Ahmad v. Graco Fishing & Rental Tools Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20200642-CA |
| Citation | 511 P.3d 1183 |
| Parties | Tariq AHMAD, Appellant, v. GRACO FISHING & RENTAL TOOLS INC., Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Terry R. Spencer and Reid W. Lambert, Attorneys for Appellant
Joseph E. Minnock and Rod N. Andreason, Attorneys for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 Tariq Ahmad appeals various rulings from the district court. But due to Ahmad's untimely notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider all but one of the issues Ahmad raises. With respect to that issue, we affirm.
¶2 After purchasing an oil well in 2010, Pacific Energy & Mining Company2 attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the previously unproductive well producing again. During this time, Ahmad was the secretary of Pacific and a member of its board of directors. Ahmad was also Pacific's former president and held a "very small" ownership interest in the company.
¶3 Pacific asked Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc., for an estimate for the cost of the tools necessary to fix the well and the cost for Graco to operate those tools over an eight-day period. An agreement was reached, and work commenced on the well. Soon, however, issues arose. The work took longer than eight days and a hole was drilled into the well casing.
¶4 A dispute over the scope of Graco's work and whether Graco was liable for the damage caused to the casing soon followed. Pacific did not pay Graco, and Graco placed a lien on the well.
¶5 In 2016, Pacific, through its attorney, Terry Spencer, filed suit against Graco. Pacific claimed damages for the hole in the casing. Graco filed a counterclaim against Pacific for the payment owed. Graco also filed what it styled a third-party complaint against Ahmad, claiming that he had personally guaranteed the payment of Pacific's obligations. Through Spencer, Ahmad answered the third-party complaint. Following numerous legal proceedings in state district court and Ahmad filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Graco moved to have Ahmad joined as a party-plaintiff in this case. The state district court granted that motion.
¶6 The instant case proceeded to trial in June 2019, during which Spencer represented both Pacific and Ahmad. At the end of Pacific and Ahmad's case, Graco moved for, and was granted, a directed verdict. The case was then submitted to the jury on Graco's claims only, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Graco. Pacific then filed a bankruptcy petition, and Ahmad attempted to move the claims against him to bankruptcy court. Apparently, due to the procedural hurdles in that process, the district court did not enter a judgment against Ahmad and Pacific until October 7, 2019. The document the court filed was titled "JUDGMENT," and the court stated that it "enters JUDGMENT as follows" and laid out the jury's verdict.
¶7 On November 1, 2019, pursuant to rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Pacific, through Spencer, filed a motion for a new trial. Ahmad then filed a pro se motion on November 4, joining Pacific's new trial motion. The court held a telephonic conference on December 2, the minutes of which indicate that Spencer appeared as "Plaintiff's Attorney," and a hearing on the motion for a new trial was scheduled for January 3, 2020.
¶8 Ahmad did not personally appear at the hearing. Spencer did appear, however, and informed the court that because Pacific was in bankruptcy, he could "only appear today on behalf of Mr. Ahmad." Spencer then argued on Ahmad's behalf, referring to Ahmad as "my client," and not correcting the court when it referred to Ahmad as "your client." On January 14, a new attorney filed a notice of substitution of counsel, indicating that she would be acting as the attorney for both Pacific and Ahmad. But just six days later, she filed a notice of withdrawal as counsel for both. Graco then filed a notice to appear or appoint counsel, in accordance with rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and served it on both Pacific and Ahmad. Ahmad later admitted he received the notice, but he did not appear or appoint counsel.
¶9 On May 22, 2020, the district court issued a written order deeming the motion for a new trial to be withdrawn due both to the substitute attorney's statement at the time of her withdrawal that "there were no pending motions before the Court" and Ahmad's and Pacific's failures to appear or appoint counsel. On May 28, Ahmad filed a pro se motion entitled Ahmad argued that the court and Graco's counsel "were properly notified," when he filed his pro se motion on November 4, that he "did not retain counsel and was representing himself." Ahmad further asserted that he did not receive notice of the hearing held on the motion for a new trial or of the court's subsequent entry of judgment and, as a result, that his "right to due process" was violated. On June 15, Ahmad filed another pro se motion notifying the court that his May 28 motion "should have been titled ‘Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Court Order Dated May 22, 2020.’ "3 The court denied the motion on August 6. It ruled that Ahmad's argument was unpersuasive because he did not act pro se during trial and never offered any evidence or argument that differed from that offered by Pacific and because Spencer acted as the attorney for both Pacific and Ahmad "until after the hearing on the motion for a new trial." The court also noted that Spencer never filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel prior to the January 3 hearing on the motion for a new trial and that Ahmad received the notice to appear or appoint counsel long before the court issued its written order.
¶10 Ahmad filed his notice of appeal, pro se, on August 19, 2020, asserting that he was appealing "the entire order or judgment, which was entered on August 06, 2020." Approximately one month later, Spencer filed his appearance of counsel in our court, notifying the court that he was representing Ahmad on appeal. Before the briefs were filed in this case, however, Graco moved for summary disposition on the ground that we lacked jurisdiction. It argued that Ahmad did not file his notice of appeal within 30 days of the court's May 22, 2020 ruling on the new trial motion. Graco asserted that Ahmad's rule 60(b) motion, filed on May 28, did not further extend the time for Ahmad to file a notice of appeal because rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that for a rule 60(b) motion to extend the time for appeal, the motion must be "filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered." Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(E). We denied the motion but instructed the parties to address jurisdiction in their briefs, paying particular attention to "if, and how, the definition of ‘judgment’ found in rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure affects the analysis."
¶11 Ahmad claims that multiple errors before and during trial necessitate a remand. But we may reach those issues only if we determine that we have appellate jurisdiction. "Questions about appellate jurisdiction are questions of law." Zion Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC , 2020 UT App 167, ¶ 21, 480 P.3d 1055 (quotation simplified). And because we conclude that Ahmad's notice of appeal was largely untimely, it did not vest this court with jurisdiction over the issues arising from the underlying judgment. "When this court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal, it retains only the authority to dismiss the appeal." In re adoption of A.B. , 2010 UT 55, ¶ 21, 245 P.3d 711.
¶12 We do, however, have jurisdiction to consider Ahmad's challenge to the district court's denial of his rule 60(b) motion, as to which his notice of appeal was timely. Ahmad asserts that this issue is reviewed for correctness. He is mistaken. "We review a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion." Jones v. Layton/Okland , 2009 UT 39, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 859.4
¶13 Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to file a notice of appeal "within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This requirement "is jurisdictional, meaning that an appellate court simply has no power to hear the case if a notice of appeal is untimely." Trapnell & Assocs. v. Legacy Resorts, LLC , 2020 UT 44, ¶ 35, 469 P.3d 989 (quotation simplified). The rule allows for this time to be extended, however, in enumerated circumstances:
¶14 Ahmad argues that his notice of appeal was timely because the new trial motion filed on November 1, 2019—within 30 days of the court's judgment entered on October 7, 2019—extended the time for appeal. And after the court issued its May 22, 2020 order denying that motion, Ahmad argues, his rule 60(b) motion further extended the time for appeal because that motion was filed within 28 days of that order. Thus, Ahmad contends that his notice of appeal, filed within 30 days of the court's August 6 denial of his rule 60(b) motion, was timely, allowing him to challenge the court's underlying judgment. Graco responds that Ahmad's argument does not comport with the plain language of the rule, which distinguishes between the "judgment" and "the entry of the dispositive order." Id. Thus, to properly extend the time for appeal by means of a rule 60(b) motion, Graco argues...
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