Adoption of Haley A.
| Decision Date | 07 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. A070920,A070920 |
| Citation | 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 361,49 Cal.App.4th 1351 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 49 Cal.App.4th 1351 49 Cal.App.4th 1351, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7464, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,289 Adoption of HALEY A., a Minor. MARK A. et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ELIZABETH L., Defendant and Appellant. |
John L. Dodd, Jane A. Gorman, Tustin, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Konrad S. Lee, Riverside, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rita L. Swenor, San Francisco, for Minor.
Elizabeth L. appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to Haley A. on grounds of abandonment. She contends that the trial court erred in finding she abandoned the child; that she did not receive effective assistance of counsel from the attorney who represented both appellant and the adoptive parents; that the adoptive parents are estopped from raising a claim of abandonment because of the attorney's failure to advise appellant of her rights; and that the adoptive parents may not claim it to be in the child's best interests to remain with them due to the passage of time.
We shall find that appellant, who never irrevocably consented to the adoption of her child by others, complied with all of the legal requirements to recover custody and that the finding below that she abandoned the child was erroneous. Accordingly, we shall direct that Haley be returned to appellant.
Our opinion addresses not simply the legal arguments initially raised by the parties, but the constitutional contentions first raised by respondents in their petition for rehearing. We reject these constitutional arguments because they rest on inapposite authority and are unjustifiably indifferent to the well established constitutional rights of a natural mother. If judicially adopted, respondents' legal and constitutional theories would open the door to uncertainty and inconsistency in an area of the law in which the predictability and uniformity that bright lines can achieve have particular value. Subordinating legal rules to equitable considerations in cases such as this--which is, in effect, what respondents would have us do--would not only undermine any legislative scheme designed to protect the rights of natural mothers but could provide prospective adoptive parents an incentive to resist the return of a child to its natural mother in the hope this might alter the equities in their favor. Such a result would not be productive of justice.
In December 1993, appellant learned she was seven and a half months pregnant. Appellant was 28 years old, unmarried and two classes short of an associate degree. She lived with her parents in Ridgecrest, California (near Death Valley) and had worked at the store they owned for fourteen years. She and the baby's father, Alex Q., sought information about adoption and appellant began to visit an adoptions counselor, Paulette Solberg, who she continued to see after the baby was born.
Solberg referred appellant and Alex to attorney Marc Widelock. Widelock explained the adoption process to appellant, told her she would have six months after the child was placed to make up her mind about the adoption, and told her if she did not consent to the adoption and did not get the baby back, the court would terminate her rights to the child. Widelock showed appellant a book containing information about prospective adoptive parents; appellant met with and chose respondents, Mark and Stacy A., who live in Martinez. She did not express to respondents any hesitation about placing the child with them for adoption. According to Stacy A., appellant did not tell respondents anyone was forcing her to place her child for adoption and told them "she wasn't a mother-like person, that if a baby cried or whatever, she really didn't have anything to do with them." On January 19, 1994, appellant and respondents signed a consent to representation of multiple parties by which they agreed to have Widelock represent them.
Appellant testified that her parents pressured her into placing the baby for adoption by threatening to cut her off from the family and make her life difficult. 1 As related in the probation officer's report prepared for the trial in this case, a hospital worker who had known appellant's family from other contacts before the adoption described appellant's parents as "walking the straight and narrow" and being "from an older generation where pregnancy is not acceptable outside of marriage" and " 'very cold people.' " As also related in the probation officer's report, appellant's therapist stated that for appellant, The probation officer concluded that appellant was "a confused woman whose emancipation from her parents was considerably delayed." Appellant testified that she believed she told respondents of her parents' threats and told Widelock that her parents were forcing her to place her child for adoption.
Alex, who at the time of the birth was on probation for having made death threats against appellant, testified that he wanted to keep the baby and offered to assist appellant with insurance to cover the child and a place to live, but agreed to the adoption because appellant's mother had threatened to have him arrested if he did not go along with it. Appellant knew that Alex wanted to keep the child, that she would have his support if she did so, and that he had a good job.
Haley was born on February 23, 1994. 2 At the hospital, appellant filled out the birth certificate with the name respondents had chosen for the baby, including their last name. On February 24, appellant signed a "Declaration of Intention by Birth Mother; Medical Treatment Authorization Form" by which she authorized respondents to "take possession of the baby for purposes of adoption." Among other things, this form stated that appellant wished to proceed with the adoption, understood that if she did not wish to consent to the adoption she could sign a Refusal to Consent Form or write to the court or Department of Social Services (Department), understood that she was under no compulsion or pressure to choose respondents as the adoptive parents and understood that by signing the form she was not forfeiting or waiving any of her rights to the child. Appellant understood that if she did not want to consent to the adoption she could sign a refusal to consent.
On February 25, Haley was released to respondents. On that date, appellant signed a Department of Social Services "Health Facility Minor Release Report" (form AD 22). This form contained a box captioned, "Important Notice," which stated the law governing agency and independent adoptions and provided, "If you place a child for adoption, but do not relinquish, consent or reclaim your child within six months, the court may find that you have abandoned the child and terminate all of your parental rights regarding the child even though you have not signed a relinquishment or consent." Stacy A. testified that appellant expressed no hesitation about respondents taking the baby when they were at the hospital.
On March 10, Widelock filed a petition for adoption on behalf of respondents. 3 Appellant testified that in March she thought about changing her mind about the adoption and Alex encouraged her to do so; Robin testified that they discussed what appellant needed to do to reclaim the baby. Appellant wrote a letter to Widelock expressing her displeasure with the way respondents had treated her at the hospital and the way the case was being handled. Appellant testified that she did not reclaim the child at this point because she was "under the control and constraints of [her] family." 4 Adoptions case worker Linda Salazar testified that when she spoke with appellant in mid-March, appellant did not express any hesitation about the adoption. In late March, Salazar told appellant that if she did not sign the consent within six months, respondents could initiate an abandonment action; appellant again expressed no concern about the adoption.
In April, appellant spoke with Department social worker Diane Villalon and said she was not ready to sign a consent because respondents had not yet paid all her medical bills. Appellant did not say she was thinking of reclaiming the child in that conversation or when she again spoke with Villalon on May 3.
In May, appellant told respondents she would sign the consent after they paid all her medical bills. According to the probation officer's report, Villalon concluded after appellant repeatedly put off signing the consent papers that appellant did not want to sign but did not know how to say no. Also according to the report, Villalon contacted Widelock's office and said, "You're not going to get a consent from her." Salazar contacted appellant after being told by Villalon that appellant was not going to sign the consent because of unpaid hospital bills and was told,
On June 30, appellant and Alex sent Widelock a proposed agreement for contact between them and Haley after the adoption; at this time, appellant was planning for respondents to adopt the baby. On July 25, Widelock sent appellant and Alex a revised agreement, informed them a Department social worker would be in their area on August 10, and asked them to contact him to arrange to have the consents signed. Appellant never signed the agreement; she testified that she was "pretty sure" she wanted the child back and also did not feel respondents would honor the agreement. Appellant did not call and did not meet with the social worker.
Appellant testified that she decided in early August that she wanted to reclaim Haley but did not call respondents because of continued...
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