Airfare, Inc. v. Greenville Airport Commission
| Decision Date | 28 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 18625,18625 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | AIRFARE, INC., Appellant, v. GREENVILLE AIRPORT COMMISSION, Respondent. |
William W. Doar, Jr., of Smith & Moore, Georgetown, for appellant.
J. Brantley Phillips, Jr., of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, W. H. Arnold, of Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason, Greenville, for respondent.
Airfare, Inc., the appellant herein, and Greenville Airport Commission, the respondent herein, on October 8, 1963, entered into a written agreement or contract, whereby the respondent leased to the appellant for a term of ten years certain Airport property and facilities, including a portion of the Terminal Building, which property is generally known as 'The Greenville Downtown Airport'.
The appellant, by its complaint, alleges that as a result of various acts on the part of the respondent, the aforesaid lease agreement was breached, and asked for actual damages for said breach in the sum of Seventy-five Thousand & 00/100 ($75,000.00) Dollars and, in addition, seeks to enjoin the respondent, its officers and agents, from further acts of interference with appellant's use of the leased premises. It is alleged in the complaint, that the aforesaid lease is in full force and effect and that the respondent has committed various wrongful acts in violation thereof, as follows: (a) in notifying the appellant and its subtenants that the aforesaid lease has been cancelled, and directing the appellants and its subtenants to vacate the leased premises; (b) advising prospective subtenants of the appellant that the lease has been cancelled; (c) in attempting to negotiate with one of appellant's competitors a lease of a portion of certain premises presently under lease to the appellant; and (d) in requiring of the subtenants of the appellant conditions contrary to the terms of the aforesaid lease. It is then alleged that because of the acts of the respondent, the appellant has been deprived of the peaceful and quiet occupancy and enjoyment of said leased premises to which it is lawfully entitled and, in paragraph 5, it is alleged as a direct result of the above mentioned acts, the appellant's business operations have been disrupted and discontinued, thereby causing it a loss of profits.
The respondent made a motion: (1) to require the appellant to make an election as to whether it was proceeding Ex contractu or Ex delicto; (2) to refer this case to the Master in Equity for Greenville County for trial; and (3) to require the appellant to make paragraph 5 of its complaint more definite and certain by alleging the nature of its damages, including allegations as to the manner in which its business operations were allegedly disrupted and discontinued, specifying dates and nature of such occurrences and by further alleging the amount of any alleged loss of profits. This motion came on for hearing before The Honorable Frank Eppes, Resident Judge of the Thirteenth Circuit. At that hearing the appellant conceded that it was proceeding Ex contractu. It resisted the motion of the appellant requiring the complaint to be made more definite and certain and to refer this case to the Master in Equity for Greenville County for trial. The trial judge granted the motion referring the case to the Master in Equity for Greenville County for trial and requiring the appellant to make paragraph 5 of its complaint more definite and certain. The case is here on appeal from the order of the circuit judge, (1) requiring it to make its complaint more definite and certain, and (2) referring this case to the Master in Equity for Greenville County for trial.
The circuit judge has a wide discretion in passing on a motion, under Section 10--606 of the Code, to make a complaint more definite and certain. The cited section invests the circuit court with power to order such amendment when the allegations of the pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the charge is not apparent, and large discretion must necessarily be allowed and the court...
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