Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. California Coastal Farms, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1982
• Docket Number: S.F. 24324,AFL-CI,D
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 645 P.2d 739, 97 Lab.Cas. P 55,391 AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL FARMS, INC., Defendant and Appellant; United Farm Workers of America,efendant and Respondent.

Page 231

183 Cal.Rptr. 231

31 Cal.3d 469, 645 P.2d 739, 97 Lab.Cas. P 55,391

AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL FARMS, INC., Defendant and Appellant United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Defendant and Respondent.

S.F. 24324.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

May 27, 1982.

Dressler, Quesenbery, Laws & Barsamian, Lewis P. Janowsky, ElCentro, Wayne A. Hersh, San Diego, Marion I. Quesenbery, Laurie A. Laws, ElCentro, Patrick D. Leathers, George McInnis and Abramson, Church & Stave, Salinas, for defendant and appellant.

Ellen Lake, Manuel M. Medeiros, Daniel G. Stone, Sacramento, Frances C. Schreiberg, Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

Kirsten L. Zerger, Salinas, Sanford N. Nathan, San Francisco, Jerome Cohen, Marco E. Lopez, Keene, Carlos M. Alcala, Sacramento, Francis E. Fernandez, Carmen S Flores, Keene, and Dianna Lyons, Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

KAUS, Justice.

California Coastal Farms, Inc. (Coastal), appeals from a preliminary injunction granting striking United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UFW) limited access to Coastal's property for the purpose of communicating with nonstriking farm workers. We have concluded that the trial court's grant of limited access was not an abuse of discretion and that the injunction should be affirmed.

I

This case arises out of the agricultural strikes in the Salinas Valley in 1979--strikes marked by numerous incidents of violence. In January 1979, after the breakdown of collective bargaining negotiations over a successor contract, UFW struck a number of growers including Coastal. In response to the strike, the growers hired replacement workers. On February 16, 1979, Coastal filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) alleging that strikers had unlawfully entered the company's fields, threatened the nonstriking employees, and forced them to leave work. Coastal also alleged that UFW and its agents destroyed irrigation machinery and threw rocks at company vehicles. UFW also filed a charge, claiming that a Coastal employee had brandished a handgun at the strikers in a threatening manner.

After investigation, the ALRB filed unfair labor practice complaints under Labor Code section 1160.2 against UFW as well as Coastal. Pursuant to Labor Code section 1160.4, the ALRB asked the superior court of Monterey County for a temporary restraining order (TRO). The proposed TRO enjoined the UFW from coercing, restraining or assaulting Coastal's employees through acts or threats of violence, limited to 75 the number of pickets permitted at each location, barred all conduct within a specified distance from Coastal's gates while the premises were in use, and enjoined a variety of other activities such as brandishing weapons and interfering with Coastal's activities. The proposed order flatly prohibited UFW from "trespassing upon the property of the employer."

At the initial hearing on the TRO on February 23, 1979, Judge Silver adopted the ALRB's language, but expanded the number of pickets permitted at each location to 150. He also indicated that he would be disposed to grant the strikers some limited access to Coastal's land to communicate with nonstriking employees. Nevertheless, the initial TRO was issued without access provisions.

At a hearing on the access issue, held four days later, the ALRB representative indicated that although the ALRB--as distinguished from its general counsel--had not yet decided if strike access was a protected right, he was authorized by the general counsel's office to request that access be permitted. The ALRB proposed language based on California Administrative Code, title 8, section 20900, permitting union representatives to enter the employer's property for one hour before and after work and a period not to exceed one hour during the employees' lunch break. Under the proposed order, access was limited to 2 representatives for each crew of no more than 30 workers and an additional representative for every 15 additional workers. The union was required to provide the names of access takers 48 hours in advance.

Judge Silver amended the TRO to include this language but expressly noted that the destruction of crops would not be tolerated, that access would have to be closely monitored, and that it could be suspended if violent incidents occurred. Additional proceedings clarifying and modifying the TRO were held on March 2, March 16, and March 27. The preliminary injunction under review, which contained the access provisions, was issued on March 29, 1979. ¹ Minor amendments to the injunction were adopted on March 30, May 4 and July 3.

II

The sole issue is: Was the trial court's grant of strike access ² an abuse of discretion? Coastal contends that the trial court's decision to permit access, which was based on the ALRB's general counsel's apparent theory that a right to strike access existed under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA), constituted an abuse of discretion because, before permitting exercise of that right, the ALRB was required to adopt a valid rule or regulation respecting access, and could not proceed by adjudication on a case-by-case basis. We disagree and affirm the trial court's order.

At the outset, it is important to note that we do not here consider the ultimate power of the ALRB to permit--by adjudication or rulemaking--union access to the employer's property in order to talk to nonstriking workers during an economic strike. The true focus of this case is on the power of the trial court, in granting a TRO or preliminary injunction restraining certain union activities, to permit limited union access. The issue, in short, is one of trial court power, not agency power.

The superior court recognized, and it is generally conceded, that at the time it issued the TRO no ALRB rule or adjudication had dealt with the precise form of access permitted here. ³ However, the ALRB had ruled in two closely related contexts: organizational access and post-certification access. ⁴

Organizational access entails union organizers' entering an employer's property for the purpose of "meeting and talking with employees and soliciting their support" before a union certification vote is taken. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 20900, subd. (e).) Unlike the NLRB, which permits organizational access on a case-by-case basis depending on whether alternative means of organizational communication exist, the ALRB chose to deal with this issue by exercising its rule-making powers. The ALRB determined that because in the agricultural setting alternative means of communication for the purposes of organizing are never adequate (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 20900, subd. (c); see also TexCal Land Mgmt. (1977) 3 ALRB No. 14, at p. 16), denial of organizational access constitutes an unfair labor practice. The ALRB adopted regulations defining the parameters of reasonable organizational access. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, §§ 20900-20901.) We upheld the validity of these regulations in ALRB v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 128 Cal.Rptr. 183, 546 P.2d 687.

In contrast to its treatment of organizational access, the ALRB determined that postcertification access may be protected, depending on the availability of other means of communication. (O.P. Murphy Co., supra, 4 ALRB No. 106.) In O.P. Murphy, the ALRB recognized that the need for postcertification access springs from a different source than organizational access--that it is based on the right and duty of the exclusive representative to bargain collectively on behalf of all employees it represents. (4 ALRB No. 106 at p. 3.) While indicating that it will "start with the presumption that no alternative channels of effective communication exist," the board stated that, "[b]ecause of the different interest involved after certification, and because of our limited experience with the effect of post-certification access on the negotiating process, we will evaluate the extent of the need for such access on a case-by-case approach." (Id., at p. 8.)

The trial court's authority for the TRO and preliminary injunction issued here was Labor Code section 1160.4, which states in relevant part: "The board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in Section 1160.2 charging that any person has engaged ... in an unfair labor practice, to petition the superior court ... for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order ... [T]he court shall have jurisdiction to grant to the board such temporary relief or restraining order as the court deems just and proper." (Italics added.) Nevertheless, Coastal argues that, in the absence of an express rule promulgated by the ALRB under its rule-making powers, the trial court's order granting limited strike access was an abuse of discretion.

The argument made by Coastal is not new to California courts. In fact, it is identical to that made by Coastal in a previous case, California Coastal Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 734, 168 Cal.Rptr. 838. (Coastal I.) That case, like the current one, arose out of unfair labor practice proceedings filed by the ALRB against the union for improper conduct of its members. The ALRB then sought an injunction that would limit, but not totally prohibit, strikers from picketing the residences of nonstriking workers. Coastal petitioned for mandate to compel the ALRB to adopt rules governing residential picketing, arguing that when the ALRB laid down conditions for such picketing, it was adopting rules and standards without complying with the procedural requirements of Labor Code section 1144. ⁵ Coastal makes the same argument here, with regard to strike access.

The Coastal I court rejected Coastal's argument noting, "The use of the permissive 'may' rather than 'shall' in section 1144 makes it clear that the statute merely confers an additional power upon the Board and authorizes...