Agarunova v. Stella Orton Home Care Agency, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2019
• Docket Number: 16-CV-0638 (MKB)
• Parties: MARAL AGARUNOVA, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE STELLA ORTON HOME CARE AGENCY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

MARAL AGARUNOVA, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE STELLA ORTON HOME CARE AGENCY, INC., Defendant.

16-CV-0638 (MKB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 25, 2019

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Maral Agarunova commenced the above-captioned action on her own behalf against Defendant The Stella Orton Home Care Agency, Inc., on February 5, 2016, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA"), the Wage Theft Prevent Act ("WTPA"), and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), alleging that Defendant engaged in illegal pay practices and wage and hour violations. (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) On September 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, (Am. Compl., Docket Entry No. 30), and on October 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Class and Collective Action Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), asserting FLSA and NYLL claims on behalf of herself and other similarly situated home health and personal care aids employed by Defendant, (SAC, Docket Entry No. 41). Two additional Plaintiffs, Alfira Caprita and Tatsiana Matveyenkava (collectively, the "Opt-in Plaintiffs"),¹ subsequently filed Consent to Join forms with the Court. (Alfira Caprita Consent to Join, Docket Entry No. 55-1; Tatsiana Matveyenkava Consent to Join, Docket EntryNo. 61-1.)

Currently before the Court are Defendant's motions (1) to compel arbitration, and (2) to stay this action pending resolution of a class grievance. (Def. Mot. to Compel Arbitration ("Def. Mot. to Compel"), Docket Entry No. 82; Def. Mem. in Supp. of Def. Mot. to Compel ("Def. Mem."), Docket Entry No. 82-11; Def. Mot. to Stay, Docket Entry No. 104.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Defendant's motion to compel and motion to stay as to Agarunova, reserves decision on Defendant's motion to compel as to the Opt-in Plaintiffs, and denies the motion to stay as moot as to the Opt-in Plaintiffs.

I. Background

a. Factual background

The following facts are taken from the SAC and the declaration of Phillip K. Davidoff and the attached exhibits, filed in support of Defendant's motion to compel.² (SAC; Decl. of Phillip K. Davidoff ("Davidoff Decl."), Docket Entry No. 82-1.)

i. The parties

Defendant is a home health care agency whose workers provide home-based aid toindividuals in need of medical or other home care assistance. (SAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs are health care workers formerly employed by Defendant. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that they, and other members of the putative class, typically worked more than forty hours per week and that Defendant failed to pay them the overtime compensation to which they are entitled. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 25-46.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant consistently delayed payment of compensation to which they were entitled. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 47-54.)

Defendant employed Agarunova from 2008 until April of 2015, (id. ¶ 10); Caprita from August 1, 2014 until August 5, 2016, (Caprita Compl. ¶ 10, annexed to Davidoff Decl. as Ex. C, Docket Entry No. 82-4),³ and Matveyenkava from October 18, 2002 until July 17, 2016, (Decl. of Tatsiana Matveyenkava ¶ 2, annexed to Davidoff Decl. as Ex. H, Docket Entry No. 82-9).

ii. The dispute resolution provision of the collective bargaining agreement

Defendant's employees are members of 1199SEIU Union Healthcare Workers East (the "Union"), who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") and several memoranda of agreement extending and modifying the CBA. (2014 MOA, annexed to Davidoff Decl. as Ex. A, Docket Entry No. 82-2; 2015 MOA, annexed to Davidoff Decl. as Ex. B, Docket Entry No. 82-3.) On March 1, 2014, Defendant and the Union entered into a memorandum ofagreement (the "2014 MOA") reflecting their intention to continue negotiations in order to implement an alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") provision in light of "changes in federal and state law imposing new obligations on the Employer." (2014 MOA 6.) The 2014 MOA provides in pertinent part:

The Parties agree that given changes in federal and state law imposing new obligations on the Employer and exposing Employers to a significantly increased level of litigation, it is in the interest of the Union, Employees, and the Employer to develop an expeditious and effective alternative dispute resolution procedure for the resolution of claims arising under such laws. Accordingly, between the execution of this Agreement and December 1, 2014, as otherwise agreed by the parties, the parties shall meet in good faith to negotiate such an alternative dispute resolution procedure. If the parties are unable to agree to such a procedure in the allotted time, the Employer may submit the dispute to Martin F. Scheinman for final and binding arbitration.

(Id. at 6-7.) Defendant and the Union subsequently agreed to an ADR provision, memorialized in an agreement signed on December 16, 2015 (the "2015 MOA"). Section one of the ADR provision of the 2015 MOA provides in pertinent part:

The parties agree a goal of this Agreement is to ensure compliance with all federal, state, and local wage hour law and wage parity statutes. Accordingly, to ensure the uniform administration and interpretation of this Agreement in connection with federal, state and local wage-hour and wage parity statutes, all claims brought by either the Union or Employees, asserting violations of or arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Law, or New York Labor Law (collectively, the "Covered Statutes"), in any manner, shall be subject exclusively, to the grievance and arbitration procedures described in this Article . . . . All such claims if not resolved in the grievance procedure, including class grievances filed by the Union, or mediation as described below shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration before Martin F. Scheinman, Esq.

(2015 MOA 8.) Sections two and three of the 2015 MOA describe the Union's obligations under the ADR provision. (Id. at 9.) Section four provides that "[i]n the event an Employee has requested, in writing, that the Union process a grievance alleging a violation of the CoveredStatutes and the Union declines to process a grievance, . . . an Employee solely on behalf of herself, may submit her individual claim to mediation, or following the conclusion of mediation, to arbitration." (Id.) Sections five and six provide further procedural frameworks for arbitration. (Id. at 10.)

iii. Defendant's motion to stay based on the filing of a grievance by the Union

On January 7, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to stay this action pending resolution of a class grievance filed by the Union. (Def. Mot. to Stay 1.) On January 2, 2019, the Union filed a "class action grievance on behalf of all of its home care bargaining unit members employed by various agencies," including Defendant, "concerning claims that employees were not properly paid on 24-hour cases and with respect to any other outstanding wage and hour claims arising under the Covered Statutes."⁴ (Wage and Hour Grievance 1, annexed to Def. Mot. to Stay as Ex. B, Docket Entry No. 104-2.)

II. Discussion

a. Standard of review

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") requires courts to compel arbitration of claims that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). Courts consider four factors in order to determine whether an action should be dismissed in favor of arbitration: "(1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the scope [of] the arbitration agreement; (3) whether, if federal statutory claims are asserted, Congress intendedthose claims to be nonarbitrable; and (4) whether, if some but not all of the claims in the case are arbitrable, the case should be stayed pending arbitration." McAllister v. Conn. Renaissance Inc., 496 F. App'x 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also Garcia v. Golden Abacus Inc., No. 16-CV-6252, 2017 WL 2560007, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2017) (same).

Generally, "as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see also Arrigo v. Blue Fish Commodities, Inc., 408 F. App'x 480, 481 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting same). When an agreement is clear, "it is the language of the contract that defines the scope of disputes subject to arbitration." E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002); see also Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that "[t]he threshold question of whether the parties . . . agreed to arbitrate is determined by state contract law principles"). An employee's right to pursue statutory claims may only be waived by a CBA if that waiver is "clear[] and unmistakable[]." See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009); see also Lawrence v. Sol G. Atlas Realty Co., Inc., 841 F.3d 81, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2016) (refusing to compel arbitration where the CBA did not clearly encompass the plaintiffs' statutory claims).

In deciding a motion to compel arbitration, courts apply a similar standard to that applied to a motion for summary judgment and "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229. The party "seeking to avoid arbitration generally bears the burden of showing the agreement to be inapplicable or invalid." Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000)). In addition, "[a] district court must stay proceedings once it is 'satisfiedthat the parties have agreed in writing to arbitrate an issue or issues underlying the district court proceeding.'" Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229 (quoting WorldCrisa Corp. v. Armstrong, 129 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Katz v. Cellco...