Aiman et al. v. Stout

• Citation: 42 Pa. 114
• Parties: Aiman <I>et al. versus</I> Stout.
• Decision Date: 17 February 1862
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

42 Pa. 114

Aiman et al. versus Stout.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 17, 1862.

APPEAL from the Common Pleas of Montgomery county. In Equity.

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The case was argued here by D. H. Mulvany for the appellant, and by G. R. Fox for complainants.

The opinion of the court was delivered, February 17th 1862, by THOMPSON, J.

As we view this case, the material inquiries are, as to the capacity of Arnold Aiman to employ the defendant as agent at the time he did so; and secondly, his subsequent ratification of his acts, and release of him from liability in consequence of the loss or mismanagement of the business in which he had been employed.

That he was competent to constitute Daniel Stout, the defendant, his agent in 1858, is a fact in the plaintiffs' case; is denied by nobody and may be assumed here: that as such agent he did not successfully manage that portion of his agency which is embraced in this controversy, may also be assumed as proved: that from want of knowledge, skill, or due care, his principal became involved in the payment of some $1200 more money than otherwise he might have been liable to pay, is claimed by the plaintiffs in the bill, and is the principal item in the account prayed. To meet this among other things, the defendant relies upon the ratification of his acts by Aiman, and a release by him from all liability arising out of the transaction in which the loss occurred.

It is not necessary to inquire into the measure of relief granted to the estate of the plaintiffs' intestate, by the court below through the medium of the account taken, as indemnifying against the alleged loss through the supineness of the defendant acting as agent, as we are of opinion that the plaintiffs are entirely precluded by the acts of their intestate from being entitled to any. It might be very doubtful, indeed, if necessary to rely solely on the ground as a defence, whether, under the terms of the employment of Stout to bid in the Hawkins property, at the request of Aiman, for this is the substance of the testimony, he was bound to investigate the state of the liens at all. The latter had lent his money and taken a judgment as security for it on the property, and the testimony seems to go far towards proving the bidding in of the property to have been by his direction and upon his own judgment. But as the defence is mainly placed upon the grounds already stated, we need not discuss this aspect of it.

Was Arnold Aiman compos mentis on the 5th of March 1859, when he executed the release relied on by the defendant? Was he competent to execute a valid contract, and did he continue so at the time of taking possession of the premises, and giving notice to the tenants on the premises that he was their landlord? If so, then a complete defence is established against the claim of the plaintiffs, to compel the defendant to account for all the money expended by him as agent of their intestate in and about the purchase, repair, and improvement of the Hawkins real estate bought in by him for the intestate.

In Graham v. Pancoast, 6 Casey 89, and in Nace v. Boyer, Id. 99, the degree of mental weakness which will authorize the setting aside an executed contract in equity, is discussed, and the rule deduced from the authorities is, that mental weakness not amounting to inability to comprehend the contract, when unaccompanied by evidence of imposition or undue influence, furnishes no ground for equitable interference. The contract here was executed.

There was but little testimony, if any, of such a degree of weakness as would bring the plaintiffs' intestate within the rule of these cases, and none whatever, of fraud or undue influence. Ten witnesses, two of whom were strongly impeached, were called by the plaintiffs to this point, but their testimony chiefly referred to a defect in the memory of Arnold Aiman, leaving the other faculties of his mind unimpeached. Opinions in a general way were called out from many of these witnesses, to the effect that they did not believe that he...