Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jewett Lumber Co., 55657
| Citation | 209 N.W.2d 48 |
| Decision Date | 03 July 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 55657,55657 |
| Parties | AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Appellee, v. JEWETT LUMBER COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Ronald A. Riley of Hansen, Wheatcraft & McClintock, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas A. Finley of Duncan, Jones, Riley & Finley, Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, REES, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ.
The question is whether an insurance policy covered a forklift vehicle. The trial court determined there was coverage and we agree.
State Equipment and Engine Corp. (insured) was insured under a comprehensive liability insurance policy issued by plaintiff. During the life of the policy the insured owned a forklift vehicle which it leased to defendant. While in defendant's possession it was destroyed by fire. Plaintiff paid the insured for the loss and thereafter as subrogee brought this action to recoup. Defendant resisted on the claim the forklift was not covered by the policy so the payment of the loss was voluntary. It is agreed that, unless plaintiff was legally obligated, its payment to its insured created no right of subrogation. The right of subrogation is of course necessary for plaintiff's standing to bring this action. The trial court determined the forklift was a 'covered vehicle' under the policy, authorizing plaintiff to proceed as subrogee. From this ruling defendant appeals.
I. The forklift was acquired by the insured after the policy was issued but is claimed to be covered under a fleet automatic provision which extends coverage to any vehicles thereafter acquired by insured during the term of the policy. The policy provided the company would pay fire losses for any 'covered vehicle.' The controlling question then becomes whether the forklift vehicle is included within the definition of a 'covered vehicle.'
The arguments for and against coverage proceed from somewhat differing definitions which are separately given in the policy. Defendant, arguing against coverage, relies on its interpretation of a provision in the general definitions section of the policy. There an automobile is defined as 'a land motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer designed for travel on public roads (including any machinery or apparatus attached thereto), but does not include mobile equipment.' In the same section mobile equipment is defined as 'a land vehicle (including any machinery or apparatus attached thereto), whether or not self-propelled, (1) not subject to motor vehicle registration, or (2) maintained for use exclusively on premises owned by or rented to the named insured, including the ways immediately adjoining, or (3) designed for use principally off public roads, or (4) designed or maintained for the sole purpose of affording mobility to equipment of the following types forming an integral part of or permanently attached to such vehicle: power cranes, shovels, loaders, diggers and drills; concrete mixers (other than the mix-intransit type); graders, scrapers, rollers and other road construction or repair equipment; air-compressors, pumps and generators, including spraying, welding and building cleaning equipment; and geophysical exploration and well servicing equipment; * * *.' Plaintiff's claim manager conceded that a forklift would probably fall within the category of mobile equipment.
Plaintiff, arguing the forklift was covered, cites a definition of 'covered automobiles' listed among the 'Additional Definitions' in the automobile physical damages portion of the policy. A covered automobile is described as a 'land motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer, including its equipment and other equipment permanently attached thereto (but not including robes, wearing apparel or personal effects) * * *.' The trial court agreed with the plaintiff, finding the forklift to be a land motor vehicle within the definition cited by plaintiff. We agre...
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...(relying on the policy definition of “motor vehicle,” which differs from the Louisiana UM statute); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jewett Lumber Co., 209 N.W.2d 48, 49–50 (Iowa 1973) (interpreting policy language unlike the statute at issue in this case); Cal. Packing Corp. v. Transp. Indemn. Co.......
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...the statute. Under these circumstances we do not consider this theory; plaintiff presents nothing for review. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jewett Lumber Co.,209 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Iowa); Berhow v. Kroack, 195 N.W.2d 379, 382 B. In another division of his brief, plaintiff claims that in its answer A......
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...on the policy definition of "motor vehicle," which differs from the Louisiana UM statute); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jewett Lumber Co., 209 N.W.2d 48, 49-50 (Iowa 1973) (interpreting policy language unlike the statute at issue in this case); Cal. Packing Corp. v. Transp. Indemn. Co., 80 Cal.......
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