Ahern v. State, s. 95288
| Decision Date | 20 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | 95270,95271,Nos. 95288,s. 95288 |
| Citation | 174 Misc.2d 123,662 N.Y.S.2d 684 |
| Court | New York Court of Claims |
| Parties | , 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 667, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 97,494 John F. AHERN et al., Claimants, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. Gerald J. LONG et al., Claimants, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. John M. MORAN et al., Claimants, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. |
Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Albany (Kevan J. Acton, of counsel), for defendant.
Blitman & King, L.L.P., Syracuse (Donald D. Oliver and Kenneth L. Wagner, of counsel), for John F. Ahern and others, claimants.
Michaels, Bell & Smolak, P.C., Auburn (Jan M. Smolak, of counsel), for Gerald J. Long and others, claimants.
Mulholland & Hickey, Washington, DC (Gregory K. McGillivary and Douglas L. Steele, of counsel), for John M. Moran and others, claimants.
The State, by pre-answer motion, seeks dismissal of these claims principally on the basis that the claims were untimely filed.
Claimants seek back pay and interest which they allege is due them for overtime work performed during the course of their employment with the New York State Police.
The three claims were initially commenced in Federal District Court during July and August 1989 by investigators and senior investigators employed by the New York State Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) pursuant to section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The plaintiffs sought recovery of unpaid overtime compensation as well as liquidated damages and/or interest, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.
The Secretary of Labor (hereinafter Secretary) subsequently brought a separate enforcement action (Martin v. State of New York, 807 F.Supp. 919) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on September 13, 1989. Unlike the private plaintiffs' actions, however, the Secretary's suit did not allege willful violations of the FLSA, nor did it seek liquidated damages on behalf of the investigators and senior investigators.
On January 14, 1991, the District Court denied the State's motion to consolidate the Secretary's case with the private cases. The District Court entered an order in each action enjoining the State from claiming the administrative exemption as to the investigators and requiring that the investigators be paid FLSA overtime compensation.
The District Court's decision and order was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d 581 (2d Cir.1993)). The State appealed the Second Circuit's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court subsequently denied the State's petition for certiorari review of the Second Circuit's decision (New York v. Reich, 510 U.S. 1163, 114 S.Ct. 1187, 127 L.Ed.2d 537).
After the Supreme Court's March 27, 1996 holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252, the State brought a motion to dismiss, asserting that its sovereign immunity was offended by requiring it to litigate the FLSA claims in Federal Court. On November 12, 1996 the District Court entered an order granting the State's motion and dismissed the private actions based upon the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in Federal Court.
In early December 1996 the claimants filed the three claims presently before this Court seeking retroactive pay to April 15, 1986.
The State argues that the claims were not timely filed with the Court and served upon the Attorney General within 90 days of accrual as required by Court of Claims Act §§ 10(3) and 11(a).
It is undisputed that the accrual of a cause of action based upon a Federal statute is governed by Federal law (McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 2 L.Ed.2d 1272; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743; Podraza v. Carriero, 212 A.D.2d 331, 630 N.Y.S.2d 163).
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, held that the claim could not be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the procedures imposed by the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute on the basis that the requirements are preempted as inconsistent with Federal law.
The Supreme Court stated that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts, but where State courts entertain a federally created cause of action, the Federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice (id., at 138, 108 S.Ct. at 2306-07). The Court stated, however, that Congress did not intend to assign to State courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing the essential elements of a Federal cause of action (id., at 144, 108 S.Ct. at 2309).
The Supreme Court's holding is not limited to Federal civil rights actions; it applies to all Federal rights asserted in State courts. On this point, the Court stated as follows:
The state notice-of-claim statute is more than a mere rule of procedure: as we discussed above, the statute is a substantive condition on the right to sue governmental officials and entities, and the federal courts have therefore correctly recognized that the notice statute governs the adjudication of state-law claims in diversity actions. * * * In Guaranty Trust [326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079], supra, we held that, in order to give effect to a State's statute of limitations, a federal court could not hear a state-law action that a state court would deem time barred. Conversely, a state court may not decline to hear an otherwise properly presented federal claim because that claim would be barred under a state law requiring timely filing of notice. State courts simply are not free to vindicate the substantive interest underlying a state rule of decision at the expense of the federal right (Felder, p. 152, 108 S.Ct. at 2314).
Thus, based upon the holding in Felder (id.), we find and conclude that the 90-day filing requirement of the Court of Claims Act is not applicable to actions brought against the State arising under Federal law such as the actions asserted here.
None of the three claims were served and filed within three years of accrual as required by the three-year FLSA Statute...
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