Akella v. Michigan Dept. of State Police

• Citation: 67 F.Supp.2d 716
• Decision Date: 10 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-CV-75048-DT.,98-CV-75048-DT.
• Parties: Viswanath AKELLA and, Gayathri Akella, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, John Doe and Robert Doe, Plaintiffs, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE and State Police Col. Michael D. Robinson, in his official capacity, jointly and severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

67 F.Supp.2d 716

Viswanath AKELLA and, Gayathri Akella, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, John Doe and Robert Doe, Plaintiffs, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE and State Police Col. Michael D. Robinson, in his official capacity, jointly and severally, Defendants.

No. 98-CV-75048-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

August 10, 1999.

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Douglas R. Mullkoff, Ann Arbor, Michael J. Steinberg, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

Margaret Nelson, Kenneth M. Ross, Lansing, MI, for defendant.

OPINION

DUGGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this action challenging the constitutionality of Michigan's Sex Offenders Registration Act ("Act"), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.721 et. seq., claiming its provisions violate procedural and substantive due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. Plaintiffs also contend that the notification provision of the Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.730(3), which authorizes dissemination of registration materials by electronic or computerized means, is unconstitutional. This matter is currently before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss the action claiming that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for review, plaintiffs lack standing, and plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to defendants' motion contending that defendants' assertions are without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the Court shall grant defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the Michigan Department of State Police and shall dismiss it as a defendant in this action. Further, the Court shall grant defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to the substantive and procedural due process claims of the Doe and Roe plaintiffs, and as to the Akellas' procedural due process claim.

Background

Michigan's Sex Offenders Registration Act is the State's "version of a federally mandated registry or [sic] convicted sex offenders first passed by Congress in 1992." (Defs.' Br. in Supp. Mot. Dis. at 1). The Act requires individuals convicted of one of the enumerated criminal sexual offenses to register and to update their address within ten days of relocation. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.723(a), (b); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.729. In the event that an individual fails to register, the Act provides such conduct constitutes a felony. The Michigan Department of State Police is required to maintain a repository of the information compiled pursuant to the Act in the form of a computerized database. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.728. According to defendants, the database includes "name, aliases, social security number, address, a brief summary of information regarding each conviction, a complete physical description, blood type and DNA information where available." (Defs.' Br. in Supp. Mot. Dis. at 1).

In 1994, the Act was amended in response to an anticipated amendment in the federal law commonly known as "Megan's Law," 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d), in order to provide for the creation of a separate public registry of convicted sex offenders. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.728. The creation of the public registry was implemented on April 1, 1997. Defendants note that the public registry contains the following information: "name, known alias, address, physical description (i.e., sex, height, weight, hair color, eye color) birth date and offense of conviction." (Defs.' Br. in Supp. Mot. Dis. at 2). The public registry is organized by zip code and available for inspection to the public at state and local law enforcement agencies. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.728(2). The statute provides for dissemination of the public registry "by electronic, computerized, or other accessible means." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.730(3). In order to access information contained on the internet site, an individual must identify the zip code area sought for review.

On the issue of remedial measures addressing potential inaccuracy of the registry, defendants claim that they have undertaken steps to address such a problem. Defendants assert: "Local law enforcement agencies and Michigan State Police Posts were advised of the specific steps to delete erroneous information." (Defs.' Br. in Supp. Mot. Dis. at 2). In addition, defendants note that each law enforcement agency is authorized to directly enter the Law Enforcement Information Network ("LEIN") and make any verified changes. The procedure for correcting erroneous information is as follows: "the agency first verifies the registrant does not live at the registered address. The agency enters the LEIN system and deletes the address." (Id.) In the event the local agency refuses to comply, a member of the public may contact the Michigan State Police for assistance. The defendants note that verification may consist of a "statement from the current resident, a lease or title document or some other evidence of a change in residency." (Id.).

The Akella plaintiffs purchased a home in Washtenaw County approximately three years ago. The Akellas' address appears on the current registry of sex offenders. The Akellas are not required to register under the Act; thus, the Akellas' address is inappropriately listed.

Plaintiff John Doe pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct. He asserts that he had consensual sexual relations with his girlfriend, who was not sixteen years of age at the time. Plaintiff Doe is required to register under the Act and he alleges that he is fearful that he will be subject to harassment, threats, and interference with employment, education, and housing. (Doe Aff. Ex. 7).

Similarly, Plaintiff Roe engaged in sexual relations with his girlfriend who was not yet sixteen either. He pled guilty to statutory rape and received a sentence of five years probation. Plaintiff Roe is required to register under the Act. In addition, plaintiff Roe fears that he will suffer from harassment, threats, and interference with employment, education, and housing. (Roe Aff. Ex. 8).

Plaintiffs Doe and Roe challenge the constitutionality of the community notification provisions of the Act on substantive and procedural due process grounds. With respect to the notification provisions of the Act, the Doe and Roe plaintiffs note that it does not afford prospective registrants notice or any opportunity for a hearing before placement on the registry. In addition, the Doe and Roe plaintiffs complain that the Act is devoid of any rational basis for determining an individual's inclusion on the list.

The Akella plaintiffs challenge the Act on procedural due process grounds. The Akellas assert that the Act fails to include a process by which an individual whose name or address incorrectly appears may have the name or address removed.

I. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants claim that plaintiffs' maintenance of the suit against the Michigan Department of State Police is barred by the Eleventh Amendment as its immunity from suit has been neither abrogated nor waived. Further, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997), defendants assert that plaintiffs' action against State Police Colonel Michael D. Robinson is similarly barred because it implicates "special sovereignty" interests recognized by the Supreme Court as insufficient to invoke the Ex parte Young¹ fiction.

"The Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation of the judicial power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25, 54 S.Ct. 18, 20, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In the absence of consent, a suit in which the State or one of its departments or agencies is named as a defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (citing Florida Dep't of Health and Rehab. Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)). The issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment is applicable is a question of law. Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir.1997).

Plaintiffs' action against the Michigan Department of State Police is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. "The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity, Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-73, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2945-46, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987), or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309-10, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 104 S.Ct. at 908 ("It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment"). The Amendment thus provides immunity to the State, as well as its departments and agencies, from all suits, whether for declaratory, injunctive, or monetary relief. See Thiokol Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir.1993); accord Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 104 S.Ct. at 908. ("This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.") Plaintiffs do not identify any facts that would support a finding that the State has waived its immunity or that Congress has expressly overridden it. The Court finds that plaintiffs' maintenance of the instant case...