AIRLINE FLIGHT ATTEN., ETC. v. TEX. INTERN., ETC.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 75-H-1459.
• Citation: 411 F. Supp. 954
• Parties: The AIRLINE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS IN the SERVICE OF TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., as represented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

411 F. Supp. 954

The AIRLINE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS IN the SERVICE OF TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., as represented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 75-H-1459.

United States District Court, S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

March 17, 1976.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Baab, Inc. (Hal K. Gillespie, Atty. in Charge), Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff.

Benjamin Best, II, Houston, Tex., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NOEL, District Judge.

This suit is brought by the Airline Flight Attendants in the service of Texas International Airlines, Inc., as represented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International (hereinafter referred to as the "Flight Attendants") who seek to enjoin alleged violations of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., by defendant Texas International Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Airline"). Jurisdiction of this suit is vested in the Court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1337. Having agreed that there are no material facts in dispute, the parties submitted the case to the Court for disposition as a matter of law on plaintiff's prayer for injunctive relief and defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment.

The controlling issue in this case is whether the unilateral action of the Airline in cancelling and rerouting certain flights during the months of July and October gave rise to a "major" or a "minor" dispute. These two classes of disputes are distinguished in Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act (hereinafter referred to as the R.L.A.), 45 U.S.C. § 151a, which states as among the five general purposes of the Act:

(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.

The former class of disputes has been labeled "major", while the latter class has been labeled "minor". The distinction between these two classes of disputes is important because the R.L.A. sets forth two entirely different procedures for the settlement of the two types of disputes. The most important procedural difference for purposes of this case is that in a major dispute the R.L.A., 45 U.S.C. § 156, imposes upon the parties a legally enforceable obligation to refrain from altering the status quo while the Act's "almost interminable process" is being exhausted (see e. g., Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149, 90 S.Ct. 294, 298, 24 L.Ed.2d 325, 332 (1969)), whereas in a minor dispute the Act is silent as to any obligation to maintain the status quo. Accordingly, it has generally been held that a carrier cannot be required to maintain the status quo pending resolution of minor disputes. See Ruby v. TACA International Airlines, S.A., 439 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1971).

The only two exceptions to this general rule are that an injunction may issue against a carrier when necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of a board of adjustment over a minor dispute already submitted to it and an injunction restraining a union from striking a carrier during a minor dispute may be conditioned upon the carrier maintaining the status quo. Neither of these two exceptions is applicable here since this dispute has not been submitted to the System Board of Adjustment and the Airline has not sought to enjoin any strikes. Thus, the Flight Attendants' request for injunctive relief, insofar as it seeks to require the Airline to restore and maintain the status quo that existed prior to the cancellation and rerouting of certain flights, can be granted only if the dispute is major.

The Flight Attendants have also requested injunctive relief requiring the Airline to comply with the mandate of 45 U.S.C. § 152, First, which states in pertinent part:

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise . . ..

Since it is clear that the Airline has been willing and has in fact attempted to settle this dispute with the Flight Attendants, but has merely refused to treat such discussions as negotiations pursuant to a Section Six (45 U.S.C. § 156) major dispute notice,¹ the Airline can be held to be in violation of 45 U.S.C. § 152, First, only if the dispute is in fact a major dispute.

Briefly summarized, the material facts of this case as they appear from the affidavits submitted by the parties follow. The defendant, Texas International Airlines, is a regional, C.A.B., certificated, air carrier. In the course of its daily operation, the Airline makes an average of 277 departures from the 48 communities it serves, utilizing a fleet of 20 DC9 jet aircraft and 13 CV-600 turbo-prop aircraft. As of November 1, 1975, the Airline employed 246 captains and co-pilots and 196 flight attendants to serve in the operation of its fleet of aircraft over its routes. The Airline maintains separate collective bargaining agreements with its pilots and its flight attendants, both of whom are represented by the Air Line Pilots Association.

In March of 1975 the Airline and the Flight Attendants exchanged Section Six notices proposing changes in the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between the Airline and the Flight Attendants pursuant to Section 34 of said agreement which provided that:

This Agreement . . . shall continue in full force and effect until June 1, 1975, and shall renew itself without change until each succeeding June 1, thereafter, unless written notice of intended change is served in accordance with Section 6, Title 1, of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, by either party hereto at least sixty (60) days prior to June 1, in any year after 1974.

Negotiations on these proposed changes commenced on May 19, 1975 and continued on a regular basis until a tentative agreement was reached on August 8, 1975.

Meanwhile, on July 7 and 8 of 1975, the Airline began unilaterally cancelling and deleting certain flights, and rerouting others. Since the Flight Attendants "bid" on schedules on a monthly basis, these mid-month schedule changes caused some flight attendants who had sufficient seniority to bid a desired schedule to lose a portion of such schedule for the remainder of the month. It also caused 17 flight attendants to lose in the aggregate the sum of $1,152.70 in pay due to flight time lost because of the schedule changes.² With full knowledge that the Airline claimed the right to make these mid-month schedule changes under the collective bargaining agreement then in effect,³ the Flight Attendants' bargaining representative signed a tentative, new agreement on August 5, 1975 without making any attempt to change the agreement to deal with the problem of mid-month schedule changes.⁴

On August 20, 1975, while the tentative agreement signed by the bargaining representatives for the Airline and the Flight Attendants was awaiting ratification by the Flight Attendants' membership, the Flight Attendants served a Section Six notice on the Airline that proposed to change the collective bargaining agreement to prohibit mid-month schedule changes except under certain conditions. On August 21, 1975 this suit was filed and a hearing was held on plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order on August 25. At said hearing the Airline reiterated its position that its action in making mid-month schedule changes was covered and permitted by the collective bargaining agreement and that any dispute concerning such schedule changes was at most a matter of contract interpretation within the exclusive jurisdiction of the System Board of Adjustment.

On September 5, 1975, representatives of the Flight Attendants and the Airline met to attempt to resolve their differences over mid-month schedule changes. The Airline made clear that, as far as it was concerned, the September 5 meeting was not being held pursuant to the Section Six notice theretofore filed by the Flight Attendants on August 20 because the tentative agreement approved by the representatives of each party on August 8 precluded negotiations over additional changes while a vote by the Flight Attendants' membership on the tentative agreement was pending. On September 19, the tentative agreement was ratified by vote of the membership of the Flight Attendants and a new collective bargaining agreement was signed pursuant to that ratification.

On October 26, 1975, the Airline again unilaterally put into effect a mid-month schedule change.⁵ As a result of this mid-October schedule change, a total of seven flight attendants lost in the aggregate the sum of $565.40 due to lost flight time.⁶ This action by the Airline caused the Flight Attendants to file a second application for a temporary restraining order, which was denied, the Court, however, agreeing to expedite the disposition of this case on its merits.

In determining whether the above facts give rise to a major or minor dispute, the Court must apply the classic definition of major and minor disputes set forth by the Supreme Court in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1290, 89 L.Ed. 1886, 1894 (1945):

The first major disputes relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the

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