Adoption of MM, In re, C-13

• Decision Date: 28 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. C-13,C-13
• Citation: 652 P.2d 974
• Parties: In re ADOPTION OF MM a/k/a NLM, a minor. SKMD, Appellant (Objector-Respondent), v. SLM and LKM, Appellees (Petitioners).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 974

652 P.2d 974

In re ADOPTION OF MM a/k/a NLM, a minor.

SKMD, Appellant (Objector-Respondent), v. SLM and LKM, Appellees (Petitioners).

No. C-13.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 28, 1982.

Sue Davidson of Urbigkit & Whitehead, P.C., Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellant.

No appearance on behalf of appellees.

Before ROSE, C.J., RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ., and O'BRIEN, District Judge.

RAPER, Justice.

This is an appeal by the natural mother, appellant (SKMD) of the child, MM, also known as NLM (NLM), from a Decree of Adoption by which appellees (SLM and LKM), became the adoptive parents. SKMD states as issues:

"1. Did the Trial Court err in failing to give full faith and credit to the applicable and controlling New York adoption law in derogation of the Constitutions of the State of Wyoming and of the United States of America?

"2. Did the Trial Court err in failing to give full faith and credit to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children of New York or in failing to apply the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children of Wyoming?

"3. Did the Trial Court err in failing to return legal and physical custody of the minor child to her natural mother?"

We will affirm.

There is no substantial dispute about the facts incorporated into the decree of adoption. Briefly summarized, SKMD, in March or April, 1980, became pregnant while a member of the United States Navy stationed at Guantanomo Bay, Cuba. In July, 1980, she was transferred to the naval base at Norfolk, Virginia. While there, she expressed to her superior a desire to relinquish the baby for adoption when born. He conveyed that information by letter to his friends SLM and LKM, husband and wife who were Wyoming residents. SLM and SKMD made contact with each other. SKMD orally agreed at that time to give the child to SLM and her husband, and they agreed to pay the costs and expenses of the birth.

SKMD was discharged from the Navy ¹ and moved to New York City to live with a male friend (D), whom she had met while in the Navy. (They were married shortly before the initial hearing.) SKMD at that time maintained that D was not the father of the unborn child and she did not know the name of the child's father.

After several long-distance conversations about the adoption, SKMD asked SLM and LKM to have legal documentation prepared to assure her that they would adopt the child and pay the expenses. They contacted a New York attorney who advised them to hire a Wyoming attorney since Wyoming would become the child's domicile and the adoption proceedings would be conducted in Wyoming courts. As a result, various documents were prepared in Wyoming and sent to SKMD's doctor at her request: a contract whereby the mother consented to the adoption and the adopting parents agreed to pay medical expenses; an affidavit in which the mother consented to the adoption and stated the father was unknown ²; and, a promissory note made by SKDM payable to SLM and LKM to secure the advanced payment of medical expenses in the sum of $2,300 in the event the mother changed her mind before the child was handed over to SLM and LKM. These were all executed by the parties. The agreement and separate affidavit of consent were made under oath and acknowledged. SKMD executed the documents on November 22, 1980, after consulting with her doctor and D and after an opportunity to consult with an attorney; it does not appear that she sought the advice of legal counsel until after custody of the baby was relinquished.

On January 5, 1981, the girl child was born and the adopting parents notified. They traveled to New York City where, in the hospital and in the presence of the hospital administrator and D, the infant was delivered by SKMD to SLM and LKM on January 8, 1981. The adoptive parents, with the child, returned to their residence in Kemmerer, Wyoming.

On January 14, 1981, SKMD, through her attorney, sent notice to SLM and LKM demanding return of the child to her and declaring that her previous consent to adoption was revoked. SLM and LKM petitioned the Wyoming district court of the district wherein they resided for adoption of NLM on January 16, 1981. They have continuously resisted revocation of the consent.

On February 9, 1981, the Director of the Wyoming Lincoln County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services was ordered by the district judge to conduct a home study of the petitioners for adoption. He, as well, requested New York authorities to conduct a like study of SKMD's home. On the same date an attorney guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the best interests of the child. On February 11, 1981, objection to adoption was filed in the proceeding by the natural mother and D, who at that time, by attached affidavit, alleged he was the putative father. ³ In answers to interrogatories, SKMD acknowledged having sexual intercourse with someone other than D during the time when conception could have occurred. Blood tests indicated the odds of D being the father were 0 to 1. It was eventually stipulated that D was not the father of the child and his objection to the adoption was not an issue.

At the hearing prior to entry of an Interlocutory Decree of Adoption by the district court, the natural mother testified that S, a member of the United States Marines was the father. He was served notice of the hearing set on an application for a final decree of adoption but defaulted. SKMD petitioned for a new hearing following entry on December 15, 1981 of a final Decree of Adoption. Among the grounds therefor, it was alleged that new evidence indicated that one Monty was the father of the child and should have been given notice. Monty furnished an affidavit to the effect that he had sexual relations with SKMD during the period when the child was conceived. SKMD's affidavit stated that she had named S with his consent instead of Monty in order to protect Monty because Monty had just gone through a bad divorce experience.

In the light of the possibility of a new father having been discovered, and questionable notice to the natural mother of a hearing prior to entry of the December 15, 1981 final Decree of Adoption, the trial judge directed service of notice on Monty and fixed a further hearing date. Monty defaulted. The trial judge thereafter entered a new final Decree of Adoption on May 20, 1982. It is from that decree that this appeal has been taken. ⁴ The Decree of Adoption now appealed from is uniquely exhaustive in its findings of fact and conclusions of law--covering some 21 pages of legal size paper. The trial judge took particular care in not only the decree, but also in open court to record his observations of the demeanor of the parties and witnesses, along with their credibility as related to the best interests of the child to bolster the testimony which is ordinarily all we have before us. He feared that we would not see those reflections from the transcript. He found (1) the consent was regular in every respect; (2) there was no duress in obtaining it; (3) there is no known father; and (4) it is in the best interest and welfare of NLM that the petition for adoption by SLM and LKM be allowed and a decree of adoption granted.

SKMD does not in this appeal challenge the findings of fact. She elects to stand on issues involving only questions of law.

We understand, as did the trial jurist, that a contested adoption matter is emotionally charged and sparked by persuasive conflicting philosophies which must be brought into equalibrium. While this case is one of first impression for us, the supreme court has had before it a case involving a non-consenting parent in an atmosphere compounded by divorce, In the Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976). Therein the caution with which courts guard the parent-child relationship was explained to be based upon the postulate that:

" * * * [T]he earliest and most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity, in all countries considered sacred, is the relationship of parent and child. Therefore, parents have the first and natural right to their children. A decree of adoption tears asunder forever the parent-child relationship and for all legal and practical purposes, that child is the same as dead to the parent affected. The parent has lost the right to ever again see the child or even know of his whereabouts. * * * " 550 P.2d at 485.

We again in a termination of parental rights appeal showed compassion for the natural mother-child relationship in our decision in DS and RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911 (1980).

On the other hand, there are the childless who yearn for the opportunity to parent children. This court observed in In the Matter of the Adoption of Voss, supra, that there is splendor in adoption of children in appropriate cases. It affords in so many instances a future in every respect which a child may not otherwise enjoy. It fills a void for those not blessed as natural parents and those others who also have the capability and overwhelming desire to care for and raise the helpless. They, too, must not be deprived when they take a lawful, sincere, caring, and good faith course, especially when they have been committed to and are willing to assume or have assumed parental responsibilities.

The legislature has recognized irrevocable consent as a meaningful device through which such a commitment may be made secure. This is a matter of public policy which is the business of the legislature. In its general sense, public policy refers to the law of a state embodied in its constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. When the constitution and statutes have not spoken on a subject, public policy refers to a principle of law that holds no one can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. Here, however, we have a statute which, from our decision,...