Agnew v. City of Los Angeles

Decision Date29 April 1952
Citation110 Cal.App.2d 612,243 P.2d 73
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesAGNEW v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. Civ. 18802.

Ray L. Chesebro, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., James A. Doherty, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for appellants.

R. W. Agnew, in pro. per.

VALLEE, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this suit for a decree declaring that sections 93.64 and 93.65 of the Electrical Code of Los Angeles (Mun. Code, Art. 3, ch. 9, enacted November 12, 1948, effective January 1, 1949) are invalid, and to enjoin their enforcement. Plaintiff had a decree as prayed. Defendants appeal.

Section 93.64 1 provides that every person operating as an electrical contractor, who desires to obtain permits for electrical installations and wiring, shall register and pay 'a permit service fee of $100.00 to defray expenses of miscellaneous inspections, reinspections and other services not specifically mentioned' in the Electrical Code. The fee is collected annually on and after January 1st for each calendar year. No permit may be issued to any licensed contractor who has not registered and paid the fee for the current year. Any person who has registered and paid the registration fee as provided in sections 93.561 2 and 93.573, 3 and any dwelling owner qualified under section 93.568, is excepted.

Section 93.65 4 provides that before a permit for electrical installations or wiring may be issued to any person such person shall furnish an approved surety bond in the sum of $1,000 to the city, payable to persons damaged by reason of any violation of the Electrical Code.

Plaintiff is an electrical contractor duly licensed by the state pursuant to the provisions of the Business and Professions Code. Defendants threaten to prosecute him criminally should he fail to comply with sections 93.64 and 93.65. The court concluded that section 93.64 is invalid for the reason it is regulatory in nature and for the further reason it is arbitrary, unreasonable and uncertain. It concluded that section 93.65 is invalid for the reason the city has sought to impose conditions, regulations and restrictions which it has no power to impose on electrical contractors licensed pursuant to the Business and Professions Code.

'Any * * * city * * * may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.' Const. art. XI, § 11. The last clause of this section is a limitation on the power of municipalities, from whatever source the power is derived. In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 148, 14 P. 405; In re Mingo, 190 Cal. 769, 773, 214 P. 850. A local ordinance is in conflict with general law if the general law occupies the entire field, leaving no room for local regulations. Mr. Chief Justice Gibson, writing for the court in Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515, stated that the general rule permitting the adoption of local regulations in the form of additional reasonable requirements not in conflict with general law is subject to the exception that the local regulation is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field which is fully occupied by the general law.

Defendants contend that sections 93.64 and 93.65 do not conflict with the Business and Professions Code. Plaintiff says they do. We have concluded they do.

The Business and Professions Code, Div. 3, ch. 9, sometimes called the 'Contractors' License Act,' creates a 'Contractors' State License Board', referred to as the board, Bus. & Prof.Code, § 7000; defines those coming within the jurisdiction of the board, including electrical contractors, § 7026; prohibits any person from engaging in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor without first having obtained a state license, and makes it a misdemeanor to do so, §§ 7028, 7030; provides for investigation and examination of applicants for license, § 7072; 5 requires the payment of an application fee, annual renewal fees, and penalties, § 7137; makes elaborate provision for investigation of the acts of contractors, accusations against them, causes for disciplinary action, hearings, review, discipline, prosecution of violations of any law, and renewal or reissuance of suspended or revoked licenses, §§ 155, 7090-7122; and vests broad powers in the board relative to the licensing and regulation of contractors. §§ 7000-7145.

Wilful or deliberate disregard and violation of the building laws of the state, or of any political subdivision thereof, constitutes a cause for disciplinary action. § 7110. Section 7071.5 provides that before reinstatement after disciplinary action the board may require the applicant to give a surety bond or make a cash deposit conditioned upon his compliance with the provisions of the Act. Every person injured by the unlawful acts or omissions of such contractor may maintain an action on the bond or a claim on the deposit.

The intent of the Legislature in adopting the general scheme for the licensing and regulation of contractors is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. It was clearly the intention of the Legislature to declare that the licensing and regulation of contractors by the state shall be the only licensing and regulation in the state. This does not limit the right of a city or county to protect life and property by the enforcement of local regulations as to character and qualify of electrical installations. Bus. & Prof.Code, § 7110.

We are of the view that Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal.App.2d 443, 168 P.2d 767, City and County of San Francisco v. Boss, 83 Cal.App.2d 445, 189 P.2d 32, and Collins v. Priest, 95 Cal.App.2d 179, 212 P.2d 269, are determinative of the questions presented. A hearing was denied in each of those cases. Each of them held: (1) the licensing of contractors throughout the state is a matter of general and state-wide concern, and is not a municipal affair that concerns only the inhabitants of a chartered city and which is subject to local regulation; (2) the state, by the provisions of the Business and Professions Code to which we have referred, has adopted a broad and comprehensive plan for licensing contractors throughout the state, for examination as to their qualifications and fitness to engage in their various activities, for licensing only those who prove themselves qualified by satisfactorily passing examinations, and for punishing those who prove themselves incompetent or unfaithful to the trust imposed in them; (3) the general law has fully occupied the field; (4) a state license implies permission to the licensee to conduct his business at any place in the state, and this permission should not be circumscribed by local authorities; (5) a city ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements. See, also, In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254, 93 P.2d 105, 123 A.L.R. 1378.

In the Horwith case, 74 Cal.App.2d 443, at page 448, 168 P.2d 767, at page 770, the court declared: 'The state license implies permission to the licensee to conduct his business at any place within the State. This permission should not be circumscribed by local authorities. This does not limit the right of local governmental agencies to protect property and life through the enforcement of local regulations as to the quality and character of the installations. The right to enforce local ordinances is still in the hands of municipalities through the power of inspections and permits.'

In the Boss case, 83 Cal.App.2d 445, 189 P.2d 32, 33, it was held that San Francisco could not recover unpaid license taxes for the fiscal years 1943-1946 from a painting contractor who had not obtained a certificate from the city to the effect that he was registered as a licensed contractor as required by a city ordinance. The ordinance provided that all amounts received from the issuance of these certificates 'shall be used to defray the cost of making the investigations and reports and furnishing the information mentioned in Section 205 of [110 Cal.App.2d 618] this article.' Section 205 provided that any contractor may apply to the superintendent of the Bureau of Building Inspection or to the city engineer for 'all information necessary to enable said contractor to prepare for the execution of any contract for construction, alteration or improvement of any building, structure, street, road or way' and that such information shall be made available 'in order to enable said contractor to prepare for the execution or performance of such contract; all without charge, and when in order to obtain said information, an inspection or investigation of the site on which said contract is to be performed is necessary, said inspection and investigation shall be made.' The court held the ordinance invalid and that its purpose was regulation, not revenue. The same is true with respect to the ordinance provisions under consideration: their purpose is regulation.

The Electrical Code contains detailed specific fees for miscellaneous inspections, reinspections, and other services which are set forth in the margin. 6 The Code expressly requires the payment of a $2 fee for any electrical wiring for which a permit is required but for which no fee is provided. § 93.60.

Section 93.64 compels a state-licensed contractor to register with the electrical division of the Department of Building and Safety before he may obtain a permit for electrical installations and wiring in the city. As we have noted, no person may engage in or carry on the business of electrical contracting, or install, alter, or repair any electrical wiring in the city, without having first registered and obtained a certificate of registration. § 93.561. No person may do so after the certificate of registration issued to him has expired or has been revoked or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Weekes v. City of Oakland
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 17, 1976
    ...for revenue purposes but as an inseparable part of a regulatory scheme excluded by state law. (See also Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal.App.2d 612, 619-623, 243 P.2d 73; Lynch v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal.App.2d 115, 118-120, 249 P.2d 856; City & County of San Francisco v. Boss, 83......
  • Northern Cal. Psychiatric Society v. City of Berkeley
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 1986
    ...1 [local ordinance licensing fire insurance adjusters in conflict with Bus. & Prof.Code, § 7520 et seq.]; Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 612, 615, 243 P.2d 73 [local fee and bond for electrical contractors void]; San Francisco v. Boss (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 445, 448-450, 1......
  • Agnew v. City of Los Angeles
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 1961
    ...solely for revenue purposes but as an inseparable part of a regulatory scheme excluded by state law. See also Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal.App.2d 612, 619-623, 243 P.2d 73; Lynch v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal.App.2d 115, 118-120, 249 P.2d 856; City and County of San Francisco v. ......
  • Willingham Bus Lines, Inc. v. Municipal Court for San Diego Judicial Dist. of San Diego County
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1967
    ...to those prescribed by the state.' (In re Galusha (1921) 184 Cal. 697, 699, 195 P. 406, 407; cf. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 612, 619--621, 243 P.2d 73; 44 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. (1964) 117, 118--121.) It simply provides 'an increase in * * * revenue by imposing a tax upon......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT