Aery v. Hoskins, Inc.

• Citation: 493 S.W.3d 684
• Decision Date: 30 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 04–14–00807–CV,04–14–00807–CV
• Parties: Brad Aery and Randi Aery, as Plaintiffs; and J. L. House Trust, Lloyd House, Robert Eugene House, Magdalen House, Judith Ann House, Wayne House, Jimmy R. House, Edna Pawelek Ulbrich, Peter Pawelek, Jesse Pawelek, Ruby Pawelek Schumacher, Elizabeth Pawelek Reich, Roy Pawelek, Darlene Williams, Diane Fischer Casey, Mary Kay Fischer Adams, and Arley House, as Intervenors and Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants v. Hoskins, Inc., C. Clifton Hoskins, Hazel Q. Hoskins Living Revocable Trust, Hazel Q. Hoskins, Trustee, Lee Ann Kulka, Lee Roy Hoskins, III, Andrea Jurica, Blake C. Hoskins, Brent C. Hoskins, and Leonard K. Hoskins, as Defendants, and Aurora Resources Corp., Armadillo E&P, Inc. f/k/a Texoz E&P II, Inc., Texoz E&P I, Inc., Sea Eagle Ford, LLC, and Sundance Energy, Inc., as Third-Party Defendants, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

493 S.W.3d 684

Brad Aery and Randi Aery, as Plaintiffs; and J. L. House Trust, Lloyd House, Robert Eugene House, Magdalen House, Judith Ann House, Wayne House, Jimmy R. House, Edna Pawelek Ulbrich, Peter Pawelek, Jesse Pawelek, Ruby Pawelek Schumacher, Elizabeth Pawelek Reich, Roy Pawelek, Darlene Williams, Diane Fischer Casey, Mary Kay Fischer Adams, and Arley House, as Intervenors and Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants

v.Hoskins, Inc., C. Clifton Hoskins, Hazel Q. Hoskins Living Revocable Trust, Hazel Q. Hoskins, Trustee, Lee Ann Kulka, Lee Roy Hoskins, III, Andrea Jurica, Blake C. Hoskins, Brent C. Hoskins, and Leonard K. Hoskins, as Defendants, and Aurora Resources Corp., Armadillo E&P, Inc. f/k/a Texoz E&P II, Inc., Texoz E&P I, Inc., Sea Eagle Ford, LLC, and Sundance Energy, Inc., as Third-Party Defendants, Appellees

No. 04–14–00807–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

Delivered and Filed: March 30, 2016

Rosemarie Kanusky, John W. Weber Jr., Jeffrey Webb, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Daniel Pozza, Pozza & Whyte, PLLC, Melanie Phipps Sanders, Kustoff & Phipps LLP, Marc Whyte, Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, LLP, San Antonio, TX, Attorneys for Appellant.

Julia Wommack Mann, Peter Earl Hosey, Jackson Walker LLP, San Antonio, TX, David William Navarro, Hornberger Sheehan Fuller & Beiter Inc., San Antonio, TX, David L. Ylitalo, Attorney at Law, San Antonio, TX, Bruce D. Oakley, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Houston, TX, Ellen Mitchell, C. David Kinder, Dykema Cox Smith, San Antonio, TX, Roberta Shellum Dohse, Conner Jackson, R. Clay Hoblit, Hoblit Ferguson Darling LLP, Corpus Christi, TX, Jason Allen Newman, Baker Botts LLP, Houston, TX, Ezra Johnson, Uhl, Fitzsimons, Jewett & Burton PLLC, San Antonio, TX, Michael C. Sartori, George West, TX, Benjamin F. Youngblood, III, San Antonio, TX, Attorneys for Appellee.

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice, Karen Angelini, Justice, Jason Pulliam, Justice

OPINION

Opinion by: Jason Pulliam

, Justice

Introduction

This litigation arises from a dispute involving three siblings' agreement to pool and share royalty interests in each of their three separate tracts of land. This appeal concerns the issue whether one sibling's undivided royalty interest held in the other tracts included in the pool became an appurtenance to his land and thereby was passed with that sibling's conveyance of his land through a general warranty deed. The appellants assert that by acquiring the land of one of the siblings, appellants also acquired his undivided royalty interest held in the land of the other siblings. The trial court granted declaratory relief on the parties' competing motions for summary judgment, stating a sibling's undivided royalty interest held in other tracts in the pool did not pass with that sibling's conveyance of his tract through a general warranty deed.

We affirm the trial court's declaratory judgment.

Procedural History

The subject real property from which this litigation arises originally consisted of 2,471.8 acres known as the Rose Teal Quinn Ranch (hereinafter referred to as “the Quinn Ranch”). In 1957 and 1963, Rose Quinn partitioned the surface estate of the Quinn Ranch and conveyed specific tracts to her three children: Hazel Hoskins, Sam Quinn, and Frances Ray. Rose also conveyed to her three children an undivided mineral interest in the Quinn Ranch. Also in 1963, the three siblings executed an agreement (“the Sibling Agreement”) which acknowledged the individual tracts conveyed to each and the undivided mineral estate. In the Sibling Agreement, the siblings partitioned the undivided mineral estate. The Sibling Agreement was filed in the real property records in McMullen County.

This appeal arises from suit brought by numerous plaintiff parties and intervenors who are all derivative of two principal parties, Brad Aery and Lloyd House (hereinafter collectively referred to as the House parties). The House parties derive their interest in the subject surface estate and mineral estate through Sam Quinn. The House parties brought suit against numerous defendants, principally within and derived from the Hoskins family (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Hoskins parties).¹ The House parties asserted numerous causes of action and sought declaratory relief pertaining to the parties' competing claims to royalty interests in production on the tracts originally devised to Hazel Hoskins and Frances Ray. Several of the Hoskins parties asserted counterclaims.

C. Clifton (Cliff) Hoskins and the House parties filed competing motions for partial summary judgment on the House parties' declaratory-judgment claims. Initially, on August 4, 2014, the trial court granted Clifton Hoskins' first amended motion for partial summary judgment on the House parties' requested declaratory relief, declaring,

[T]he February 6, 1966 Deed from Sam E. Quinn to James L. House conveying the lands of the 623.93–acre Quinn Tract ... did not convey Sam E. Quinn's non-participating royalty interest in the Ray Tract and Hoskins Tract, originally established and described in that certain November 7, 1963 Partition and Royalty Deed ... and subsequently conveyed to Hazel Hoskins and L.R. Hoskins by that certain February 11, 1966 Deed from Sam E. Quinn to L.R. Hoskins and Hazel Hoskins conveying his non-participating royalty interests in Ray Tract and Hoskins Tract.

In making this declaration, the trial court ordered that the House parties take nothing on their declaratory-judgment claims against Cliff Hoskins.

In response to this Order, the remaining defendant parties filed numerous derivative summary judgment motions, each seeking to apply the court's declaratory-judgment holding to the causes of action asserted against them. The trial court granted all of the derivative motions for summary judgment. In its order dated September 18, 2014, the trial court ordered the House parties take nothing on any of their claims against all of the defendant parties. Finally, on October 21, 2014, the trial court entered a final judgment. In this final judgment, the trial court incorporated its previous orders and disposed of all pending motions. By incorporating its previous orders, the trial court rendered a final judgment that effectively denied all causes of action asserted by all parties against each other, denied all requests for attorneys' fees, and denied the House parties' requests for declaratory relief. In its construction and interpretation of the Sibling Agreement, the trial court declared through its granting of Cliff Hoskins' motion for partial summary judgment that any royalty interest on the Ray tract and the Hoskins tract originally held by Sam was passed by Sam to Hazel and L.R. Hoskins on February 11, 1966.²

The House parties filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment, specifically the trial court's orders: (1) denying the House parties' joint motion for partial summary judgment, dated September 18, 2014; (2) granting the derivative summary judgment motions, dated September 18, 2014; and (3) granting Cliff Hoskins' first amended motion for partial summary judgment, dated August 4, 2014.

Standard of Review

A declaratory judgment rendered by summary judgment is reviewed under the same standards that govern summary judgments generally. Hourani v. Katzen, 305 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)

; Lidawi v. Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)

. When, as in this case, both sides move for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, an appellate court must review de novo all questions presented and all summary-judgment evidence presented by both sides. McCall v. McCall, 24 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). If the appellate issue raised is based on undisputed and unambiguous facts, the appellate court will review the trial court's award of declaratory relief and determine its propriety as a matter of law. See

Gramercy Ins. Co. v. MRD Invs., Inc., 47 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (citing Comm'rs Court of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.1997) ). The appellate court may then either affirm the judgment or reverse and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered, including one that denies both motions. Gramercy Ins. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 724 (citing Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.1988) ).

Under the traditional standard for summary judgment, the movant has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)

; KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.1999). When both parties move for summary judgment on strictly legal questions, each party “bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex.1993) ; Mandell v. Mandell, 214 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

Declaratory judgment is not an appropriate remedy to resolve a purely factual dispute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.003(a)

, 37.007 (West 2015) ; see also

Indian Beach Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Linden, 222 S.W.3d 682, 699–700 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Thus, a plaintiff who moves for summary judgment on a claim for declaratory relief must conclusively prove no genuine issue of material fact exists, and it is entitled to the requested declaratory relief as a matter of law. See

Schuhardt Consulting Profit Sharing Plan v. Double Knobs Mountain Ranch, Inc., 468 S.W.3d 557, 565–66 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) ; Indian Beach Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 222 S.W.3d at 699–700. Likewise, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment on a plaintiff's request for declaratory relief if the defendant disproves the plaintiff's entitlement to the declaratory relief as a matter of...