Adoption of J.M.H., Matter of
Decision Date | 03 June 1997 |
Docket Number | Nos. 960270,960271,s. 960270 |
Citation | 564 N.W.2d 623,1997 ND 99 |
Parties | In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF J.M.H., a Minor. M.H., Petitioner and Appellee, v. T.J.E., Jr., Respondent and Appellant, and H.C. Wessman, as Director of Human Services of the State of North Dakota, and M.M.H., Respondents. STATE of North Dakota, County of Cass, ex rel., T.J.E., Jr., Plaintiff and Appellant, and J.M.H., a Minor Child, by and through his Guardian ad litem, Plaintiff, v. M.M.H., Defendant and Appellee. Civil |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Leslie Johnson Aldrich, of Johnson Law Office, Fargo, for appellees M.H. and M.M.H.
Robin L. Olson, of Olson Law Office, Grand Forks, and Brian W. Nelson (on brief), of Nelson Law Office, Fargo, for appellant.
¶1 T.J.E., Jr., (Tom) 1 appealed from an order terminating his parental rights to J.M.H. (James) and granting a petition for adoption by James's stepfather, M.H. (Mark). We hold the evidence supports the termination of Tom's parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-19(3)(b). We also hold the procedure for terminating Tom's parental rights did not deprive him of due process and his conclusory allegations are insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
¶2 Tom and M.M.H. (Mary) are the natural parents of James, who was born on December 18, 1988. Tom and Mary have never been married, and Mary has had custody of James since his birth. In February 1996, Mark and Mary were married. Mark petitioned to adopt James and to terminate Tom's parental rights. The court consolidated Mark's petition with a pending paternity action and appointed counsel to represent Tom, an indigent inmate at a federal penitentiary in Oklahoma.
¶3 At trial, Tom testified by telephone and was represented by his court-appointed counsel. The parties initially stipulated Tom was James's natural father, and after a further hearing, the court terminated Tom's parental rights and granted Mark's petition for adoption. Tom moved for a rehearing, alleging the court erred in terminating his parental rights and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied Tom's motion, and he appealed.
¶4 The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. §§ 14-15-04 and 27-05-06. The appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. §§ 14-15-15 and 28-27-01.
¶5 Tom contends the court erred in terminating his parental rights. He argues the evidence was insufficient to show he abandoned James. He also asserts Mark and Mary frustrated his contacts with James, and the court erred in not considering their behavior in terminating his parental rights.
¶6 Before Mark can adopt James, Tom's status as James's natural father must be severed. See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of A.M.M., 529 N.W.2d 864, 866 (N.D.1995). See generally N.D.C.C. ch. 14-15 (Revised Uniform Adoption Act). Consent to the termination of parental rights severs the parent-child relationship. A.M.M. at 864. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-06(1)(e), consent is not required if the court has terminated parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-19.
¶7 A party seeking termination of the parent-child relationship must prove the elements necessary to support termination by clear and convincing evidence. Matter of Adoption of P.R.D., 495 N.W.2d 299, 302 (N.D.1993). Clear and convincing evidence means evidence which leads to a firm belief or conviction the allegations are true. A.M.M. at 866. In parental termination cases, we review factual findings de novo; however, we give substantial weight to the trial court's findings and we recognize the court's superior position to decide questions of demeanor and credibility. A.M.M.
¶8 Here, the trial court found the evidence supported the termination of Tom's parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-19(3)(a)-(c), which provides:
¶9 Although Tom focuses his argument on the issue of abandonment, the trial court's decision to terminate his parental rights was not limited to abandonment. Rather, the court terminated Tom's parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-19(3)(a)-(c), and we decide this case under subsection (b).
¶10 In P.R.D. at 301-302, we harmonized N.D.C.C. §§ 14-15-19(3)(b) and 27-20-44(1)(b) and held those provisions authorized the termination of parental rights if (1) a child is deprived, (2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue, and (3) the child is suffering, or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral or emotional harm. See also Matter of Adoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d 653, 664 (N.D.1995).
¶11 In P.R.D. at 302 (citations omitted), we discussed the definition of a deprived child, quoting from In Interest of T.J.O., 462 N.W.2d 631, 633 (N.D.1990):
" "
¶12 When James was born, Tom was incarcerated in Oklahoma. Tom has been incarcerated on three or four different occasions for all but about two years of James's life. In 1995, Tom pled guilty to threatening Mark with serious bodily injury during an interstate telephone call. Tom's current incarceration for that crime, by itself, is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights. See J.S.P.L. at 664; Matter of Adoption of J.W.M., 532 N.W.2d 372, 379 (N.D.1995). The nature of the crime for which an inmate is incarcerated, however, is a relevant factor in deciding whether to terminate the inmate's parental rights. J.S.P.L. at 665. Tom also conceded he had eight or nine other felony convictions. While incarcerated, Tom continued to make harassing telephone calls to Mark and Mary, causing them to block collect calls on their private telephone line. There was evidence Tom then made repeated harassing telephone calls to Mary at her place of employment. Tom testified his access to James had been restricted by Mary since she began her relationship with Mark. Those restrictions are not insignificant, but they do not excuse Tom from making an effort to build a relationship with James. See A.M.M. at 867; Matter of Adoption of A.M.B., 514 N.W.2d 670, 673 (N.D.1994). Moreover, Mary's hesitation to allow Tom contact with James cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Those limitations coincided with Tom's threatening and harassing telephone calls to Mark and Mary. We agree with the trial court's observation Tom's predicament was one of his own making. See A.M.M. (father's misconduct caused unemployment and did not obviate his child support responsibility).
¶13 The evidence establishes Tom acted unreasonably and inappropriately regarding his relationship with Mary and her relationship with Mark. Tom's harassing telephone calls started after Mary began a relationship with Mark. There also was evidence Tom resisted an attempt to establish paternity when James was born, but asserted his paternity after Mary began a relationship with Mark. See A.M.B. at 673-74 ( ).
¶14 Mary also testified Tom provided only about $300 for support for James and never spent any meaningful time with him. Tom acknowledged he had seen James only for brief periods and not more than seven times. Tom testified he had paid about $1,000 for support for James, although there was no court order for support. The absence of a court order, however, does not absolve Tom from his parental responsibilities. A.M.B. at 673-74. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08. We have repeatedly cautioned issues involving the termination of parental rights are of grave importance and should not be treated lightly; however, parental rights do not spring fully from the biological connection between a parent and child, and noncustodial parents should not treat lightly their rights and responsibilities toward their minor children. J.W.M. at 379;...
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