AFSCME v. City of Norwalk

• Decision Date: 24 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 35917.,35917.
• Citation: 156 Conn.App. 79,113 A.3d 430
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: AFSCME, AFL–CIO, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 2405 v. CITY OF NORWALK et al.

156 Conn.App. 79

113 A.3d 430

AFSCME, AFL–CIO, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 2405

v.CITY OF NORWALK et al.

No. 35917.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 27, 2014.

Decided March 24, 2015.

J. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Kimberly A. Cuneo, West Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

M. Jeffry Spahr, deputy corporation counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).

Frank N. Cassetta, assistant general counsel, for the appellee (defendant State Board of Labor Relations).

BEACH, PRESCOTT and FOTI, Js.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

General Statutes § 7–470(a)(1) prohibits municipal employers from “[i]nterfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7–468”¹ of the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7–460 et seq. This administrative appeal arises out of a prohibited practice complaint filed by the plaintiff, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, Council 4, Local 2405 (union), against the defendant city of Norwalk (city), alleging that supervisory personnel employed by the city's Department of Public Works (department) engaged in conduct prohibited by § 7–470(a)(1) after one of the union's members filed a grievance against the department. The State Board of Labor Relations (board), a codefendant in this case, denied the union's complaint after concluding that the union had failed to prove a prima facie case that the city violated § 7–470(a)(1). The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether substantial evidence supported the board's decision. We conclude that it did and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the union's appeal.

The following facts, which are relevant to our resolution of this appeal, were found by the board. The union represents a bargaining unit composed of city employees assigned to the department. On December 21, 2009, Christopher Torre, a department supervisor, held a snowplow crew meeting to address complaints that snow had not been properly removed from intersections during a storm the previous weekend. At some point during this meeting, Torre asked three crew members why they were late arriving to the meeting. One of the crew members, Hector DeJesus, responded that he was late because he had been conducting union business. Torre responded that union business during work hours must be preapproved by the department's director, and that the city and/or Torre “ ‘owns you from 7 to 3.’ ” DeJesus responded that certain union business did not require preapproval. Torre disputed DeJesus' claim, discussed the manner in which intersections should be plowed in the future, and adjourned the meeting.

Approximately nine days later, Lawrence Taylor, a crew member who attended the meeting held by Torre, filed a grievance on a form filled out by DeJesus alleging that “[Torre's] ... constant racist statements, telling the men ... I own you from 7 a.m. till 3:30 p.m. ... [and scare] tactics are in violation [of the parties' collective bargaining agreement] and [d]iscrimination [l]aws....” Two or three days after filing the grievance, Taylor received a telephone call from Torre during which Torre told him that he should “ ‘not go down that road’ ” with DeJesus and Milton Giddiens, the union's president. Taylor asked Torre if Torre was threatening him, and Torre denied that he was. Taylor then told Torre that his crew did not like Torre or his scare tactics, and the conversation ended.

On January 5, 2010, Torre told DeJesus that his truck was dirty and directed him to wash it. DeJesus responded that the truck had just been washed and still had soap residue on it. He further told Torre to speak with another supervisor to confirm that the truck had been washed. Torre responded by taking photographs of DeJesus' truck. Around the same time, Torre told other employees within the department that the city had previously terminated DeJesus' employment for taking money from a customer, but that the city was forced to reinstate him on the basis of a technicality. Two days later, a member of the union's executive board heard Torre singing “Back Stabbers,” a popular rhythm and blues song, loudly near the entrance to the cafeteria.

Approximately three days after the dispute over the cleanliness of DeJesus' work vehicle, the department's director, Harold Alvord, reminded Giddiens in a letter that a longstanding department policy required union members to seek preapproval before conducting union business during work hours. Four days later, Alvord sent Giddiens a memorandum denying Taylor's grievance.

The union subsequently filed a prohibited practice complaint against the city claiming that Torre's actions in (1) calling Taylor and encouraging him to withdraw his grievance, (2) directing DeJesus to clean his work vehicle, and (3) notifying the union that it would begin enforcing the department's policy of requiring union members to seek preapproval before conducting union business during work hours² interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in MERA and, as a consequence, violated § 7–470(a)(1).³

The board held a hearing on the union's complaint and, with one member dissenting, dismissed it after concluding that the union had failed to make a prima facie showing that the city had discriminated against department employees on the basis of their protected activity. In doing so, the board also considered and rejected an additional claim not raised in the union's complaint that Torre had improperly disclosed DeJesus' past disciplinary history to other city employees.

The union appealed from the board's decision to the trial court, which dismissed the union's appeal after concluding that substantial evidence supported the board's decision. The union then appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The union advances two principal claims. First, it claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the board applied the proper standard in determining that the city did not violate § 7–470(a)(1). Second, it claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the board's determination that the union failed to demonstrate the existence of antiunion animus was supported by substantial evidence.⁴

In light of the manner in which this case has been litigated by the union, we are not persuaded.

I

We turn first to the union's claim that the board failed to apply the proper standard in determining that the city did not violate § 7–470(a)(1). We begin our analysis of this claim by setting forth the well established standard governing our review. “[J]udicial review of an administrative agency's action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4–166 et seq., and the scope of that review is limited.... When reviewing the trial court's decision, we seek to determine whether it comports with the [UAPA].... [R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.... Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact.... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if ... they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.... The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of [its] discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dickman v. Office of State Ethics, Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board, 140 Conn.App. 754, 766–67, 60 A.3d 297, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 934, 66 A.3d 497 (2013).

Our Supreme Court has previously recognized that “[MERA] ... is closely patterned after the National Labor Relations Act [ (NLRA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. ] ... [and] the language of these [acts] is essentially the [same]....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 239 Conn. 168, 193 n. 3, 682 A.2d 490 (1996). Accordingly, “[i]n judging whether the labor board's interpretation was reasonable, we may look to federal labor law for guidance in construing our labor relations acts.” Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 120, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991) ; see Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 299 Conn. 63, 80, 7 A.3d 371 (2010) ( “because Connecticut statutes dealing with labor relations have been closely patterned after the [NLRA] ... the federal statute is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of our own acts” [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted] ); Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE, 201 Conn. 577, 589, 519 A.2d 1 (1986) (“[T]he language of [MERA] ... and of the [NLRA] ... is essentially the same.... Therefore, the judicial interpretation frequently accorded the federal act is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of our own acts.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ); Winchester v. State Board of Labor Relations, 175 Conn. 349, 354, 402 A.2d 332 (1978) (“[MERA] ... is closely patterned after the [NLRA] ... which a comparison of the two acts clearly demonstrates.... This court has stated that it is for this reason that the judicial interpretation frequently accorded the federal act is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of our own act.... In speaking of the similarity of language that exists between the [NLRA] ... and ... MERA, we have often noted that the language of these [acts] is essentially the same....” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ).

Section 7–470 (a)(1), which is almost identical to § 8(a)(1) of...