Adoption of Long, In re
| Decision Date | 15 January 1952 |
| Citation | 56 So.2d 450 |
| Parties | In re Adoption of LONG. Petition of BOEHM et ux. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Joseph E. Price, Jr., Panama City, for appellant.
David J. Lewis, Jacksonville, for appellee.
George Boehm and Mary Seale Boehm, his wife, petitioned the circuit court for a decree authorizing the adoption of the child of an unwed mother. Chapter 72, Florida Statutes 1949, and F.S.A. Afterwards, the State Welfare Board addressed to the court a comprehensive report relative to the adoptive parents and the child and concluded it with the statement that it would be to the best interest of the child that the petition be granted.
Thereupon the circuit judge, reciting the recommendation of the board, decreed interlocutorily that the baby be placed in the custody of the petitioners for seven months, and that the matter be formally heard on a specified day eight months later.
Immediately prior to the day set for the final hearing the State Welfare Board advised the court that on information gained during the probationary period, it recommended a decree granting petitioners permanent custody of the child.
At the hearing, however, the judge concluded that the petition should be dismissed because the mother of the child had executed her consent to the adoption before the baby was born and had used a fictitious name when doing so.
The sole question for determination here is the validity of the consent agreement measured by the requirements of Section 72.14, Florida Statutes 1949, and F.S.A., in so far, that is, as the name used and time of execution are concerned.
The consent agreement was executed by Mary Alice Long, unmarried expectant mother, and by the petitioners twelve days before the birth of the baby. The instrument contained recitals that it would be impossible for the mother normally to rear and educate her child; that the prospective parents desired to assume this responsibility; that they had paid or become responsible for all expenses incident to the birth.
It was specifically agreed that the child, if normal at birth, be delivered to the adoptive parents and that the natural mother renounced all claim to the child and unqualifiedly consented to the adoption. This instrument was signed by the three parties and acknowledged before a notary public.
Turning now to the report of the board we find that the petitioners took the child when two days old and have had it ever since; also, that the whereabouts and true names of the natural parents are not even known.
We cannot agree that the consent agreement, because signed before the birth, was so premature as to be inconsistent with the statutory provision that such a consent be executed by 'the living mother of a child born out of wedlock * * *.' It seems to us that this construction emphasized too much the form and too little the purpose. As we have seen, the welfare of the child has been adequately protected. The matter of consent has mainly, if not absolutely, to do with the parent's right to the joys and blessings of parenthood, as distinguished from the child's right to proper rearing.
Under the statute, rights of the parent may be surrendered by a formally executed paper. But at all times its purpose is the abandonment of the parent's right, and if this be done before birth and be afterward observed, recognized and honored by all parties, we think the purpose of the law is...
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In re Adoption of Infant Child Baxter
... ... Because the Consents were not executed in the presence of any of the entities listed in the Consent Statute, they contend that the Consents were not valid and were void ab initio. They buttress their argument by restating the long-standing principle that because the Adoption Code is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed in favor of the rights of natural parents.3 ... The adoptive parents contend that the failure of the Consents to meet the specifications 799 N.E.2d 1061 set forth in ... ...
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Johnson v. Cupp
... ... 274 N.E.2d 411 ... 149 Ind.App. 611 ... Jerry L. JOHNSON and Constance E. Johnson, Defendants-Appellants, ... In the Matter of the Adoption of Infant Johnson by Robert L ... CUPP and Geraldine S. Cupp, Plaintiffs-Appellees ... In re ADOPTION OF INFANT JOHNSON ... No. 471A66 ... , and while no Indiana court decision directly on point can be found, petitioners have provided us with the case of In re Adoption of Long (1952), Fla., 56 So.2d 450, in support of the contrary interpretation, wherein the Florida Supreme Court stated, at p. 451: ... 'We cannot agree ... ...
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McKinney v. Weeks, 1954
... ... The writ issued, and the reply thereto averred that petitioner executed a valid consent to adoption and, that under the terms of the said consent for adoption, petitioner consented to the adoption of her minor son by respondents and consented to ... 712, 188 So. 576; In re Stonehouse's Adoption, 1944, 155 Fla. 223, 19 So.2d 788.) ... Next mentioned was In re Adoption of Long, Fla.1952, 56 So.2d 450, 452, the facts being that the court by interlocutory decree had placed the child of an unwed mother in petitioners' custody ... ...
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U.S. v. Wasman, 79-5643
... ... In re Adoption of Long, 56 So.2d 450 (Fla.1952). His argument is patterned after the holding of the sixth circuit in United States v. Cox, 593 F.2d 46 (6th ... ...