Akers v. Mortensen

• Decision Date: 22 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 33587.,No. 33694.,33587.,33694.
• Citation: 147 Idaho 39,205 P.3d 1175
• Parties: Dennis Lyle AKERS and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Vernon J. MORTENSEN and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants, and D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, Defendants. Dennis Lyle Akers and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants, and Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, Defendants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

205 P.3d 1175

147 Idaho 39

Dennis Lyle AKERS and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Vernon J. MORTENSEN and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants, and D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, Defendants.

Dennis Lyle Akers and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants, and Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, Defendants.

No. 33587.

No. 33694.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Lewiston, March 2008 Term.

January 22, 2009.

Rehearing Denied April 16, 2009.

Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for appellants Mortensen. Terri Yost argued.

Robert Covington, Hayden, for appellants White.

James Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Susan Weeks argued.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION. THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE 4, 2008 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN

HORTON, Justice.

This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easement and trespass dispute. Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Appellants") appeal the district court's ruling regarding the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis and Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages for trespass and emotional distress. This Court previously decided an appeal concerning this case in Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) (Akers I). We affirm in part and vacate in part the district court's judgment issued after Akers I and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property involved in this case: "Government Lot 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property." The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner. Government Lot 2 is located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern corner of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective properties.

Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop Road. Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions of the Akers' property. Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and Government Lot 2 do not actually share a border. It is therefore physically impossible to access Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other property.

The Akers acquired their real property in 1980. At the time of acquisition, a road provided access to a Quonset hut on Parcel A, running through the southern portion of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. The Quonset hut is located near the border of Parcel A and Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an approach (the original approach) that turned sharply north from the access road, which runs east to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Akers constructed a new approach (the curved approach), which starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis, over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit. The Peplinski/Akers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, including Parcel A, to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining Parcel B, to the Whites.

In January 2002, the Akers blocked Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property in Parcel A. Appellants then brought in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers' property and alleged malicious behavior by Appellants.

In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence. The district court bifurcated the trial proceedings. After the first phase of the trial, the district court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Appellants had an express easement 12.2 feet in width across the Akers' property in Government Lot 2. The district court determined that the express easement began at Millsap Loop Road, ran through the original approach rather than the curved approach, and tracked the southern boundary of Government Lot 2, terminating at the western boundary of that parcel and did not enter into the Akers' property in Parcel B. The district court concluded that Appellants had failed to establish a prescriptive easement or an implied easement arising from prior use. The district court further concluded that Appellants had trespassed and unreasonably interfered with the Akers' use of their property, with damages to be determined in the second phase of the trial.

Before the damages portion of the trial, the district court personally viewed the property in dispute in the company of counsel for the parties. After the second phase of the trial, the district court awarded the Akers compensatory damages arising from Appellants' trespass in the amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C. § 6-202 for a total of $51,008.55, to be paid by Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of $30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers, to be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06.

Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers I. This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights.

On remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusion of law on its finding that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found the prescriptive easement passed from Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees from Akers I, and awarded the Akers their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellants timely appealed from the district court's order on remand.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253, 256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990)). A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006) (citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); I.R.C.P 52(a)). If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998))....