Ainsworth v. Mt. Moriah Lodge, A.F. & A.M.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1898
• Citation: 172 Mass. 257,52 N.E. 81
• Parties: AINSWORTH v. MT. MORIAH LODGE, A.F. & A.M., et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

172 Mass. 257

52 N.E. 81

AINSWORTH v. MT. MORIAH LODGE, A.F. & A.M., et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

December 9, 1898

COUNSEL

J.B. Carroll, W.H. McClintock, and J.F. Stapleton Jr., for plaintiff.

H.W Ely and A.S. Kneil, for defendants.

OPINION

HAMMOND J.

In order to hold Towle, Waterman, and Cook, hereinafter called the defendants, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that, at the time the wall fell, the defendants had an interest in the building; and on this point his only claim was that they, as successors of the lessees named in the lease from Horton and others to Lewis and others, were at that time the holders of the leasehold estate thereby created, and that the estate was then outstanding. One of the answers made by the defendants to this claim was that the leasehold estate was terminated by the ravages of the fire, and consequently was not outstanding at the time the wall fell. If the defendants were right in this, they could not be held. Considerable evidence as to the condition of the building after the fire was introduced. At the close of the evidence, the defendants asked the court to rule that "the life of the building had been terminated prior to the time the wall fell, and that the life of the building had been terminated by fire." The court declined so to rule and upon this point instructed the jury as follows: "Up to the time this structure commenced to fall, where was the life of the building? Was it extinct, or was it not? If the building was still alive in the sense it is used here, then the tenants, the trustees, would be the persons liable; but if, on the other hand, the life of the building had become extinct before that time, it would be the owners who would be liable." To the refusal of the court to give the instruction as requested, and to the instructions actually given, the defendants excepted. We think the instruction should have been given. The leasehold estate was to exist only during "the life of the building," and the real question is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that, within the meaning of the lease, the "life of the building" had not terminated. The building was three stories in height, and had brick walls. The premises described in the lease were "all that part of the brick building known as 'Masonic Block,' situated on the corner of Elm and Arnold streets, in said Westfield, above and including the third floor of said building, together with the stairs and stairway leading from the second to the third floor of said building, to their sole use; also the hall upon the second floor, the front and rear stairways leading to the same, and the front and rear entrances, and halls leading to said stairways, to be used and occupied by said party of the second part in common with the parties owning and occupying the other portions of said building, and their heirs and assigns." We understand the hall upon the second floor to be not a room, but simply an entry to and from which stairways led. The lease also contained the following: "And the party of the first part doth also lease, demise, and let unto the party of the second part the box or cupboard in the northwest corner of said building, and in the second story, to be used in connection with the third story, in substantially the same manner and to the same extent as now used by said lodge, and also the water pipes leading from the tank through the first and second stories of said building, to the drain leading to the brook, with the right to use and enjoy the same in the same manner and to the...