Aiudi v. Pepin, 79-321-A

• Decision Date: 14 July 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-321-A,79-321-A
• Citation: 417 A.2d 320
• Parties: Aldo AIUDI v. Maurice O. PEPIN, Treasurer, City of Woonsocket. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 320

417 A.2d 320

Aldo AIUDI v. Maurice O. PEPIN, Treasurer, City of Woonsocket.

No. 79-321-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 14, 1980.

Edward E. Dillon, Jr., Cumberland, for plaintiff.

Aram P. Jarret, Jr., Asst. City Sol., Woonsocket, for defendant.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

The litigants in this declaratory-judgment action are before us on cross-appeals. The plaintiff, Aldo Aiudi (Aiudi), contends that a Superior Court justice erred in dismissing his claim that under G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 45-19-1 (1979 Supp.), he was entitled to certain salary benefits from the city of Woonsocket (city). In its appeal, the city takes issue with that portion of the declaratory judgment which makes it liable for medical expenses incurred by Aiudi after May 15, 1975. This controversy can be placed in its proper perspective by settling certain undisputed facts.

Aiudi, a member of the city's police department since May of 1963, received service-connected injuries on June 1, 1969. On May 15, 1975, the police chief suspended him and filed "conduct-unbecoming-an-officer" charges against Aiudi. These charges specified that Aiudi, while working as a security guard at a supermarket, had stolen groceries and other items on more than one occasion. The chief's actions were affirmed by the city's public safety director, its personnel appeal board, and by this court. See Aiudi v. Baillargeon, R.I., 399 A.2d 1240 (1979).

Subsequent to his dismissal order, Aiudi presented the city with medical and doctor bills amounting to just over $1,226. The city refused, and still refuses, to pay these bills, taking the position that Aiudi's dismissal acts as a bar to his receipt of any benefits under the relevant statute. Aiudi claims that, notwithstanding his dismissal, he is entitled to both the medical and salary benefits provided by this statute.

The issue presented is what benefits, if any, under § 45-19-1, are available to a dismissed police officer when the disability giving rise to the claim occurred prior to his discharge from the police department?

We begin our consideration of this question by reviewing the following pertinent portions of § 45-19-1:

"Salary payment during line of duty illness or injury. Whenever any police officer * * * of any city * * * shall be wholly or partially incapacitated by reason of injuries received * * * in the performance of his duties, the respective city * * * by which said police officer * * * is employed shall, during the period of such incapacity, pay such police officer * * * the salary or wage to which the said police officer * * * would be entitled had he not been so incapacitated, and in addition thereto shall pay such medical (expenses) * * * for such period as is necessary * * * . In addition, said cities and towns shall pay all similar expenses incurred by a member who has been placed on a disability pension and suffers a recurrence of the injury or illness that dictated his disability retirement. As used in this section, the term 'police officer' shall mean and include any chief or other member of the police department of any city or town regularly employed at a fixed salary or wage." (Emphasis added.)

In his appeal, Aiudi reminds us that statutes governing pensions are to be liberally construed, and cites the case of Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Starasinich, 128 Colo. 556, 560, 264 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1954), which holds:

"In the absence of any statutory provisions on the subject of the misconduct of one primarily entitled to receive a pension, the majority rule seems to be that such misconduct is not ground for denial of a pension."

Although certain classes of statutes must be construed liberally , the application of this policy must never serve to do violence to the express terms of the statute. Orthopedic Specialists, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., R.I., 388 A.2d 352 (1978); Reardon v. Hall, 104 R.I. 591, 247 A.2d 900 (1968).

Aiudi's claim for possible salary subsequent to May 15, 1975, flounders upon the crystal-clear language of § 45-19-1, which obligates a municipality to pay to an incapacitated police officer "the salary or wage to which the said officer * * * would be entitled had he not been so incapacitated." This proviso is self-declaratory and needs no construction. Cardi Corp. v. City of Warwick, R.I., 409 A.2d 136 (1979). Salary benefits become payable only if, at the time of the demand, the officer would have been eligible to receive a salary. On May 15, 1975, Aiudi was not entitled to the salary benefits called for by § 45-19-1 because he was no longer a member of the Woonsocket Police Department.

Both the trial justice and the city, in their consideration of Aiudi's claim for continued medical benefits, rely upon certain comments found in Santanelli v. City of Providence, 105 R.I. 208, 250 A.2d 849 (1969). Santanelli was a retired firefighter who sought a declaratory judgment regarding where he should look for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred after his retirement but in connection with a job-related injury. The two potential reimbursement sources were § 45-19-1 and P.L. 1923, ch. 489, a special retirement act applicable only to the city of Providence. We ruled that the retiree's reimbursement was to be governed solely by the provisions of the Providence Retirement Act. As we concluded our opinion in Santanelli, we observed:

"If the benefits he (Santanelli) finds there (in the Providence Retirement Act) are less favorable than those which other municipalities are required under the general legislation to provide for others similarly situated, his recourse lies within the legislature and not with the courts." Id. at 213, 250 A.2d at 852.

Apparently, the trial justice was intrigued with this language, for he ruled that implicit in our reliance on the terms of the special act was an assurance that all full-time police officers who work for municipalities having no special retirement acts would be eligible for the medical...