Aguirre-Molina v. NY STATE DIV. OF ALCOHOLISM AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

• Decision Date: 12 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 80-CV-920.,80-CV-920.
• Citation: 675 F. Supp. 53
• Parties: Marilyn AGUIRRE-MOLINA, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF ALCOHOLISM AND ALCOHOL ABUSE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

675 F. Supp. 53

Marilyn AGUIRRE-MOLINA, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF ALCOHOLISM AND ALCOHOL ABUSE, Defendant.

No. 80-CV-920.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

November 12, 1987.

Jose A. Rivera, Brooklyn, N.Y., for plaintiff.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. for the State of N.Y., Albany, N.Y., for defendant; David B. Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

MUNSON, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Marilyn Aguirre-Molina is an Hispanic woman of Puerto Rican descent who claims that defendant New York State Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse ("defendant" or "the Division") discriminated against her on the basis of race, color or national origin when it decided not to hire her for two positions within the Division. On November 17, 1980 plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. A nonjury trial was conducted on November 26 and 27, 1984. The court hereby issues its findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52.

I. BACKGROUND

The Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse is a New York state agency that was created by the New York legislature in 1977. Trial Transcript for November 27, 1984 (hereinafter "Tr. II") at 85. The various bureaus within the Division develop and coordinate policy for state-wide projects addressing the social problems stemming from alcohol abuse. Some projects are conducted by the Division itself, and others are developed through contracts with private, nonprofit agencies. The Division also conducts training programs for professionals and para-professionals in the alcohol abuse field. Trial Transcript for November 26, 1984 ("Tr. I") at 56-57. Throughout the time period relevant to this lawsuit, the Division was undergoing an expansive process of creating positions and hiring individuals to fill those positions. Tr. II at 87. Though the Division officially lacked autonomy with regard to policy development, budgeting and hiring, effectively its determinations concerning hiring were routinely approved. For instance, the Division was required to obtain approval from the Civil Service Commission ("CSC") before a new position within the Division could be created. Nonetheless, assuming a source of funding existed for some project the Division had undertaken, the CSC's role in practice was limited to determining the proper salary grade for the proposed position. The CSC generally accepted job descriptions as proposed by the Division and approved the individuals chosen by the Division's directors to fill those jobs. See Tr. II at 87-88.

At the time of trial, plaintiff was a member of the faculty of Rutgers University. She had earned a bachelor's degree from Hunter College in 1972, obtained a Master of Science degree in Community Health and Administration from Columbia University in 1975, and received a Doctorate of Education from Columbia in 1980. Tr. I at 6-7. Plaintiff specialized in alcohol abuse and alcoholism studies. Tr. I at 7. In 1979, prior to receiving her doctorate degree, plaintiff was informed by Judith Chris, an employee with the Division, that a position was about to become available at the Division. Plaintiff forwarded a resume, see Defendant's Exhibit ("Exh.") A, to Barbara E. Smith, Ed.D., the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Special Emphasis Programs within the Division.¹ On October 12, 1979, Smith conducted an interview with plaintiff.

The Bureau of Special Emphasis Programs had been created to make alcohol abuse services and programs more readily available to what were considered to be "underserved" populations — particularly racial minorities, teenagers, and the elderly. Tr. II at 37. At the time of plaintiff's interview, the Bureau was awaiting approval from the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism ("NIAAA"), a federal agency which administers federal funds, for a grant that would enable the Bureau to create an administrative position for a program oriented toward "treatment and intervention" to combat the problems associated with alcoholism. Tr. II at 38. It was for this untitled position, which would be later designated as Coordinator of State Alcoholism Services Demonstration Program ("SASDP"), that plaintiff interviewed on October 12. Tr. I at 16. During the course of the interview, Smith described the duties of the position that would be created if NIAAA funding was obtained. This description substantially conformed with a job description that was later submitted to the CSC for final approval. Tr. I at 19; Exh. B.

According to the job description submitted to the CSC, the Coordinator of SASDP would be responsible for "planning, initiating, implementing, and operating" a demonstration project designed to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of alcoholism services by "developing and coordinating new relationships for alcoholism services among health and social services providers." The individual holding this position was to act as liaison with the NIAAA and attempt to coordinate state and federal efforts to develop "community based alcoholism services for the benefit of geographically defined populations" as well as to monitor various project grants and plans falling under the umbrella of the demonstration project. Exh. B. Smith testified that the Coordinator of SASDP would be required to oversee fourteen to fifteen such programs funded by federal grants. Tr. II at 57. The minimum educational qualification for this position was an undergraduate degree. In addition, the Division sought to fill this position with an individual with five years of administrative experience or three years of administrative experience and two years of program experience in human services. A masters degree could be substituted for one year of such experience. Exh. B. Smith testified that plaintiff easily met these minimum qualifications. Tr. II at 47.

During the course of the October 12 interview, Smith told plaintiff of another position that might become available within the Division's Bureau of Prevention, Education, and Training, depending upon final approval of funding. Plaintiff expressed an interest, and that same day Smith introduced plaintiff to Joan Lorenson, then the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Prevention, Education, and Training. Tr. I at 24, 60-61. At that time, Lorenson was interviewing candidates for positions as coordinators of two separate projects which were about to be commenced. Plaintiff did not qualify for either of these positions since she had not yet completed her work for her doctorate.² Lorenson did, however, interview plaintiff for a position that was being proposed to the CSC. That position ultimately was titled Coordinator for Alcoholism Training Services, and the duties of that position were described in a memorandum prepared for use by the Bureau after CSC approval for the position had been obtained. Tr. I at 71-72. In the memorandum, it was contemplated that the holder of this position would plan, direct and coordinate the day-to-day operations of the Division's Training Unit and would be responsible for implementing a comprehensive alcoholism training program on a statewide basis. The coordinator was to develop procedures to assess training needs, develop curriculum and course materials to be used in educational programs, assess the effectiveness of various training approaches, act as liaison with the New York State Education Department in the promotion of alcohol and alcoholism education in the schools, and to work with other state agencies to implement public educational programs and to minimize duplicity of efforts among various agencies which might be involved in educating the general public about the dangers of alcohol abuse. See Exh. G. Lorenson testified that the description she gave plaintiff of the duties of this proposed position during the October 12 interview was in accordance with that set out in this memorandum. Tr. I at 76.

Both Smith and Lorenson testified that they were favorably impressed with plaintiff after the interviews that took place on October 12, 1979. Tr. I at 76; Tr. II at 50. However, both positions were ultimately filled by other individuals. The authority to make hiring decisions within the Division rested with Robert Ross, the Deputy Director for Program Operations. Tr. II at 87. Sometime in November 1979 Ross hired Joseph Boro, a white male, to fill the position with the Bureau of Special Emphasis Programs and John Doe^*, also a white male, for the position with the Bureau of Prevention, Education, and Training. These hiring decisions were made on the recommendations of Smith and Lorenson, respectively. See Tr. II at 89, 94. Plaintiff was notified that she would not be hired for these positions after the decision to hire Boro and Doe had been made.³ Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint of discrimination with the New York State Division of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and after receiving a notice of right to sue plaintiff commenced this action.⁴

II. DISCUSSION

A. Disparate Treatment Under Title VII

The basic structure of analysis in the typical Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity was set forth in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). There, the Court held that the plaintiff bore the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If this burden is met, the defendant must come forward with "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment decision that was made. Should the defendant articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for its action, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons...