Aiona v. Judiciary of State of Hawaii

• Decision Date: 03 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-15810,92-15810
• Citation: 17 F.3d 1244
• Parties: John A. AIONA, Jeton Lee Allen, Martin Andrews, Terry J. Bateman, Tamara Bray, Lynette Ching, Cory Chock, Michael A. Ilaszcat, David L. Kelly, Charles Kernan, William Milovich, Dan S. Okamura and Michael A. Willard, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The JUDICIARY OF the STATE OF HAWAII; Irwin Tanaka, Administrative Director of Courts of the Judiciary of the State of Hawaii, individually and in his official capacity; Ronald Sakata, Director of the Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office of the Judiciary of the State of Hawaii, individually and in his official capacity; Michael Nakamura, Chief of the Honolulu Police Department of the City and County of Honolulu, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1244

17 F.3d 1244

John A. AIONA, Jeton Lee Allen, Martin Andrews, Terry J.

Bateman, Tamara Bray, Lynette Ching, Cory Chock, Michael A.

Ilaszcat, David L. Kelly, Charles Kernan, William Milovich, Dan S. Okamura and Michael A. Willard, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The JUDICIARY OF the STATE OF HAWAII; Irwin Tanaka,

Administrative Director of Courts of the Judiciary of the

State of Hawaii, individually and in his official capacity;

Ronald Sakata, Director of the Administrative Driver's

License Revocation Office of the Judiciary of the State of

Hawaii, individually and in his official capacity; Michael

Nakamura, Chief of the Honolulu Police Department of the

City and County of Honolulu, individually and in his

official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 92-15810.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 1, 1993.

Decided March 3, 1994.

Arthur E. Ross, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Girard D. Lau, Deputy Attorney General, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

Before: POOLE, WIGGINS and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

POOLE, Circuit Judge:

John Aiona and twelve other persons appeal the district court's dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of Hawaii's "Administrative Revocation of Driver's License" statute, Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 286-251 et seq. The plaintiffs, whose drivers' licenses were revoked under the statute for driving while intoxicated, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that (1) the claims of eight of the plaintiffs were moot because their license revocations were rescinded during state court proceedings and (2) it was required to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), from hearing the claims of the remaining five plaintiffs.

We review de novo the district court's dismissal of the action as moot. Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S.Ct. 1206, 89 L.Ed.2d 319 (1986). We also review de novo the district court's decision to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed.2d 133 (1993). We affirm.

I

Effective August 1, 1991, the Hawaii legislature enacted an "Administrative Revocation of Driver's License" statute providing for the administrative revocation of driver's licenses of persons arrested for driving while intoxicated. Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 286-251 et seq.; see id. Sec. 291-4 (person drives while intoxicated when his blood alcohol concentration is .10 or more). The administrative revocation statute is separate from any criminal prosecution. Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 286-253. For example, evidence from the administrative proceedings may not be introduced against a defendant in the criminal proceedings. Id. The purpose of the administrative revocation statute is to remove suspected drunk drivers from the road immediately. Session Laws of Hawaii, Act 188, Section 1.

Under the administrative license revocation statute, whenever a person is arrested for driving while intoxicated in violation of section 291-4, the arresting officer immediately takes the person's driver's license if he determines that (1) there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, or the vehicle was stopped at an intoxication control roadblock, and (2) there was probable cause that the person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 286-255.

Drivers do not lose their driving privileges immediately. Under the statute, the arresting officer issues a "notice of administrative revocation" which serves as a temporary thirty-day driving permit. Id. ¹ The officer then must inform the driver that he has the option of taking a breath test, a blood test, or both. Id. If a test is administered and shows a blood alcohol concentration of less than .10, the license is returned to the arrestee immediately, and the administrative revocation proceedings are terminated with prejudice. Id. Sec. 286-256. If the arrestee fails the test, or refuses to take the test, then the license revocation is automatically reviewed by the administrative director of the courts. Id. Sec. 286-258.

The arrestee has the right to submit a written statement to the director within three days of his arrest stating reasons why his license should not be revoked. Id. Sec. 286-258(b). The director automatically reviews the notice of administrative revocation, considering any sworn or unsworn statement provided by the arrestee, the breath or blood test results, if any, and the sworn statements of the law enforcement officials involved. Id. Sec. 286-258(c). ² The director may uphold the license revocation only if he determines that (1) there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle or the vehicle was stopped at an intoxication roadblock, (2) there was probable cause to believe that the arrestee was driving while intoxicated, and (3) the evidence proves by a preponderance that the arrestee did operate the vehicle with a .10 blood alcohol concentration or refused a blood alcohol test. Id. Sec. 286-258(d). The director must mail to the arrestee a written decision administratively revoking the license or rescinding the revocation no later than eight days after the date of arrest. Id. Sec. 286-258(a).

If the director upholds the revocation, then the driver may request a full administrative hearing within five days from the date the decision is mailed. Id. Sec. 286-259(a). ³ The hearing must be scheduled within twenty-five days of the arrest. Id. At the hearing, the arrestee may be represented by counsel and may submit evidence, testify, and present and cross-examine witnesses. Id. Secs. 286-259(b), 286-258(f). ⁴ The director may affirm the license revocation only if, after considering all of the evidence, he again determines that three factors exist: reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, probable cause that the driver was intoxicated, and a preponderance of evidence that the driver had a .10 blood alcohol concentration or declined a blood test. Id. Sec. 286-259(e). Within five days of the hearing, the director must issue his decision. Id. Sec. 286-259(i). Thus, the director issues his decision within thirty days from the arrest, or before the temporary permit expires. ⁵

The driver then may seek judicial review, which must be scheduled "as quickly as is practicable." Id. Sec. 286-260. The court cannot stay the license revocation during its review, which is based only on the administrative record and is limited to whether the director "exceeded constitutional or statutory authority, ... acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, committed an abuse of discretion, or made a determination that was unsupported by the evidence in the record." Id. Although the court cannot stay the license revocation, the director may issue a conditional driving permit, effective after a mandatory thirty-day license suspension, to drivers with no prior "alcohol enforcement contacts" who need to drive for work or to substance abuse treatment. Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 286-264.

Aiona and the twelve other plaintiffs in this case all were arrested for driving while intoxicated and had their licenses revoked by the arresting officer. Eight plaintiffs had their revocations rescinded: two at the administrative review stage and six following review by the state court within seventy days of the date their petitions for review were filed. The five remaining plaintiffs had their revocations affirmed by the state court within ninety days of the date their petitions for judicial review were filed. Three plaintiffs appealed the state court decisions affirming the revocations to the Hawaii Supreme Court on January 17, 1992. On August 9, 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the revocations of two of the three plaintiffs and rejected their constitutional challenges. Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 856 P.2d 1207 (1993).

On October 7, 1991, while state proceedings were pending, the thirteen plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of Hawaii's administrative revocation statute. The district court dismissed the action on April 28, 1992. The plaintiffs timely appeal.

II

Eight of the plaintiffs in this case had their revocations rescinded during the administrative revocation proceedings or by the state court during judicial review of the administrative proceedings. We agree with the district court that these plaintiffs' claims are moot. See Sample, 771 F.2d at 1338. ⁶

The plaintiffs nevertheless argue that their claims are not moot because a declaratory judgment would expunge the damage to their reputations. This argument is meritless. These plaintiffs already received a declaration in state court that their revocations were improper.

The plaintiffs also argue that their claims are not moot because they are capable of repetition yet evading review. This exception applies if two conditions are satisfied: the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before its cessation, and there is a reasonable expectation that the complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). These conditions do not exist here.

III

The remaining plaintiffs contend that the district court should not have abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), from hearing their due process challenge to the administrative revocation statute because the statute does not provide a timely opportunity for them to raise constitutional claims.

Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal court in most circumstances...