Akers v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. E2006-01513-COA-R3-CV.,E2006-01513-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | Rondal AKERS, et al. v. BUCKNER-RUSH ENTERPRISES, INC., et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
This is an appeal from three consolidated lawsuits filed against T. Ray Brent Marsh, Marsh's former business, Tri-State Crematory, and Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc. The plaintiffs are relatives and a girlfriend of three deceased individuals whose bodies were sent by Buckner-Rush Funeral Home to Tri-State Crematory for cremation. The bodies were not cremated and either were dumped or buried by Marsh on the Tri-State premises. The Trial Court dismissed all three lawsuits after holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring any of the tort, contract, or statutory claims at issue. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This is the third appeal from numerous civil lawsuits filed against T. Ray Brent Marsh ("Marsh") and various other defendants. The underlying facts are set forth in depth in our other opinions, Floyd v. Prime Succession of TN, No. E2006-01085-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 2297810 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug.13, 2007), no appl. perm. appeal filed, and Crawford v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc., 253 S.W.3d 149 (Tenn.Ct.App., 2007).1 We will again mention in this opinion only the most significant underlying facts.
Marsh operated Tri-State Crematory in Noble, Georgia. In 2002, it was discovered that the crematory was not operational and had not been operational in years. Although Marsh continued to accept bodies for cremation, he simply was burying or dumping the bodies on the Tri-State premises. Marsh would return to the family members what purported to be the ashes of a deceased, but the ashes were not the remains of their loved one. Over 300 un-cremated bodies were discovered on the Tri-State premises. Local authorities were able to identify approximately 200 of those bodies. Criminal charges were brought against Marsh in Georgia and Tennessee. Marsh received a 12-year prison sentence in Georgia and a 9-year prison sentence in Tennessee. The sentences are being served concurrently. See Floyd, 2007 WL 2297810, at *2, 3.
Numerous civil lawsuits were filed in several states by family members of the deceased individuals who were not or were believed not to have been cremated. The lawsuits were filed against various defendants including Marsh, Tri-State Crematory, and the funeral homes.
As discussed in much more depth in our Crawford opinion, a class action lawsuit was filed in Georgia. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified class action status and members of the class were permitted to opt-out. The class action lawsuit was settled.
The present appeal involves three separate lawsuits brought by individuals who were not parties to the Georgia class action lawsuit. The plaintiffs have alleged various causes of action, including breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional mishandling of a corpse, and fraud. All three of these law-suits were filed in the Circuit Court for Bradley Country, Tennessee. The Trial Court consolidated the cases because they involved similar and, at times, identical issues. All the defendants in the three lawsuits filed motions for summary judgment claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue any of their claims. Resolution of the standing issue, at least in part, involves an examination of the familial relationship of the plaintiffs to their deceased loved one. The basic familial relationships are as follows:
1. The Akers lawsuit. Rondal D. Akers, III, died on November 23, 2001. At the time of his death, the decedent was divorced, had never remarried, and had one child, a twelve-year old daughter named Lindsey D. Akers. Funeral arrangements were made with the Buckner-Rush Funeral Home2 in Cleveland, Tennessee. The decedent's father, Rondal D. Akers, Jr., signed the contract for funeral services with the Funeral Home. Both Rondal D. Akers, Jr. and his wife, the decedent's mother, Lucinda Akers, signed a three page document titled "Cremation and Disposition Authorization." The decedent's body then was taken to Tri-State for cremation. Because the crematorium was not operational, we can safely assume that the decedent's body was not cremated. It is unclear what happened to the decedent's body as it was not one of the bodies later identified. The decedent's body either is one of the unidentified bodies, or has yet to be found. The Akers lawsuit was filed by the decedent's parents, Rondal D. Akers, Jr., and Lucinda Akers.
2. The Burns lawsuit. William R. Burns died on March 19, 1999. Mr. Burns was survived by his wife, Linda Burns. Following his death, Mr. Burns' daughter, Donna Burns, made the necessary funeral arrangements with the Funeral Home. Donna Burns signed both the general contract for funeral services and the cremation and disposition authorization. Mr. Burns' body was sent to Tri-State for cremation and either was dumped or buried on the Tri-State premises. Mr. Burns' remains later were identified and returned to the family. The Burns lawsuit was filed originally by Linda and Donna Burns. After the lawsuit was filed, Linda Burns decided to participate in the Georgia class action lawsuit, and she ultimately settled all of her claims in the class action lawsuit. Accordingly, the claims of Linda Burns in the lawsuit now before us were voluntarily dismissed. Donna Burns is the only remaining plaintiff in the Burns lawsuit.
3. The Hall lawsuit. Lloyd Nolan Harden died on April 18, 2000. At the time of his death, the decedent was not married. However, he did have a girlfriend, Elaine Waldron, who was pregnant with the decedent's only child. The decedent was survived by his mother and six siblings. One of the decedent's sisters, Susan Hall, signed the contract for funeral services with the Funeral Home. However, all six of the decedent's siblings signed the cremation and disposition authorization. These six siblings are: Susan Hall, Doyle Harden, Ricky Harden, Sandra Fogle, Mollie Denton, and Donnie Harden.3 The decedent's body was transported to Tri-State for cremation. As with the other bodies, the decedent's remains were not cremated. In August of 2002, the decedent's body was discovered on the Tri-State premises. The remains were returned to the family and properly cremated. The present lawsuit was filed by the decedent's siblings and his girlfriend.
After examining the familial relationships of the plaintiffs to their deceased family members, the Trial Court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment in all three cases after finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Trial Court's dismissal in the Akers case states as follows:
The Plaintiffs are the parents of Rondal Douglas Akers III, who died on November 23, 2001, and whose remains were delivered to Tri-State Crematory, in and through Buckner-Rush, for cremation. . . . The issue at the core of [the Defendants' motions for summary judgment] is whether the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit [have] standing to maintain a claim against these Defendants. Tennessee law only allows the relative with superior title to bring claims arising from the mishandling of a corpse. Superior title was defined in 1926 by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Hill v. Traveler's Inc. Co., 154 Tenn. 295, 294 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1926), as the surviving spouse of the deceased and, in the absence of such, the next of kin.
* * *
Analogous to the Hill case, the Plaintiffs' claim in this action, even though written with contractual overtones, arises from the mutilation of a body. Only in the absence of a next of kin may the parents bring action. Lindsey Dominica Akers, as the daughter of the decedent, holds the sole right, if any, to bring suit on the decedent's behalf. Her actions and claims are not before this court, yet her status precludes the Plaintiffs from their right as the otherwise next of kin. . . .
Plaintiffs make essentially two arguments. First is that their claims are contractually based and, therefore, kinship status is not an issue. This is simply not the case; the contractual relationship, if any, between the Plaintiffs and Defendants appears limited by the language of the contract itself by stating the document is simply a release authorization. . . . .
[T]his court will follow its 2006 decision and rationale set forth in Crawford v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc. In Crawford, as in the case at bar, the action was brought by a family member who did not meet the Hill limitations on standing. . . .
All other issues raised in the motions are pretermitted by the decision with respect to the standing of the Plaintiffs in this case. . . .
The orders dismissing the Burns and Hall cases were virtually identical to the order dismissing the Akers case. The Trial Court concluded in Burns that the decedent's wife, Linda Burns, was the sole person with standing to...
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