East Greenwich Firefighters Association v. Corrigan

Decision Date08 November 2017
Docket NumberC.A. KC-2017-0898
PartiesEAST GREENWICH FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 3328, IAFF, AFL-CIO, WILLIAM PERRY, MIKE JONES, MATT HOWARD, ANDREW CAMPBELL and ROB WARNER, in their capacities as Executive Board Members of Local 3328, and on behalf of the members of Local 3328 and JAMES M. PERRY v. GAYLE CORRIGAN, in her capacity as TOWN MANAGER OF THE TOWN OF EAST GREENWICH, LINDA DYKEMAN, in her capacity as FINANCE DIRECTOR OF THE TOWN OF EAST GREENWICH, THE EAST GREENWICH TOWN COUNCIL, and SUZANNE CIENKI, SEAN TODD, ANDREW DEUTSCH, NINO GRANATIERO, and MARK SCHWAGER, in their official capacities as members of the East Greenwich Town Council
CourtRhode Island Superior Court
Kent County Superior Court

For Plaintiff: Elizabeth A. Wiens, Esq.

For Defendant: David M. D'Agostino, Esq.

DECISION

MCGUIRL, J.

Plaintiffs East Greenwich Firefighters Association, Local 3328, IAFF AFL-CIO and James M. Perry (FF Perry) filed a Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order against Defendants-Gayle Corrigan (Corrigan), in her official capacity as the Town Manager of East Greenwich; Linda Dykeman, in her official capacity as Finance Director of the Town of East Greenwich; and the East Greenwich Town Council, by and through its President, Suzanne Cienki (Town Council or EGTC)-alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), G.L. 1956 §§ 42-46-1 et seq., the Town of East Greenwich Home Rule Charter (Town Charter), and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The Superior Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order in this matter on August 30, 2017. Defendants were ordered to (1) continue to provide FF Perry with health insurance coverage while he is on Injured on Duty Leave as defined in section 22 of the CBA; (2) continue to provide FF Perry with his full compensation pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-19-1, pending further Order of the Court or a decision on the merits of Plaintiffs' Complaint; and (3) consolidate the matter for hearing and advance the matter on the calendar. (TRO 1-2.)

A jury-waived trial commenced on September 18, 2017. On Friday September 22, 2017 both parties rested. On October 2, 2017, both parties presented closing arguments. The Defendants, at that time, raised several jurisdictional issues and defenses, one of which- contending that Plaintiffs failed to name all indispensable parties-the Court found to have merit. On the next day, October 3, 2017 each party submitted post-trial memoranda. The parties returned on October 13, 2017 for a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Verified Complaint to name additional parties, which this Court granted. At that time, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Verified Complaint. Defense counsel accepted service on Defendants' behalf and requested additional time to present witness testimony. This Court granted Defendants' request and allowed both parties to call additional witnesses. On October 17, 2017, Defendants presented witness testimony from East Greenwich Town Council Vice President Sean Todd and East Greenwich Town Council Member Andrew Deutsch. That same day, both parties again rested. This Court now issues a Decision in this matter pursuant to its jurisdiction under G. L. 1956 §§ 9-30-1 et seq., G. L. 1956 §§ 8-2-13 and 8-2-13.1, and § 42-46-8(c).

I Jurisdiction
A Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act

Pursuant to § 9-30-1 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the court "upon petition, following such procedure as the court by general or special rules may prescribe, shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Our Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to "facilitate the termination of controversies." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. E.W. Burman, Inc., 120 R.I. 841, 845, 391 A.2d 99, 101 (1978). "[T]he decision to grant a remedy under the Declaratory Judgments Act is purely discretionary." Lombardi v. Goodyear Loan Co., 549 A.2d 1025, 1027 (R.I. 1988) (citing Emp'rs' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 628, 240 A.2d 397, 401 (1968)). As a result, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act bestows broad jurisdiction on the trial courts to issue declaratory relief. Sec. 9-30-1; see also Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997) (stating that the trial court's "decision to grant or to deny declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is purely discretionary"). A party may be entitled to declaratory relief even though alternative methods of relief are available. Taylor v. Marshall, 119 R.I. 171, 180, 376 A.2d 712, 717 (1977).

II Standard of Review

In a non-jury trial, '"the trial justice sits as a trier of fact as well as of law."' Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1239 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984)). '"Consequently, [the trial justice] weighs and considers the evidence, passes upon the credibility of the witnesses, and draws proper inferences."' Id. (quoting Hood, 478 A.2d at 184). The trial justice may also "'draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses, and such inferences, if reasonable, are entitled on review to the same weight as other factual determinations.'" DeSimone Elec., Inc. v. CMG, Inc., 901 A.2d 613, 621 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Walton v. Baird, 433 A.2d 963, 964 (R.I. 1981)). Furthermore, "[w]hen rendering a decision in a non-jury trial, a trial justice 'need not engage in extensive analysis and discussion of all the evidence. Even brief findings and conclusions are sufficient if they address and resolve the controlling and essential factual issues in the case.'" Parella, 899 A.2d at 1239 (quoting Donnelly v. Cowsill, 716 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I. 1998)). Indeed, the trial court is not required to '"categorically accept or reject each piece of evidence in [its] decision for [the Supreme] Court to uphold it because implicit in the trial justices [sic] decision are sufficient findings of fact to support his rulings."' Notarantonio v. Notarantonio, 941 A.2d 138, 147 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 102 (R.I. 2006)).

III Statement of Issues

In this case, the Court must essentially determine four issues: (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over the parties; (2) whether FF Perry was properly terminated under any provision of the Town Charter or the CBA; (3) whether FF Perry materially misrepresented himself or lied on his resume and whether there was any valid basis for his termination; and (4) whether the Town Council violated the OMA when it appointed Corrigan as Acting Town Manager and Town Manager.

IV Findings of Fact

The Town of East Greenwich (Town) is a municipal corporation having a Town Charter and is a Council-Manager form of government. The Town has a municipal fire department following the dissolution of the East Greenwich Fire District and the incorporation of the Fire District into the Town in July 2014.

In 2016, the Town implemented the "Town of East Greenwich Fire Department Lateral Transfer Procedures, " which established a hiring process for firefighters transferring from other fire departments. (Pls.' Ex. 1.) The stated reasons were to promote the hiring of experienced firefighters that intended to remain at the East Greenwich Fire Department (EGFD). The EGFD wanted to avoid going through the hiring and training process, to ultimately have the new hires seek employment elsewhere. (Tr. 29, Sept. 18, 19, and 20, 2017) (Tr. I). In accordance with the procedures, the EGFD posted the job position and requested applicants submit an application or resume. (Pls.' Ex. 2.) FF Perry applied to the EGFD as a prospective lateral transfer from the Coventry Fire Department, where he had been a career firefighter for seventeen years; serving as Lieutenant for the seven years leading up to his transfer. (Pls.' Exs. 4, 5.) FF Perry had also worked as a per diem dispatcher with the EGFD since November 2014.

In response to the job posting, FF Perry submitted an application and resume though both were not required. (Pls.' Ex. 2.) FF Perry's resume contained the following section:

"CERTIFICATIONS
"FF Level 1 & 2 NFPA 1001-1002 (Coventry Fire Academy State of RI EMT-Cardiac
" Core Hazmat Operations and Mission-Specific PPE Endotracheal Intubation
"Confined Space Awareness ACLS
" ICS/FEMA 100, 200, 241, 242, 301, 700, 800
"Electric and propane vehicle safety
"RI CDL Class-A License"

(Pls.' Ex. 4.) Thereafter, in May of 2016, an interview panel consisting of Captain Ken Montville, Captain Thomas Mears, Deputy Chief Michael Sullivan, and Union Executive Board Member Matthew Howard-along with Chief McGillivray and the Town's Director of Human Resources-interviewed FF Perry. Subsequent to that interview, FF Perry had a second interview with the former Town Manager, Chief McGillivray, and the Director of Human Resources. (Tr. I 195-96.) On August 2, 2016, the Town appointed FF Perry to the EGFD as a probationary firefighter.[1] (Pls.' Ex. 7.)

During the eleven months FF Perry served as a probationary firefighter, he successfully completed trainings and received excellent reviews from his supervisors on three separate evaluations, two of which were completed by Chief McGillivray. On June 30, 2017, FF Perry suffered a work-related injury while assisting a patient on a rescue call. As a result of the injury he sustained, FF Perry sought medical treatment from a physician who advised him that he was then not capable of performing his job duties with his injury. After filing his paperwork with the Town, the Town acknowledged FF Perry's injury and subsequently placed FF Perry on "Injured on Duty Leave" (IOD) on July 1 2017. Since that date, the Town has continued paying FF Perry's required...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT