Airport Coach Service, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth

• Decision Date: 05 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 783,783
• Citation: 518 S.W.2d 566
• Parties: 1974-2 Trade Cases P 75,394 AIRPORT COACH SERVICE, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF FORT WORTH et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 566

518 S.W.2d 566

1974-2 Trade Cases P 75,394

AIRPORT COACH SERVICE, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF FORT WORTH et al., Appellees.

No. 783.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Tyler.

Dec. 5, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1975.

Second Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1975.

Sayers, Scurlock, Binion & Brackett, Fort Worth, for appellant; Lloyd Scurlock, Fort Worth, of counsel.

N. Alex Bickley, City Atty., Lee E. Holt, Joseph G. Werner, Asst. City Attys., Dallas, for appellee, City of Dallas.

S. G. Johndroe, Jr., City Atty., Fort Worth, for appellee, City of Fort Worth.

DUNAGAN, Chief Justice.

Appellant, Airport Coach Service, Inc., brought suit for a declaratory judgment against the appellees, the cities of Fort Worth and Dallas, alleging that their formation of D/FW Surtran Systems as the 'single operator of ground transportation services for the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport,' denies appellant a privilege it has under RRC authority to operate limousine service from and on the D/FW Regional Airport. Appellant further sought injunctive relief from the enforcement of applicable regulations and penal ordinances enacted by the appellees in conjunction with the formation of Surtran. The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and appellant perfected its appeal.

Appellant holds Amended Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 2429--B, issued by the Railroad Commission of Texas. This certificate authorized appellant to transport passengers having prior or subsequent transportation by air and airline personnel over twelve specified routes to and from Love Field, Greater Southwest International Airport and certain specified cities in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. Appellant had the authority to serve all the intermediate points on these routes and to tack, join or combine the routes to render a coordinated or through service.

In 1964, Dallas and Fort Worth jointly undertook to establish a regional airport. Appellees now own and operate the D/FW Regional Airport under the authority of the Municipal Airport Act, Article 46d, sec. 14, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St. The airport area consists of 17,000 acres and is located in the cities of Fort Worth, Grapevine, Euless and Irving. It is governed by a joint airport board appointed by the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth. Following the approval by both cities of a Code of Rules and Regulations prepared by the Joint Board, ¹ the appellees contracted to form a joint venture called D/FW Surtran Systems which was designated as the single operator of ground transportation service for the Regional Airport.

Surtran's responsibility consists of four operations: (1) Dallas bus-limousine service, (2) Fort Worth bus-limousine service, (3) service to other cities in the region, and (4) taxi and subcontract service. Surtran therefore has the franchise required by the code.

Appellant sought a judicial declaration that Certificate of Convenience 2429--B provided adequate authority for appellant to serve the D/FW Airport.

Appellant contends that each city in which the Regional Airport is located is a point which the appellant is authorized to serve under RRC Certificate No. 2429--B. Appellant asserts that by tacking, joining and combining various authorized routes, it can follow its routes from any point within the Airport to any point on its twelve routes. Appellant is also contending that the exclusive franchise held by Surtran violates the anti-monopoly provision of the Texas Constitution, Art. I, sec. 26, Vernon's Ann.St.; that the operation of the D/FW Airport is designed to close other area airports and that these closings will destroy the appellant's business. Because of this, appellant sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of the applicable code provisions so as to enable Airport

Appellant brings two points of error:

Appellant brings two points of error. (1) that the trial court erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction, and (2) that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. The jurisdictional error presented in point one, being essential to the power of this court to consider this appeal must be considered first.

In the motion for summary judgment filed by Fort Worth and adopted by Dallas, it is contended in relation to the interpretation of Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 2429--B 'that there exists no right or privilege from which a justiciable controversy could spring between the plaintiff and this defendant and with respect to which the Declaratory Judgment Act, Article 2524--1 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, gives this Honorable Court jurisdiction.' (Emphasis added.) In paragraph three of the motion, which we interpret to refer to the court's interpretation of those penal ordinances enumerated in footnote one, it is stated that 'Even a cursory examination of plaintiff's prayer for relief, in light of the foregoing, reveals the attempted invocation of this court's equitable and declaratory powers to provide plaintiff with a bar to prosecution for violation of valid ordinances of the Cities of Dallas, Fort Worth, Grapevine and Irving and violation of the Code of Rules and Regulations of the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Board. Such a stratagem of collaterally attacking the ordinances and skirting the joinder of otherwise essential parties cannot create and Does not present a valid, justiciable controversy concerning which this Honorable Court could or should exercise jurisdiction under the provisions of Article 2524--1, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas.' (Emphasis added.)

In granting the summary judgment the district court states that in addition to specific findings indicating the non-existence of any genuine issue as to any material fact, 'the City of Fort Worth and the City of Dallas, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and That summary judgment should be granted upon each and every ground stated in said motion * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

A declaratory judgment is one which declares the rights and duties or the status of the parties. Article 2524--1, V.A.T.S. Although a cause of action in the sense of a claim upon which consequential relief may be granted is not essential to the maintenance of an action for declaratory judgment, there must exist a justiciable controversy. California Products, Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 160 Tex. 586, 334 S.W.2d 780 (1960). The existence of a justiciable controversy is a jurisdictional pre-requisite to the granting of a declaratory judgment. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bivins, 423 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1967, n.r.e.). The court has the duty to decide whether a justiciable controversy exists. State v. Margolis, 439 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1969, n.r.e.).

As we construe the record in this case, appellant is asking the court to first construe Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 2429--B and declare rights thereunder and second, to construe the aforementioned penal ordinances and thereafter enjoin their enforcement. As evidenced from the language previously quoted from the motion for summary judgment and the judgment itself, the court found that it had no jurisdiction to construe Certificate 2429--B. In this finding the court erred. We believe that this is a proper situation for the application of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is broad in scope and should be liberally construed. Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.1945). In Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. Becker, 373 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1963, n.r.e.), the court, upon plaintiff's request for an interpretation of a Railroad Commission Certificate of Convenience, stated:

'* * * The pleadings and the evidence show that appellees are merely seeking a declaratory judgment construing said certificate, declaring what rights and authority appellant has thereunder, and enjoining appellant from operating in excess of the authority granted in the certificate. In Sunset Express, Inc. v. Gulf, C. & S .F. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 860, writ ref., w.m., the defendant's contentions were similar to those of appellant in this case. The court held that the District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, had jurisdiction to maintain a suit brought to enjoin a motor carrier from operating in excess of the authority granted under its certificate and to prevent further violation of a final order of the Railroad Commission. In that case, as in this case, the suit was not an appeal from any act, order or ruling of the Commission. * * *'

Similarly, in this case the suit is not an appeal from any act, order or ruling of the Railroad Commission. Appellant simply sought construction of Certificate 2429--B.

Both parties in their respective briefs give much emphasis to the jurisdiction or the lack thereof of the Railroad Commission over routes to and from the Regional Airport. It is appellees' contention that the lack of RRC authority over these routes precludes the existence of a justiciable controversy and therefore the court had no jurisdiction. However, as we see it, the question of the RRC's jurisdiction over these routes bears directly upon the rights available under Certificate No. 2429--B. The mere fact that this jurisdiction is questioned does not remove the presence of a justiciable controversy concerning the rights available under 2429--B but is only a matter to be determined in discovering those rights. A finding of no jurisdiction of the RRC over the appellant's routes would be part of a declaration of the rights and duties under 2429--B .

Nevertheless we do hold that such interpretation of jurisdiction is a question of law. There exists no genuine fact issue as to any material fact, hence the trial court was correct in rendering the summary judgment.

However, the second allegation of lack of jurisdiction contained in paragraph three of appellees' motion for summary judgment is based on appellant's...