Akers v. Division of Welfare

• Decision Date: 08 November 1949
• Docket Number: No. 6825.,6825.
• Citation: 224 S.W.2d 850
• Parties: AKERS v. DIVISION OF WELFARE, STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

224 S.W.2d 850

AKERS v. DIVISION OF WELFARE, STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE.

No. 6825.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

November 8, 1949.

"Not to be published in State Reports."

Geo. F. Addison, L. Clark McNeill, Wm. P. Elmer, E. W. Bennett, B. G. Dilworth, of Salem, for appellant.

J. E. Taylor, Attorney General of Missouri, Aubrey R. Hammett, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

BLAIR, Judge.

This case came to the Circuit Court of Dent County by appeal from an order of the Welfare Division of the State Department of Public Health and Welfare, refusing to allow appellant old age assistance. The circuit court sustained the order, overruled applicant's motion for new trial, and granted her an appeal to this Court.

It seems that applicant, appellant here, had been the recipient of old age assistance for several years before. Such old age assistance was stopped by the commission, and applicant claimed that she was still entitled to such assistance.

An appeal may be taken by the person applying for such assistance to the circuit court of the county where the applicant resides. Upon dissatisfaction with the ruling of the circuit court, the applicant may take an appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Section 9411, R.S.Mo.1939, Mo.R.S.A.; Laws of 1941, p. 334, Mo.R.S.A. § 2044.1.

No question is raised in this record about the prior eligibility of applicant, under Section 9406, R.S.Mo.1939, Mo.R.S.A. But to understand fully Section 9406, R.S.Mo.1939, Mo.R.S.A., it is necessary to reproduce in this opinion the first paragraph of Section 9406, which is as follows: "In determining the eligibility of an applicant for public assistance under this law, it shall be the duty of the Commission to consider and take into account all facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant, including his earning capacity, income and resources, from whatever source received, and if from all the facts and circumstances the applicant is not found to be in need, assistance shall be denied. The amount of benefits when added to all other income, resources, support and maintenance shall provide such persons with reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health. Benefits shall not be payable to any person who:".

Subsection (4) of said section is as follows: "(4) is married and actually living with husband or wife, if the value of his or her property, or the value of his or her interest in property together with that of such husband or wife exceeds $2,000.00;".

That subsection was not affected by the amendment of 1943, in Laws of Missouri for that year, page 950.

The first contention of appellant is that the word "value" in such subsection means the cost to her of the lot and house erected thereon at the time such house was built. On the other hand, respondent contends that such word "value," as used in the statute, means the amount such property would have commanded, if put on the market and sold at the time the order of the commission was made.

Respondent contends that the legislative meaning of such word "value" is shown by the action of the 63rd General Assembly in providing that said Section 9406 should be amended by increasing the amount a husband and wife could claim, under subsection (4), to $3000, instead of $2000. Laws of Missouri for 1945, page 1731, Mo.R.S.A. § 9406-a. The Legislature then made the following provision: "The provisions of this Act shall terminate and cease to be effective on June 30, 1949."

Respondent also contends that the 65th General Assembly, by H. B. No. 388, further amended said Section 9406-a by extending the time provided therein to June 30, 1951.

It is the contention of respondent that the Legislature thought that the high prices of that period would cease and that such prices would return to normal by June 30, 1951. This contention is sustained by the following quotation from respondent's brief: "Respondent contends that the sole and only reason for increasing the amount of property a person may own or possess and still qualify for benefits under the Act, was due to the fact that property has increased in value to such an extent in recent years that it became difficult for many persons to qualify for benefits under the State Social Security Act and own or possess even a very small and inexpensive home."

In other words, respondent contends that the amount the property would bring when the order was made, and not the original cost of the property, determines the "value" of the property which applicant can have in order to be entitled to old age assistance.

There is not the slightest doubt under the record that the original cost of applicant's property was considerably under $3000; nor is there any question but that such property would have sold on the market for more than $3000, had it been sold at current prices at the time respondent cut off applicant's old age assistance. So the meaning of the word "value" as used in Sections 9406 and 9406-a is practically decisive in this case.

Appellant cites Galvin v. State Social Security Commission of Missouri, Mo.App., 129 S.W.2d 1051, loc. cit. 1053. Nowhere does that case attempt to deal with the subject of "value." There appellant was removed from the rolls of old age assistance through error. The circuit court ordered the commission to restore her to the rolls and the Kansas City Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.

The only possible bearing that case might have on this case were the following words: "In construing the act `we should consider the former state of the law, the new provision, the evil sought to be removed, as well as the remedy provided, and so construe the law as to further the remedy and retard the evil. Such is a venerable rule of construction, none the less alive because old.'"

Appellant then cites us to the word "value" in Volume 44 of Words and Phrases, Perm.Ed., especially to pages 42, 43, 47 and 70 thereof. On page 41 of that volume, we find the following:

"In action to recover chattel, `value' means value at time of trial, not at time of seizure thereof, and admission of evidence of value of automobile at time of seizure was error, in action for recovery thereof. Civil Practice Act, § 1120. Spear v. Auto Dealers' Discount Corporation, Sup., 278 N.Y.S. 561, 154 Misc. 801." And also on the same page, it is said: "`Value' of goods is not what they cost their owners; it is what they are worth to him or to others. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. Pennsylvania Iron Works Co. [3 Cir.], C.C.A.Pa. 256 F. 339, 334."

While the case cited in the last quotation does not hold in plain words that the word "damages" in a replevin suit means "value," when the replevined property cannot be returned, the case apparently so holds.

The case of Heyward v. Bradley, 4 Cir., 179 F. 325, 331, 102 C.C.A. 509, cited as a part of page 42, Vol. 44 of Words and Phrases, Perm.Ed., was a specific performance case and the contract was held unenforceable, because the "value" named in the contract was wholly inadequate at the time the contract was made. That case throws no light on the proposition here involved.

Appellant cites page 43,...