Akers v. Mortensen, Docket No. 33587/33694 (Idaho 6/4/2008)
| Decision Date | 04 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 33587/33694 |
| Parties | DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants, and D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife, Defendants. DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants, and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, Defendants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for appellants Mortensen. Terri Yost argued.
Robert Covington, Hayden, for appellants White.
James Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Susan Weeks argued.
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easement and trespass dispute. Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Appellants") appeal the district court's judgment regarding the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis and Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages for trespass and emotional distress. This Court previously decided an appeal concerning this case in Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) (Akers I). We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property involved in this case: "Government Lot 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property." The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner. Government Lot 2 is located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern corner of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective properties.
Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop Road. Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions of the Akers' property. Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and Government Lot 2 do not actually share a border. It is therefore physically impossible to access Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other property.
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980. At the time of acquisition, a road provided access to Parcel A, running through the southern portion of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an approach (the original approach) that turned sharply north from the access road, which runs east to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Akers constructed a new approach (the curved approach), which starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis, over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit. The Peplinski/Akers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, including Parcel A, to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining Parcel B, to the Whites.
In January 2002, the Akers blocked Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property in Parcel A. Appellants then brought in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers' property and alleged malicious behavior by Appellants.
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence. During the trial, the district court personally viewed the access road and property in question. The district court confirmed to Appellants an express easement 12.2 feet in width across the Akers' property in Government Lot 2, through the original approach, but not the curved approach, to Millsap Loop Road. Although the district court confirmed Appellants' easement across part of the Akers' land, the court found that the easement ended at the western boundary of Government Lot 2 and did not cross into the Akers' property in Parcel B.
The district court also awarded the Akers compensatory damages arising from Appellants' trespass in the amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C. § 6-202 for a total of $51,008.55, to be paid by Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of $30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers, to be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06.
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers I. This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights.
On remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusion of law on its finding that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found the prescriptive easement passed from Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees from Akers I, and awarded the Akers their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellants timely appealed from the district court's order on remand.
Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253, 256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990)). A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006) (citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); I.R.C.P 52(a)). If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998)). This Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4 (citing Bramwell, 136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the question of damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial and competent evidence. Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007) (citing Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49, 665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983)).
Both sides to this appeal ask this Court to finally resolve their dispute. We are unable to fulfill their requests. We conclude that the district court's factual...
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