Agnew v. Jones

• Decision Date: 18 January 1897
• Citation: 23 So. 25,74 Miss. 347
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: S. A. AGNEW ET AL. v. A. G. JONES

23 So. 25

74 Miss. 347

S. A. AGNEW ET AL. v. A. G. JONES

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 18, 1897

October 1896

FROM the circuit court, first district, of Hinds county HON ROBERT POWELL, Judge.

Plaintiffs sued defendant before a justice of the peace, claiming that they were the owners of a house which defendant had torn down and converted the material thereof to his own use. A jury trial was had in the justice's court, resulting in a verdict of one cent against defendant. Plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court, where a trial de novo was had, and, upon which, the facts were shown to be these:

Certain residents of Forest Hill School District concluded, for their convenience, to erect a schoolhouse at a point near the southern boundary of the district. There was already a schoolhouse belonging to the district, but it was located in the northern part thereof. These residents selected an acre of land belonging to the ancestor of the plaintiffs, who was one of their number, upon which to erect the new house, and plaintiffs' ancestor, consenting thereto, agreed verbally to execute a deed, conveying the land to the county for school purposes, but it was understood that the deed should provide that religious worship might be held on the premises and if the use of the land for school purposes was abandoned the title thereto should revert to the grantor, or his heirs but it was a controversy, on the trial, whether the agreement was that the proposed deed should provide that the house itself was never to be the property of the grantor. The house sued for was built upon the land, under the verbal agreement, partly with money obtained for the purpose from the county, and partly by voluntary contributions from the parties interested. This was done in the lifetime of plaintiffs' ancestor. A school was maintained in the house for a year or two, and then, after the death of plaintiffs' ancestor, the patrons, or a large majority of them, of Forest Hill School District--one of the plaintiffs, as was claimed by defendant, participating--agreed to dispose of both schoolhouses, and with the proceeds erect a new one near the center of the district; the school board of the county having so located the school of the district. The house in controversy was sold accordingly by a committee of the patrons of the school district, and the purchaser from them conveyed the same to the defendant. The members of the committee who made the sale were not of those who built the house. Plaintiffs' ancestor died intestate without ever having executed a deed to the premises, and several of the plaintiffs are infants. Defendant tore down the house, the value of which was proved, and converted the material to his own use. The trial in the circuit court resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Lowry & Jayne, for appellants.

The well-settled principle of law is that a building permanently fixed on the freehold becomes a part of it; that prima facie a house is real estate belonging to the owner of the land upon which it stands. The exception to this rule obtains only when a building is erected upon the land of another, for a special purpose, by written or parol agreement between the parties that the builder has the right to remove the building at pleasure. Tested by this rule, the judgment should be reversed, as the evidence unmistakably fixed the house permanently on the acre of land referred to, and prescribed its use in case it was abandoned as a school.

The duties and powers of school trustees are limited (see § 4005, code of 1892), and our statutory laws neglected to clothe patrons and citizens of a school district with authority to sell property belonging to other people. The law and evidence unmistakably fix the legal rights of the parties, and the court below should have given the peremptory instruction asked by appellants.

Williamson & Potter, for the appellee.

If the house was put on Agnew's land with the agreement and understanding that he would deed the land to the county or to the trustees of the school, he nor his heirs can refuse or fail to make the deed and hold the house. The people who put the house on the land under such circumstances had a right to tear it away without the consent of Agnew or his heirs.

After inducing the people to use the county money and their own to build the house on his land by promising to make deed. and agreeing the house should never become his own for any purpose, Agnew, the ancestor, if he were living, could not object to removal of the house after he refused or failed to make the deed; and if he had made the deed, according to the understanding, the people of the district had the right to remove the house and abandon the use of the acre of land. The plaintiffs have no greater rights than their ancestor would have, if living. Inheriting from him, they are parties to, and bound by agreements and contracts made by him relative thereto.

Jones was not a trespasser in going upon the acre of land where stood the house he had bought and paid for. The people and patrons of that school district had a right to go on that acre of land and to make or do what they pleased with the house, under the very agreement made with Agnew at the time it was put there. Agnew consented...