Andrews v. Norton
| Decision Date | 19 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. H-74-190. |
| Citation | 385 F. Supp. 672 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Leonard ANDREWS et al. v. Nicholas NORTON, Individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of the State of Connecticut Welfare Department, et al. |
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James C. Sturdevant, Tolland-Windham Legal Assistance, Rockville, Conn., Raymond J. Kelly, Tolland-Windham Legal Assistance, Willimantic, Conn., David B. Spanier, Legal Aid Society of Hartford, Hartford, Conn., Charles A. Pirro,, Fairfield County Legal Services, South Norwalk, Conn., for plaintiffs.
Francis J. MacGregor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.
This is an action to enjoin the defendants, state welfare officials, from continuing to require welfare recipients to report to State Welfare Department offices for periodic AFDC redetermination interviews without reimbursing them for travel, day-care, or other expenses involved in making the required journey. The plaintiffs seek certification of a class, the convening of a threejudge court and a preliminary injunction pending final adjudication of the case on its merits.
At issue in this action is an emergency welfare regulation, § 17-2-31 (1974) which has been in effect since May 28, 19741 (published at 36 Conn.L.J., Oct. 22, 1974 at 19). The regulation provides that the "AFDC personal interview provided for . . . redetermination of eligibility, is a face-to-face interview in the district office of the department." Under emergency § 17-2-29 such interviews are to take place "no less frequently than ninety (90) days after the effective date of award and every six (6) months thereafter . . . ." There are only a limited number of district offices in the state at which such interviews are conducted2 with the attendant result that some welfare recipients must travel further distances at greater expense and inconvenience than others. In addition, plaintiffs allege that persons who live at a greater distance are more likely to incur baby-sitting or day-care expenses during the period when they are traveling to and from welfare offices. Welfare recipients are not reimbursed for these expenses.
At the time of recertification the recipients are notified by mail of the date and location of their interview. Emergency regulation § 17-2-31(a) governs the issue of notice and the allowable excuses for failure to attend the interview:
Should a recipient fail to keep a scheduled interview appointment, that situation is governed by § 17-2-31(2):
The named plaintiffs are all individuals who live a considerable distance but less than 25 miles3 outside of the cities in which their recertifications were to take place. It is unnecessary at this juncture to set out in detail the specifics of each of their cases. However, some discussion is necessary to indicate the dimensions of the discrimination complained of.
Leonard Andrews receives $64.00 per month of AFDC benefits. He lives two miles outside of Willimantic and was ordered by the Welfare Department to report to the Norwich welfare office for his redetermination interview. It was established at the hearing that Willimantic is 18 miles from Norwich. At the time of the hearing on this motion in June 1974, there was only one bus a week running between Willimantic and Norwich. The cost of a round trip ticket on that bus was $2.60. Mr. Andrews was able to arrange for his interview to take place on the day of the week on which the bus ran, but stated that he was unable to afford the cost of the ticket. It was also established that beginning July 1, there would be daily buses operating between those two towns. Mr. Andrews also complained that he would have to incur the expense of providing a baby sitter for his five- and six-year-old children while he traveled to Norwich. However, upon further examination he testified that he had several older children who would be available to take care of their younger brothers and sisters.
Plaintiff Vivian Feltault resides in Enfield and was ordered to attend a recertification interview in Manchester. She has several young children and would apparently not be able to leave them alone, but rather would have to bring them to the interview or obtain the services of a baby sitter. There is no direct bus line between Enfield and Manchester; travel between these points involves changing buses at Hartford. The total distance of this route is approximately 52 miles round trip. Because of the difficulty of making bus connections, it is apparent that Mrs. Feltault would have to devote the better part of a day in traveling to and from the site of the interview. However, in cross-examination she did concede that her children could ride free on the buses and she would thus be willing to take them with her to Manchester.
The other named plaintiffs did not testify at the hearing, but their situations, as set out in the complaint, are basically variations on those of plaintiffs Andrews and Feltault. In no case does the trip required of the plaintiffs exceed that involved in Mrs. Feltault's case. A number of the plaintiffs are residents of South Norwalk and are required to travel to Bridgeport for their interviews, a total round trip distance of 36 miles. At the hearing it was established that there is hourly bus transportation between these two cities at a round trip cost of $3.10.4
The plaintiffs in their complaint seek certification of a class for the purposes of maintaining this as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(2). The proposed class is defined as "all present and future AFDC recipients in Connecticut who are required to report to State Welfare Department Offices for AFDC redetermination interviews pursuant to written departmental policy, Manual Vol. I, Index No. 2200, paras. 4 and 5, p. 25 without affording said persons travel, day-care, or automobile expenses to and from said offices." (Plaintiffs' complaint ¶ 3). As all of the prerequisites for class certification are present, this will be treated as a class action.
Plaintiffs seek to ground jurisdiction of this action on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).6 They have presented for the Court's consideration a number of constitutional challenges to the Welfare Department's interview policy. Basically, they contend that the interview requirement invidiously discriminates against that class of persons who must incur expenditures for travel to the welfare offices for the redetermination interviews. Secondly, they challenge the practice on the basis that the state has made a conclusive presumption that welfare recipients receive enough welfare assistance to allow them to pay these added expenditures. Thirdly, they challenge the evidentiary hearing procedure which precedes the termination of welfare payments in this class of cases. They argue that such a hearing does not satisfy the requirements of due process as set out in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) because affected individuals are required to attend these hearings at the locations where the interviews themselves are scheduled to take place. It is not due process, they argue, to hold a hearing at a location which a person cannot, or can only with great difficulty, reach when the very reason why relief is to be terminated is his inability to attend an interview at that location.
In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) the Supreme Court established the very minimal standards of merit which must be satisfied before a District Court may assume jurisdiction of a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Quoting from Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-667, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974), the Court held that a claim could be dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction only if it were "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits." Id. at 543, 94 S.Ct. at 777. With due regard, however, for the strictness of this standard, I conclude that each of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims is insubstantial.
Their first argument is grounded upon the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They contend that the defendants' action in conducting interviews at only a limited number of locations in the state has invidiously discriminated against those who live substantial...
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