Kernan v. Tanaka
| Decision Date | 09 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | 15906 and 15905,Nos. 15908,s. 15908 |
| Citation | 856 P.2d 1207,75 Haw. 1 |
| Parties | Charles KERNAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Irwin TANAKA, Administrative Director of the Courts, State of Hawaii, Respondent-Appellee. Jeton Lee ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Irwin TANAKA, Administrative Director of the Courts, State of Hawaii, Respondent-Appellee. Paul STEWART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Irwin TANAKA, Administrative Director of the Courts, State of Hawaii, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Appellate courts are under an obligation to insure that they have jurisdiction to hear and determine each case.
2. The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over cases properly brought before it on any appeal allowed by law from any other court or agency.
3. Appeals to the supreme court shall be allowed from all final judgments, orders, or decrees of circuit and district courts, except as otherwise provided by law.
4. The omission of language from HRS chapter 286, part XIV, the Administrative Revocation Program, specifically providing further appeal from the district court appellate decision to the supreme court, does not signal finality at the district court level.
5. Under the Administrative Revocation Program, jurisdiction properly lies in this court to hear and determine appeals from district court judgments after an administrative hearing.
6. A due process right exists if the interest which the claimant seeks to protect is property within the meaning of the due process clause of the federal or state constitutions.
7. Although driving is a privilege rather than a right, once conferred, a driver's license is a constitutionally protected interest and due process must be provided before one can be deprived of his or her license.
8. Due process encompasses the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
9. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.
10. The appropriate process due in a given situation requires consideration of three distinct factors: 1) the private interest affected by the official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 3) the governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens that the additional procedures would entail.
11. When examining the private interest affected, we consider the duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest.
12. A driver's license interest is not so great as to require us to depart from the ordinary principle that something less than a predeprivation evidentiary hearing is sufficient to protect due process rights.
13. Hawaii's existing statutory procedures, providing a predeprivation administrative review and hearing, adequately protect citizens from the possibility of wrongful license suspensions.
14. When prompt post-deprivation judicial review is available for correction of administrative error, we have generally required no more than that the predeprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official warrants them to be.
15. Due process does not require error-free determinations.
16. Under the Administrative Revocation Program, the administrative hearing officer determines the validity of basic facts that set the stage for the court to consider constitutionally significant matters.
17. The government has a high interest in removing drunken drivers from the roads in the interest of public safety.
18. Under the Administrative Revocation Program, the police have the initial burden to prove that reasonable suspicion existed to stop the vehicle; that probable cause existed to believe the arrestee was driving under the influence; and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the arrestee did in fact drive under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
19. In the Administrative Revocation Program, the administrative reviewing and hearing officers are not prosecutors, but are objective decision makers.
20. The interest in a driver's license is not so great that more than an administrative review and hearing are needed to comport with the requirements of due process.
21. Given the criminal penalty for making a false statement and the arrestee's ability to require the officer to testify under oath, sufficient mechanisms exist to insure due process and fairness in the presentation of facts to the Administrative Drivers License Revocation Office officers.
22. The Offender-Based Transaction Statistics/Computerized Criminal History Arrest Report satisfies the requirements for the arrest report pursuant to HRS § 286-257. The complete police report is not required.
23. An issue which was not raised in the lower court will not be considered on appeal. An appellate court will deviate from this rule only when justice so requires.
24. A vehicular stop followed by police questioning of the driver constitutes a seizure for purposes of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
25. Traffic stops are valid without probable cause due to the limited nature of the detention.
26. Key in analyzing the validity of a traffic stop is the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.
27. Given sufficient articulable facts, a police officer may stop and question a driver without probable cause. HRS § 286-255 requires the traffic stop to be supported by reasonable suspicion.
28. Police must have at least a reasonable basis of specific articulable facts to believe a crime has been committed to order a driver out of a vehicle after a traffic stop.
29. In analyzing the reasonableness of the belief that a crime has been committed, the totality of circumstances, including the time, place, and length of detention, must be considered.
30. Ordering a driver from the vehicle requires sufficient facts to determine that the police had a reasonable basis to believe a crime was being committed. Probable cause is not required to support an exit order.
Arthur E. Ross, Honolulu, for petitioners-appellants.
Edwin L. Baker, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for respondent-appellee.
Before LUM, C.J., * MOON, KLEIN and LEVINSON, JJ., and BURNS, Chief Judge, Intermediate Court of Appeals, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.
Petitioners-Appellants Charles Kernan (Kernan), Paul Stewart (Stewart), and Jeton Allen (Allen) (collectively "Appellants") appeal from a district court order affirming their license revocations pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 286, Part XIV. (Supp.1992) (Administrative Revocation Program). Each Appellant was separately arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) in violation of HRS § 291-4 (SUPP.1992)1 and given a notice of administrative revocation.
The Administrative Revocation Program sets out the rules and procedures for license revocations. The process consists of five main stages: 1) notice of license revocation and a thirty-day temporary permit are issued by the police at the time and place of the arrest; 2 2) an administrative review occurs automatically; 3 3) an administrative hearing is conducted upon request; 4 4) a district court judicial review occurs upon request; 5 and 5) an appeal of the district court's decision may be brought. See HRS §§ 602-5(1) and 641-1(a).
Appellants' licenses were revoked after an administrative review by the Administrative Driver License Revocation Office of the Judiciary of the State of Hawaii (ADLRO). The revocations were affirmed in administrative hearings. Appellants' appeals to the district court asserted that the procedures established by the statutory scheme codified in HRS chapter 286, Part XIV denied them due process of law. The district court affirmed the revocations and ruled the Administrative Revocation Program constitutional. We consolidated the appeals for review because they contain common issues. The issues on appeal are whether the Administrative Revocation Program facially violates Appellants' due process rights and whether the application of the Administrative Revocation Program violated Appellants' rights by failing to fulfill the Program requirements. For the reasons set forth below, we find no constitutional or other infirmities and affirm.
Police arrested Kernan on August 9, 1991 for DUI in violation of HRS § 291-4 and issued a Notice of License Revocation and a thirty-day driving permit, pursuant to HRS § 286-255. Although notified of the implied consent to submit to a blood or breath test and the penalties for refusing to take either test, Kernan refused to be tested. The ADLRO director reviewed the evidence provided by the law enforcement officers and revoked Kernan's license. Kernan's requested administrative hearing was held on August 30, 1991. The hearing officer upheld the revocation and Kernan requested judicial review, which was held by the district court on November 18, 1991. Kernan challenged the constitutionality of the revocation process. The district court affirmed the revocation, finding the revocation process constitutional. Kernan now appeals, citing as error: 1) the lack of properly sworn statements of the arresting officer and the unavailability of the entire police report in violation of the requirements of HRS § 286-257(a)(1)(A); 2) alleged due process deficiencies of the Administrative Revocation Program; and 3) the inadmissibility of evidence used to establish probable cause to believe that Kernan was driving under the influence at the time of the arrest as required by HRS §§ 286-258(d)(2) and 286-259(e)(2).
Police arrested Allen on August 13, 1991 for DUI in violation of HRS § 291-4 and issued a Notice of...
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