Agan v. Singletary, 92-2442
| Decision Date | 11 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2442,92-2442 |
| Parties | James AGAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Robert A. Butterworth, Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Mark C. Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, FL, for respondents-appellants.
Larry Helm Spalding, Martin McClain, Gail E. Anderson, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, FL, for petitioner-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before FAY, ANDERSON and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
The court, sua sponte, issues the revised opinion attached.
The State of Florida appeals the grant of James Agan's petition for writ of habeas corpus. We hold that the District Court for the Middle District of Florida properly issued the writ. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
On September 19, 1980, James Agan ("Agan") plead guilty to the murder of a fellow inmate, Dana DeWitt ("DeWitt"), at the Florida State Prison. As a result of the plea and sentencing proceeding, the court imposed a sentence of death. 1 Agan v. State, 445 So.2d 326 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 225, 83 L.Ed.2d 154 (1984). After exhausting state remedies, 2 Agan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The court denied the petition. Agan v. Dugger, No. 87-489-Civ-J-16 (June 24, 1987).
Agan appealed the denial to our Court 3 and we remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of Agan's ineffective assistance of counsel and competency claims. Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205, 108 S.Ct. 2846, 101 L.Ed.2d 884 (1988). Following the evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted the petition and issued the writ based on ineffective assistance of counsel and competency grounds. Agan v. Dugger, No. 87-489-Civ-J-16 (March 17, 1992). The State of Florida now appeals that determination. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253.
Agan was serving a life sentence for first degree murder without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. During his incarceration at the Florida State Prison, Agan had a conflict with DeWitt over money DeWitt had allegedly stolen from him. Subsequently, Agan was disciplined by confinement in special restriction for two years for possession of a weapon which he purportedly intended to use against DeWitt.
Following the two year disciplinary confinement, Agan was returned to general population and assigned a job in a prison factory. Shortly thereafter, DeWitt was stabbed to death in his cell. Agan almost immediately accepted responsibility for the murder, but refused to offer many details regarding how the crime occurred. Specifically, after the prison officials placed him under arrest, Agan openly admitted guilt but vehemently refused to explain any of the incidents surrounding the murder or to specifically identify the murder weapon. During the recorded arrest proceedings taken on September 19, the day of the murder, Agan would not respond to certain questions:
Q. (By Colonel Barton): When you went to the cell today, was he laying down on the floor or standing up?
A. (Mr. Agan): I'm not going to answer that question: I don't know, sir, I just stepped out the door.
Q. Describe the knife to me.
A. I'm not going to do that ...
. . . . .
Q. (By Mr. Clark): You've got me confused a little bit Mr. Agan. If you don't want to answer any questions, that's okay. You know you can stop don't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I don't understand why you won't describe the knife because you know that will be the evidence against you when you admit killing a man and that's evidence against you.
A. Well, see--
Q. I'm not trying to trick you, but that makes me wonder if you really killed the man.
. . . . .
Q. Well, I don't know. What I don't understand is that I'm not asking you to describe the knife. I'm not asking you that question. I'm asking you [sic] can you tell me why you admitted killing the man and you know the tape recorder is going and there are four other people in the room here to witness that, and you won't tell what the knife looked like.
A. I'm not going to tell you.
Q. Well, I understand that you won't do it. I understand that. I don't understand why.
A. Well, I--I didn't even want to talk about it.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6--4--3-5.
However, on September 23, 1980--some four days after DeWitt's murder--Agan requested that Officer Ball take his statement regarding the incidents surrounding the murder. Agan stated to prison officials that, using factory machinery, he made a knife out of a piece of metal. He further stated that he selected a time when both he and DeWitt were in their cells and no prisoners or guards were around DeWitt's cell. He purportedly went to DeWitt's cell and fatally stabbed him in the neck. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6--8. The four day gap between Agan's acceptance of responsibility for the murder and his detailed explanation of the circumstances surrounding the crime adds yet another question to an otherwise curious pattern of events.
John Stinson initially represented Agan. Stinson was appointed in the first week of October, 1980. Agan told Stinson that he wanted to confess and plea guilty. Stinson contacted investigator Leonard Ball who participated in the investigation of the DeWitt homicide. Ball told Stinson that there were several inmates under investigation and added that Agan might have been covering up for the actual murderers. Ball did not think that the case would go forward against Agan even though he was arrested following his confession. Stinson took notes on the conversation with Ball and later dictated them into a memorandum. On October 21, 1980, Stinson filed a motion to withdraw from representing Agan.
Following Stinson's withdrawal, the court appointed Mack Futch to represent Agan. Futch had little, if any, communication with Stinson regarding the case. In fact, Futch neither requested nor received a copy of Stinson's file. 4 Apparently as a result of Futch's confidence concerning Agan's guilt, Futch spent a total of approximately fifteen (15) hours on the case only seven (7) of which involved any actual investigation.
Furthermore, Futch did not interview any of the inmates, never obtained Agan's prison medical file which would have revealed a lengthy history of mental health problems, and had no idea that Agan was taking psychotropic medication at the time of the plea and sentencing. Futch ended the inquiry into Agan's family history when Agan was unwilling to answer questions. Likewise, Futch ended the inquiry into Agan's psychiatric background when Agan stated that he had no such history and refused to submit to a psychiatric examination.
At the evidentiary hearing before the District Court, Stinson testified that he was unsure whether Agan communicated in a completely rational manner. Although Agan did not appear "obviously medicated" or "heavily sedated," Stinson was concerned about Agan's competence. This concern was present even though Stinson did not know that Agan was taking medication during the time Stinson represented him. If Stinson had remained Agan's lawyer, he would have conducted a thorough investigation of Agan's mental background.
A brief review of Agan's mental health records by either Stinson or Futch would have, at the very least, revealed that: (1) Agan's military records reflect various blackout incidents; (2) Agan was diagnosed as psychotic by three psychiatrists in the 1950's while he was incarcerated at the Georgia State Prison; (3) in 1956, Agan was transferred to Milledgeville State Hospital in Georgia for psychiatric examination and treatment; (4) while at Milledgeville, Agan received eighty-one electric shock treatments--standard procedure at the time for a person with a psychotic illness; (5) one Milledgeville psychiatrist diagnosed Agan as a low-grade psychopathic personality bordering on high grade mental deficiency while another doctor at Milledgeville diagnosed Agan as having psychoneurosis anxiety reaction with psychotic episodes.
In addition, had Stinson or Futch reviewed Agan's Florida State Prison medical records, they would have discovered that in 1975, Dr. Britton evaluated Agan as an antisocial personality with a history of drug abuse and residual type schizophrenia. The records would also have revealed that between 1975 and November, 1980, Agan was continuously treated with one or more of the following psychotropic drugs: (1) Thorazine--a tranquilizer; (2) Mellaril--a tranquilizer; (3) Prolixin--an intravenous tranquilizer; (4) Haldol--an extremely potent tranquilizer; and (5) Sinequan--an antidepressant.
In sum, both Stinson and Futch stated that had either of them had any indication as to the extent of Agan's mental history, they would have questioned Agan's competency to enter a plea.
Prison investigator L.E. Turner prepared a report and compiled a file during his investigation of the DeWitt murder. However, the file was not discovered until some eight (8) years later. Thus, none of the attorneys involved in the case, Stinson, Futch, or James Elwell ("Elwell") 5 ever saw this material prior to the plea or sentencing proceedings. Elwell later stated that, as a matter of personal practice, he would have disclosed such information to the defense had it been know to him at the time. 6
Turner's file contained the following: (1) a September 9, 1980 letter from DeWitt to Carl Frye, his stepfather, asking for $100.00 to pay alleged extortionist inmates Michael Gross and Lawrence Cormack; (2) a September 15, 1980 letter from DeWitt to Cindy Pelligrino about two unidentified white men...
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