Adoption of Trent, Matter of
| Decision Date | 28 February 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 50844,50844 |
| Citation | 624 P.2d 433,229 Kan. 224 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ADOPTION of Baby TRENT. Valerie L. TRENT, Appellee, v. Carl HOOVER and Judy Hoover, Appellants. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statutes. In determining legislative intent the court may properly look to the purpose to be accomplished, and the necessity and effect of the statute.
2. An acknowledgment shows, merely prima facie, that an instrument was duly executed.
3. Certificates of acknowledgment should be liberally construed and protected from attack if there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements.
4. In an appeal from a trial court's refusal to grant a decree of adoption, it is held : A consent to adoption executed in substantial compliance with statutory requirements is valid under K.S.A. 59-2102 in view of subsequent judicial proceedings which were instituted by the natural mother and which afforded her a full hearing upon all issues bearing upon voluntariness of her consent.
Donald E. Bucher, of McDowell, Rice & Smith, Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellants.
Nancy R. Bikson, Kansas City, Mo. argued the cause, and Robert W. Harris, of Harris & Hills, Kansas City, was with her on the brief for appellee.
This is an adoption case which presents an issue as to whether the natural mother's consent to the adoption of her child is valid. The issue is a matter of first impression in our Kansas courts. We granted a petition for review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which is published in 5 Kan.App.2d 363, 616 P.2d 304 (1980). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying a minor child's adoption holding that the natural mother's written consent was invalid for lack of authority in the notary, before whom the execution of the consent was acknowledged. On review, we hold the lower courts erred in denying the adoption. The natural mother's written consent was in substantial compliance with Kansas adoption consent statute, K.S.A. 59-2102.
The child is the legitimate son of Valerie L. Trent (respondent-appellee) and her husband, Ronny L. Trent. The child was born July 25, 1978, in a Kansas City, Missouri hospital. Mrs. Trent resides in Kansas City, Missouri; Mr. Trent resides in the Missouri State Penitentiary, Jefferson City, Missouri. Carl and Judy Hoover (petitioners-appellants) reside in Lenexa, Kansas.
About four months before the child's birth, the appellants learned of the natural mother's desire to place the expected child for adoption. The natural mother's sister, Vee Collins, and the appellant Judy Hoover's sister, Anna Ashe, initiated the discussions between the parties. The natural mother eventually telephoned the appellants, and told Judy Hoover the reasons why she was offering the child for adoption: the appellee was receiving welfare, and had financial problems; she already had one child; she had been taking Valium and Dilantin due to a health problem Thereafter, the parties were in frequent contact with each other by telephone, and in contact separately with the appellants' attorney, Dan Duncan. Mr. Duncan advised the appellants to move to Kansas to facilitate the private adoption. The appellants then lived in Missouri, but moved to Kansas in June 1978. Mr. Duncan discussed details of the adoption with both the appellants, and the appellee. He explained to the appellee the requirements of parental consent. Initially, the appellee expressed doubts about the ability to obtain her fugitive husband's consent.
which increased the probability of birth defects; and the child's father was a fugitive with incarceration pending.
On Saturday, May 20, 1978, Mr. Duncan received a telephone call from the appellee who stated that her husband was available and willing to sign a consent to adoption. The Trents went to Duncan's office where Mr. Trent signed an undated consent form which was then notarized by Susan Schleicher, Duncan's secretary. The appellants arrived unexpectedly during this meeting, and were present when Mr. Trent signed the consent form.
On July 25, 1978, Valerie Trent was admitted to the Kansas City Osteopathic Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri. She gave birth to a healthy male child at approximately 9:30 p. m. The next morning, July 26, the appellee called the appellant, Judy Hoover, to announce the birth and her willingness to proceed with the adoption. Later that day, around 1:30 p. m., the appellee told the appellant Judy that she had changed her mind about the adoption. The appellant Judy called Mr. Duncan and told him of the appellee's announcement. Shortly thereafter, the appellee's mother called Mr. Duncan and told him the appellee wanted to check out of the hospital and had decided to sign the consent before leaving. A bit confused by these events, Mr. Duncan called the appellee, Valerie Trent, who told him she wanted to sign the consent to adoption.
Mr. Duncan, with his secretary, Susan Schleicher, a Kansas notary public, immediately went to the appellee's hospital room in Kansas City, Missouri. When they arrived the appellee's sister was present in the room. Mr. Duncan gave the appellee the consent form, along with several copies, which she signed. Ms. Schleicher then signed and notarized each form. Mr. Duncan informed the appellee she would not be required to appear in court and give consent in person; this was contrary to prior statements he had made to the appellee. A hospital social worker entered the room during this time and observed the appellee signing the consent forms.
At the time she signed the consent forms the appellee had been without sleep for approximately 26 hours. She had taken no strong pain relieving medication because she had not yet signed the forms. The appellee testified that only two people pressured her to sign the consent forms her mother, and a sister who lived in Washington. Neither of those persons was present in the hospital room when the appellee signed the consent to adoption. The appellee was discharged from the hospital within one hour after these events.
On July 27, 1978, the appellants filed their petition for adoption along with the written consent, in the Johnson Count District Court, and obtained an order granting them temporary custody of the child. The hospital released the child to the appellants and issued a birth certificate naming him Michael Dale Hoover.
On July 31, 1978, the appellee retained counsel and commenced a habeas corpus proceeding. The proceeding was dismissed about one week later. On August 9, 1978, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss the adoption proceedings. Hearings were held on the adoption petition on September 27, and October 4, 1978. The trial court took the matter under advisement and on February 6, 1979, issued a memorandum decision denying the adoption. The trial court found the appellee's consent was voluntarily given, but invalid because it had not been acknowledged as required by law. The trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to grant the petition for adoption absent a The Court of Appeals held the consent was invalid because it was acknowledged in Missouri before a Kansas notary public. It held a Kansas notary public has no authority to act beyond the boundaries of Kansas. K.S.A.1980 Supp. 53-101 and 53-107. The defect in the acknowledgment was not deemed a mere irregularity, hence the doctrine of substantial compliance with Kansas law was not applied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected the appellants' argument that the consent was in substantial compliance with Missouri law and valid in a Kansas adoption proceeding. The Court of Appeals also rejected the appellants' plea for relief by equitable estoppel.
valid consent. Appeal was timely filed, and on September 12, 1980, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the trial court.
This court has never confronted before the specific issues raised by this case. After careful consideration of the various legal arguments and competing interests we conclude the doctrine of substantial compliance may appropriately be applied to the facts of this case. K.S.A. 59-2102 explains who must consent to a minor child's adoption and the manner in which the consent should be given. The first paragraph of the statute states, in pertinent part:
The statute's second paragraph states:
The appellee has referred us to our prior decisions interpreting K.S.A. 59-2102(3), wherein we have stated that the provisions of the adoption statutes must be strictly construed in favor of maintaining the rights of...
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...K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 59-2129(a)(6) and (b)(2). [40] In re Marsolf, 200 Kan. 128, 131, 434 P.2d 1010 (1967). See also In re Adoption of Trent, 229 Kan. 224, 228, 624 P.2d 433 (1981). [41] K.S.A. 59-2128(f). [42] Adoption of X.J.A., 284 Kan. 853, 878, 166 P.3d 396 (2007). [43] I.H.H-L, 45 Kan.Ap......
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