Ahrens v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
| Decision Date | 09 May 1913 |
| Docket Number | 17,924 -- (70) |
| Citation | 141 N.W. 297,121 Minn. 335 |
| Parties | GEORGE AHRENS v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $ 25,000 for personal injury. The answer alleged that plaintiff while engaged in switching operations at Herndon, Iowa, placed his foot between the coupler of one car and the coupler of another while those cars were coming and came together resulting in an injury to his foot, and that the cars were equipped with automatic couplers. It further alleged that the injury was caused by plaintiff's want of due care. The reply denied the new matter in the answer. The case was tried before Olin B. Lewis, J., who denied defendant's motion to dismiss the action, and a jury which returned a verdict of $ 8,416 in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, it appealed. Affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Action for violation of Federal Safety Appliance Act.
1. Complaint construed, and held to state a cause of action for personal injuries occasioned by the alleged failure of defendant, an interstate carrier, to comply with the Federal Safety Appliance Act, and that the issues in the case were properly submitted to the jury upon that theory.
Case distinguished.
2. Creteau v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 113 Minn. 418, distinguished.
Charge to jury.
3. There were no reversible errors in the instructions to the jury.
F. W. Root and Nelson J. Wilcox, for appellant.
Samuel A. Anderson and A. F. Storey, for respondent.
Action for personal injuries, in which plaintiff had a verdict, and defendant appealed from an order denying its motion for judgment or a new trial.
The short facts are as follows: Defendant, a corporation, owns and operates a line of railroad extending through Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and other states, and as such engaged in interstate commerce. Plaintiff was in the employ of defendant on one of its interstate freight trains as a brakeman, and was injured while coupling cars by reason, as alleged in the complaint, of the negligence of defendant in permitting the automatic coupling appliances attached to said cars to become out of order and in an unsafe condition, in consequence of which plaintiff, in making the coupling, was compelled to go between the cars to adjust the appliance, and was caught and injured.
1. The complaint alleged, in general terms, facts showing that defendant was a common carrier and engaged in interstate commerce, and that plaintiff was in its employ as a brakeman on one of its interstate trains. The complaint also alleged that the injury, of which he complained, occurred in the state of Iowa, and the statutes of that state were specially pleaded as a foundation of defendant's liability.
It appeared from the evidence, and without dispute, that defendant is an interstate carrier, and that the train in connection with which plaintiff was employed was, at the time of the injury, engaged in interstate commerce. And, at the close of plaintiff's case in chief, defendant moved to dismiss the action, on the ground that no recovery could be had under the Iowa statutes, for the reason that the statutes of that state, relied upon by plaintiff, had been superseded by the Federal Employer's Liability Act. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint was broad enough in its allegations to justify a recovery under the Federal statutes. To this ruling defendant excepted. The trial proceeded upon the theory expressed by the court in denying the motion, and the cause was submitted to the jury accordingly. The court in its charge limited plaintiff's right of recovery to the question whether defendant had violated the Federal Safety Appliance Act, in having upon the car causing the injury a defective coupling appliance, and wholly eliminated all consideration of liability under the Iowa statutes. Whether the court erred in so submitting the case to the jury presents the principal question on this appeal.
It is contended by defendant that this was a distinct departure from the issues made by the complaint, and, within the case of Creteau v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 113 Minn. 418, 129 N.W. 855, reversible error. We do not sustain this contention.
The complaint is broad enough, as held by the trial court, to sustain the claim that a failure on the part of defendant to comply with the safety appliance act was intended by the pleader to be made in part the basis of plaintiff's cause of action. It...
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