurors was because the jurors were single. As the court stated in its findings:

"The District Attorney stated that it was their goal in jury selection to have jurors who were married. The primary defense of the defendant to the capital murder charges was that the defendant did not rape the victim.... It was the contention of the defendant that he met the victim, a married woman, and during the process of showing the defendant several homes to buy, the victim consented to having sexual relations with him several times during the day. It was the position of the District Attorney that married jurors were preferable to single jurors."

Striking a prospective juror because of his or her marital status may be a sufficiently race-neutral reason if the juror's marital status is related to the case. In this case all the jurors except one were married. The prosecutor also stated at the Batson hearing that when he struck the jury he believed that the one unmarried juror was married.

"Under the facts of the present case being single was a valid reasons for striking the prospective juror, especially when the state has 'struck non-black jurors for substantially the same reason. Such evidence of neutrality may overcome the presumption of discrimination.' "

Kelley v. State, 602 So.2d 473, 476 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), quoting Bedford v. State, 548 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). See also Carrington v. State, 608 So.2d 447 (Ala.Cr.App.1992); Mathews v. State, 534 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).

The reason for striking prospective juror number 59 was also race-neutral. He asked to be excused, stating that he had health problems. "A veniremember's indication that the member might have problems being on the jury in the case is ... a race-neutral reason for removing that person from the venire." Kelley, 602 So.2d at 476. See also Jackson v. State, 640 So.2d 1025 (Ala.Cr.App.1992); Gaston v. State, 581 So.2d 548 (Ala.Cr.App.1991); McGahee v. State, 554 So.2d 454 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 554 So.2d 473 (Ala.1989).

The primary reason given for striking juror number 56 was also race neutral and therefore did not violate the principles of Batson. The fact that a prospective juror knew one of the lawyers involved in the case is a race-neutral reason for striking that juror. Strong v. State, 538 So.2d 815 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).

The reason given for striking prospective jurors number 8 and 60 was also race neutral. "The fact that a family member of the prospective juror has been prosecuted for a crime is a valid race-neutral reason." Yelder v. State, 596 So.2d 596, 598 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). See also Powell v. State, 548 So.2d 590 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 548 So.2d 605 (Ala.1989). A juror's association with a known criminal is also a valid race-neutral reason for striking a prospective juror. Bedford v. State, 548 So.2d 1097 (Ala.Cr.App.1989).

Although the prosecution's information indicated that prospective juror number 60's father had served time in a federal penitentiary, she did not provide that answer on voir dire. However, the court went to great lengths to determine where the prosecutor had gotten his information before striking both jurors number 8 and 60. The record reflects that all of the notes made by the prosecutor during the voir dire selection were received into evidence at the Batson hearing and were available to defense counsel. The prosecutor further stated that it was his practice to pass around the jury lists to law enforcement officers so that they could make notes about the jurors. The prosecutor also stated during the hearing that he discovered prospective juror number 60's maiden name and knew that her father had been in federal prison. This is also indicated on his notes made during the voir dire of the prospective jurors, where the prosecutor named the individuals who supplied him with this information. We do not have a situation here where the trial court took at face value the reasons given by the prosecutor. Ex parte Thomas, 601 So.2d 56 (Ala.1992). The trial court in this case was aware of Thomas and went to great lengths to determine the motive behind each strike. The court extensively questioned the prosecutor at the Batson hearing. We find this case distinguishable from Williams v. State, 620 So.2d 82 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), where this court reversed the trial court' judgment on a Batson violation because the only reason given for striking one of the jurors was that the district attorney "knew this juror through his drug work." We find this case similar to the recent cases of Naismith v. State, 615 So.2d 1323 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), and Jones v. State, 611 So.2d 466 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). Judge Bowen stated the following in Naismith:

"Here, the information from the police department was that the particular veniremember had either been arrested or convicted, so that the information obtained from the police department is not susceptible to the same objection as that obtained in Walker [v. State, 611 So.2d 1133 (Ala.Cr.App.1992) ]....

"In Jones v. State, 611 So.2d 466 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), this Court addressed a factual situation very similar to that presented here and held that '[u]nder the circumstances presented here, the prosecutor's strike of veniremember # 4 on the ground that the sheriff's department had had "drug problems" with that person was racially-neutral.'

" 'Our holding in Walker does not apply here because in this case the prosecutor had information from the sheriff's department concerning the basis for each peremptory strike and because the prosecutor did not "simply presume, without further questioning to 'dispel any doubt,' that a veniremember who is under oath, did not answer a question truthfully merely because the prosecutor has hearsay evidence to the contrary." Walker, supra.

" 'Here, the prosecutor did not exercise a "same name" strike. There is no indication that the sheriff's department was having drug problems with someone named "Carter" as opposed to this particular veniremember. Here, there was more than the "mere suspicion" of relationship. See Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676, 683 (Ala.1991). See also Walker, supra ("A 'prosecutor's self-imposed ignorance ...