Ajello v. Schaffer
| Decision Date | 21 September 1972 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 15284. |
| Citation | 349 F. Supp. 1168 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Carl A. AJELLO et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gloria SCHAFFER, Secretary of the State of Connecticut, et al., Defendants, and James F. Bingham et al., Intervenors. |
Robert Satter, James A. Wade, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiffs.
Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen. of Conn., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.
This is another one of several lawsuits concerning related issues arising out of efforts by state authorities to reapportion the Connecticut General Assembly following the 1970 census. The plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of a Connecticut Superior Court's order that the election of state senators and representatives be held on November 7, 1972.
To put this most recent lawsuit into proper perspective, it will be helpful to view it against its complicated background of prior proceedings. Charged with the initial responsibility of reapportioning both houses of the state legislature, the General Assembly failed to promulgate a reapportionment plan during the 1971 legislative session.1 Following its unproductive efforts, a duly constituted eight-member commission of its members also tried unsuccessfully to adopt a plan. The next step in the reapportionment process was for a plan to be devised by a specially selected three-member board. The plan adopted by that board (hereinafter the board plan) was defective in some technical aspects;2 but more importantly, it failed to meet the constitutional imperative of "one man, one vote." All of this is more fully set out in Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F.Supp. 139 (D.Conn.1972) (3-Judge District Court), and need not be repeated here. The order of the three-judge district court holding the board plan unconstitutional was appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court, Gaffney v. Cummings, Docket No. 71-1476 (May 11, 1972), which subsequently granted an application to stay the lower court's judgment. 407 U.S. 902, 92 S.Ct. 2441, 32 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972).
The result of that stay was to leave the state without any existing valid reapportionment plan. To remedy this situation, a pending state court action earlier brought to obtain rectification of the technical imperfections in the board plan was pursued, and on August 23, 1972, the Superior Court ordered correction of those technical defects and implementation of the board plan. Miller v. Schaffer, Superior Court Docket No. 173606 (August 23, 1972). At the same time, that court also ordered the board plan into effect in time for the approaching elections scheduled to be held on November 7, 1972. To facilitate an election on that date, the Superior Court also ordered that the statutory time periods for various steps in the nomination and campaign processes be telescoped to fit within the seventy-five days that remained before the election.3
Since the board plan reduces the total number of assembly districts from 177 to 151, some incumbents of the General Assembly now find themselves challenged by others in the newly created districts. Faced with the fact that there are now fewer offices to compete for and a shorter than usual time in which to do it, the plaintiffs instituted this action.4
This action which alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights by state action is brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and jurisdiction of this court is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1343(4). Defendants' contention that the Anti-Injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,5 deprives this court of jurisdiction in this civil rights action has recently been squarely considered and conclusively rejected by the Supreme Court. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972).
Despite the absence of any restriction on the jurisdictional power of this court to enjoin state court proceedings in a case under the Civil Rights Act, the inadvisability of interfering with state court judicial proceedings in order not to disturb unduly the delicate balance which exists between the exercise of state and federal authority has been urged as a reason why this court, in the exercise of its discretion, should refrain from considering the plaintiffs' claim.6 If the precise constitutional claim urged by the plaintiffs in this case were being raised in the presently pending appeal from the order of the Superior Court, this court would have to fully resolve whether policies of federalism require that this court stay further action.7 However, this is not that case. The constitutionality of the reapportionment effected under the corrected board plan is not in issue in the state court. That question is pending before the United States Supreme Court in the appeal, Gaffney v. Cummings, supra. Among the many issues presented to the state Supreme Court, the only one pertinent to the constitutional issues presented here is whether that part of the order of the Superior Court instituting a "telescoped" schedule was erroneous as a matter of state law. This raises the question of whether judicial power was properly exercised to modify the time provisions which the legislature has established by statute. That issue is considerably narrower in scope than the issue of unconstitutionality raised under the Civil Rights Act. In view of this difference in the issues, not even a broad application of the principles of comity mandates that this court avoid reaching the merits of this case. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); Mitchum v. Foster, supra, 407 U.S. at 242, 92 S.Ct. at 2162, 32 L.Ed.2d at 718 (Stewart, J.).
Similarly, the fact that state law is an essential part of the foundation upon which this case arises does not alone warrant abstention when, at least for purposes of this suit, there is no allegation that the state law is unsettled or in need of state court construction.8 Cf. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 84 S. Ct. 1441, 12 L.Ed.2d 609 (1964); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).
The gravamen of this complaint is that the Connecticut Superior Court order, Miller v. Schaffer, supra, leaves so little time for prospective candidates to campaign for the nomination of their party for the offices of state representatives and senators, and thereafter in the general elections, as to deny voters and candidates rights secured by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.10 Beyond incontrovertible generalities concerning the importance of the citizen's right to effectively exercise the franchise, plaintiffs have neither clearly articulated, nor provided this court with any authority which supports their contention that a constitutional right has been impaired.
See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964); White v. Snear, 313 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa.1970). Nor is there any doubt that "(u)ndeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections." Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 554-555, 84 S.Ct. at 1377.
The state legislature's power to regulate, directly or indirectly, the orderly conduct of its elections is effectively plenary, within the limitations established by the United States Constitution, or any restrictions imposed by Congress under its constitutional powers. See, e. g., Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 14 L.Ed.2d 477 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362; Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632, 24 S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817 (1904); Wright v. Richter, 301 F.Supp. 1345, 1348 (D.Del.1969). Finally, it is of no significance that the object of the plaintiffs' constitutional attack is a judicial order of the state rather than a specific statute. As observed by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 466, 70 S.Ct. 718, 722, 94 L.Ed. 985 (1950): "The fact that Connecticut's policy is expressed by the judicial organ of the State rather than by the legislature we have repeatedly ruled to be immaterial."11
What is in dispute is whether the state's action, here in the form of a judicial order, in fact violates any provision of the United States Constitution.12
The main thrust of the plaintiffs' case attempts to demonstrate that the "telescoped" timetable for campaigning violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and it is here that the issue was joined at the hearing. In the area of voting rights, any allegation of unequal treatment, unless patently frivolous, must be scrutinized under the most...
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Andrews v. Norton
...v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 541, 94 S.Ct. at 1381. See Hill v. State of Michigan, 488 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1973); see also Ajello v. Schaffer, 349 F.Supp. 1168, 1174 (D.Conn.1972); Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F.Supp. 385, 392 (D. The conclusion that plaintiffs' claim is insubstantial is dictated not onl......
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Miller v. Schaffer
...... The stay order of the United States Supreme Court left Connecticut without any existing valid reapportionment plan. Ajello v. Schaffer, United States District Court, 349 F.Supp. 1168. The federal court, in fact, invited state action for the purpose of creating a valid reapportionment plan. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F.Supp. 139, 150 (D.Conn.). In the absence of such action by the Superior Court, the electors of this ......
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...have referred the Court to only one reported decision which involved substantially identical constitutional issues. In Ajello v. Schaffer, 349 F.Supp. 1168 (D.Conn.1972), plaintiffs sought to enjoin a state court order implementing an election apportionment plan and providing for a "telesco......