Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Bidwell

• Decision Date: 16 June 1951
• Citation: 241 S.W.2d 595,28 Beeler 627,192 Tenn. 627
• Parties: , 192 Tenn. 627 AETNA LIFE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN. v. BIDWELL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 595

241 S.W.2d 595

28 Beeler 627, 192 Tenn. 627

AETNA LIFE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN. v. BIDWELL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 16, 1951.

Louis Farrell, Jr. and Jack Norman, Nashville, for appellant.

Denney, Leftwich & Glasgow, Nashville, for appellee.

TOMLINSON, Justice.

Mrs. Thacker was accidentally killed while riding on a pleasure trip in a one-half ton pick-up truck. She had an accident insurance policy issued to her, a resident of Tennessee, by the Aetna Life Insurance Company. That policy agreed to pay the beneficiary therein named a specified amount if the insured is accidentally killed 'while--riding in--a private passenger automobile of the pleasure car type'. The policy provided that the term 'automobile' as used therein should not 'include a motorcycle or any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation'.

The question presented by this lawsuit is whether this one-half ton pick-up truck was 'a private passenger automobile of the pleasure car type' within the meaning of the policy. There is affirmative evidence, if such evidence is competent, that pick-up trucks are commonly used in this State as a passenger vehicle for pleasure purposes. This fact is so generally known that this Court takes judicial knowledge of it.

The Circuit Judge to whom the case was submitted without a jury concluded, without writing an opinion, that the Insurance Company is liable under the terms of the policy. The Court of Appeals in a well considered opinion agreed with that conclusion. The company's petition for certiorari was granted. The question has been ably briefed and argued but without citation to any Tennessee decision--nor have we been able to find one--on the question stated.

If the question stated is one of fact, about which minds may reasonably disagree, the conclusion reached here, if supported by any material evidence, is final. This Court is bound by 'all inferences and conclusions reasonably drawn' from any material evidence in the record; Conaway v. New York Life Ins. Company, 171 Tenn. 290, 295, 102 S.W.2d 66, 68. On the other hand, if there be no ambiguity as to the meaning of that language of the policy upon which depends the answer to the question stated, then the applicability of this policy to this accident is a question of law.

The exclusion clause in this policy expressly states that a motorcycle and an aeroplane shall not be considered an automobile within the meaning of the policy. It would never have occurred to the average mind; that is, to the general public, that a motorcycle or an aeroplane would reasonably come within the meaning of an automobile. Therefore, when the insurer who prepared this contract expressly excluded these two vehicles from the definition of an automobile within the meaning of this policy it would seem to logically follow that the insurer did not intend for pick-up trucks to come within the exclusion under the well known rule that 'that which is expressed puts an end to that which is implied'. Wood v. Polk, 59 Tenn. 220, 230.

Quite applicable here is the Pennsylvania case of Koser v. American Casualty Company, 162 Pa.Super. 63, 56 A.2d 301, 303. In that case the question involved was whether a tractor is an automobile within the meaning of that word as used in the policy there under consideration. That policy contained an exclusion clause identical to the exclusion clause in the policy with which we are here dealing. The Court there said: 'When the Defendant, in said clause 10, excluded motorcycles and any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, they included every other kind of automobile.'

Likewise applicable as to the effect of this exclusion clause is the Missouri case of Hoover v. National Casualty Company, 236 Mo.App. 1093, 162 S.W.2d 363, 365. There the coverage was for an accident while riding in 'a private pleasure type automobile * * * as a passenger, (excluding motorcycle and farm machinery)'. The Court in discussing the effect of this exclusion clause in the construction of the policy held this: 'It (the insurer) went further and specifically excluded motorcycles and a whole class of automotive farm machinery which, we think, could not have been considered as coming under the classification of 'pleasure type automobile.' When the above rule is applied to the exclusion clause, it would seem that all automotive vehicles not specifically named and excluded are meant to be included in the coverage.'

Our opinion is that on principle, and under the expressio unius rule, and under the persuasive decisions from other jurisdictions hereinabove discussed, it must be concluded that the pick-up truck in which the insured in the case at bar was riding was a passenger automobile within the meaning of the policy with which we are dealing.

That said hereinabove brings consideration of this case to the question of whether this pick-up truck may reasonably be construed as being a 'pleasure car type' passenger automobile within the meaning of this policy, it being generally and commonly used for pleasure purposes. Respondent so insists. Petitioner insists that there is no reasonable basis for such a construction. It says that the expression 'pleasure car type' is free of ambiguity and that, therefore, the fact that such a truck is commonly used in this State as a passenger car for pleasure purposes cannot be considered. Its insistence is that 'the type of classification of a motor vehicle is distinct from, and unrelated to, its use'.

Petitioner cites in support of its above stated insistence Lloyd v. Columbus Mutual Life Insurance Company, 200 N.C. 722, 158 S.E. 386, and Dirst v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 232 Iowa 910, 5 N.W.2d 184. Spence v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 320 Ill.App. 149, 50 N.E.2d 128 is also a decision practically identical with these North Carolina and Iowa cases.

In the North Carolina case, supra, coverage was against accidents while riding in a 'private automobile of the pleasure car type'. [200 N.C. 722, 158 S.E. 387.] The insured was killed while pleasure riding in a one and one-half Ford truck used principally for hauling milk. The Court held that the facts presented 'a bald proposition of law' and that 'manifestly, the truck in which plaintiff's intestate was riding at the time of his death was by intention, use, and construction a commercial vehicle, and so classified by the North Carolina statute'. It held that the accident did not come within the policy.

While it cannot be said that the conclusion of the North Carolina Court was based entirely upon its statute classifying motor vehicles, it must be said that the Court attached material importance to that statute in reaching the conclusion that as a matter of law this truck could not be classified as a 'pleasure car type' automobile. The Iowa and Illinois cases, supra, in referring to the North Carolina case as persuasive authority, likewise referred to their statutes of similar import. In Tennessee the classification given to motor vehicles by statutes enacted for the regulation and taxing of such vehicles does not apply in ascertaining the terms of an insurance contract. Moore v. Life and Accident Insurance Co., 162 Tenn. 682, 40 S.W.2d 403. Therefore, there was applied in those cases a rule of law not applicable in...