Akin v. Ashland Chemical Co., No. 97-6030

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and GREENE; GREENE
• Citation: 156 F.3d 1030
• Parties: 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,032, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,331, 98 CJ C.A.R. 5094 James E. AKIN; Richard G. Arellano; Charles L. Baldwin; Annie M. Barnes; Terry D. Blain; Marcia Bannock; Delton E. Brown; Timothy L. Caraway; Thomas W. Clark; Richard Cotey; Connie Cottrell; Ronnie D. Cottrell; Steven L. Coy; Hugh Crow; Nathan D'Amico; Donna M. Davis; Louis R. Dickinson; Ollie Dillishaw, Jr.; Danny L. Dunn; Jenny L. Duren; Bill R. Durington; Steven Ray Duty; Leon Ealon; Debra M. Emerich; Janette K. Farley; Jon G. Gabbard; Linda D. Gatewood; Max R. Glover; Wendell P. Gomez; Eric L. Janousek; David Keiser; Larry D. Lidell; Robert C. Love; Jack L. Manning; Thomas Marshall; Michael D. Mowles; Jeffrey Murray; Melvin E. Norton; Zenephor Overstreet; James M. Owen; Terry W. Oxley; Ronald K. Peoples; Michael Phillips; Marie L. Plumlee; Phillip Plumlee; Rick Reames; Jack D. Rhoden; Wayne Richardson; Norma Roberts; Charlon S. Rogers; Sandra Rolland; Marlys Rone; Judy A. Rowland; Tony E. Ruble; Reatha R. Schlegel; Gloria Shelton, as representative of the estate of Wilton F. Shelton, deceased; Charlie Sheppard; Herman D. Sikes; William D. Slattery; Clayton D. Statsny; Melissa C. Statsny; Gayla S. Staton; Martha J. Storozyszyn; Rick L. Stuart; Mike Sullivan; Emmett Thomas, Jr.; Benjamin Tingle; Marilyn J. Tracey; Helen Walker; Randy F. Wiens; Leonard Williams; Leonard Williams; Morten D. Williams; Glenda Wright; Herman Dale Wright; Kenneth L. Wright; Albert A. Wyatt; James D. Wyatt; Johnnie R. York; Larry N. Smith; Danny Driskill; Gerald Houston, Plaintiffs--Appellants, v. ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY; Dow Chemical Company; McGean-Rohco, Inc.; Thunderbird Sales Company, Inc., Defendants--Appellees, and E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; General Electric Company; J.W. Harris Co., Inc; Metallurgical Technologies, Inc.; Ashland Oil; Spray on Systems, Inc.; Plaze, Inc.; Royal Lubricants Company, Inc.; Stetco Inc.; Thompson & Formby, Inc.; L & F Products, Inc.; Miniwax Company, Inc.; Dow Industrial Serv
• Docket Number: No. 97-6030
• Decision Date: 21 August 1998

Page 1030

156 F.3d 1030 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,032, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,331,
98 CJ C.A.R. 5094 James E. AKIN; Richard G. Arellano; Charles L. Baldwin;
Annie M. Barnes; Terry D. Blain; Marcia Bannock; Delton
E. Brown; Timothy L. Caraway; Thomas W. Clark; Richard
Cotey; Connie Cottrell; Ronnie D. Cottrell; Steven L.
Coy; Hugh Crow; Nathan D'Amico; Donna M. Davis; Louis R.
Dickinson; Ollie Dillishaw, Jr.; Danny L. Dunn; Jenny L.
Duren; Bill R. Durington; Steven Ray Duty; Leon Ealon;
Debra M. Emerich; Janette K. Farley; Jon G. Gabbard;
Linda D. Gatewood; Max R. Glover; Wendell P. Gomez; Eric
L. Janousek; David Keiser; Larry D. Lidell; Robert C.
Love; Jack L. Manning; Thomas Marshall; Michael D.
Mowles; Jeffrey Murray; Melvin E. Norton; Zenephor
Overstreet; James M. Owen; Terry W. Oxley; Ronald K.
Peoples; Michael Phillips; Marie L. Plumlee; Phillip
Plumlee; Rick Reames; Jack D. Rhoden; Wayne Richardson;
Norma Roberts; Charlon S. Rogers; Sandra Rolland; Marlys
Rone; Judy A. Rowland; Tony E. Ruble; Reatha R. Schlegel;
Gloria Shelton, as representative of the estate of Wilton
F. Shelton, deceased; Charlie Sheppard; Herman D. Sikes;
William D. Slattery; Clayton D. Statsny; Melissa C.
Statsny; Gayla S. Staton; Martha J. Storozyszyn; Rick L.
Stuart; Mike Sullivan; Emmett Thomas, Jr.; Benjamin
Tingle; Marilyn J. Tracey; Helen Walker; Randy F. Wiens;
Leonard Williams; Leonard Williams; Morten D. Williams;
Glenda Wright; Herman Dale Wright; Kenneth L. Wright;
Albert A. Wyatt; James D. Wyatt; Johnnie R. York; Larry
N. Smith; Danny Driskill; Gerald Houston, Plaintiffs--Appellants,
v.
ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY; Dow Chemical Company;
McGean-Rohco, Inc.; Thunderbird Sales Company,
Inc., Defendants--Appellees,
and
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; General Electric Company;
J.W. Harris Co., Inc; Metallurgical Technologies, Inc.;
Ashland Oil; Spray on Systems, Inc.; Plaze, Inc.; Royal
Lubricants Company, Inc.; Stetco Inc.; Thompson & Formby,
Inc.; L & F Products, Inc.; Miniwax Company, Inc.; Dow
Industrial Service of the Dow Chemical Co.; Dowell Division
of the Dow Chemical Co. & Brasos Oil & Gas Division of the
Dow Chemical Co., Dow Industrial Service of the Dow Chemical
Company; Dow Division of the Dow Chemical Company; Brazos
Oil & Gas of the Dow Chemical Company; 3M Company;
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Corporation; Diamond
Shamrock Corporation; Diamond Shamrock Corporation, aka
Occidental Electro-Chemicals Inc.; Allied Corporation;
Allied Signal, Inc.; Exxon Corporation; Exxon Chemical;
Mobil Oil Corporation; Ameron, Inc.; Blazer East, Inc.,
formerly know as Koppers Company, Inc.; Saral Protective
Coatings Co.; Seymour of Sycamore, Inc.; Dexter
Corporation; Uni-Kem International, Inc.;
Miller-Stephenson Chemical Company, Inc., formerly known as
Miller-Stephenson Company of Conn, Inc.; Cabot Corporation;
Borden, Inc.; Phipps Products, a Division of Dow Chemical
Company; Desoto, Inc., Defendants,
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Third-Party-Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Third-Party-Defendant. No. 97-6030. United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit. Aug. 21, 1998.

Page 1033

James A. Ikard, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (E. Hart Green and Mitchell A. Toups, Weller, Green, McGown & Toups, Beaumont, Texas, and Shari A. Wright and Robert J. Binstock, Reich & Binstock, Houston, Texas, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Clyde A. Muchmore, Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Kelley C. Callahan and Harvey D. Ellis Jr., Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Mort G. Welch, Welch, Jones & Smith, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and GREENE, District Judge. ^*

BACKGROUND

GREENE, District J.

On November 13, 1992, plaintiffs filed this toxic tort case in state court at Beaumont, Texas. After receipt of answers to interrogatories, defendant General Electric (GE) removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The Texas district court judge upheld removal jurisdiction, denied plaintiffs' motion to remand and transferred venue to the Western District of Oklahoma as a more convenient forum. The Oklahoma district court judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that removal was untimely and summary judgment unwarranted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. See Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir.1995). "[We] examine the record to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact was in dispute; if not, we determine [whether] the substantive law was correctly applied," and in so doing "we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing" the motion. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec. Inc., 912

Page 1034

F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990). However, "where the non moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue" that party must "go beyond the pleadings" and designate specific facts so as to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case" in order to survive summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A dispute is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir.1993). DISCUSSION

I. REMOVABILITY TO FEDERAL COURT

-- Federal Enclave Jurisdiction

The United States has power and exclusive authority "in all Cases whatsoever ... over all places purchased" by the government "for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Such places are "federal enclaves" within which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction. ¹ Personal injury actions which arise from incidents occurring in federal enclaves may be removed to federal district court as a part of federal question jurisdiction. There is no dispute that Tinker Air force Base at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma is such a federal enclave.

-- Federal Officer Removal

Plaintiffs argue that the removal petition was defective in that all co-defendants did not consent and join in the removal papers. In the case at bar, defendant GE removed the case based on its status as a "person acting under" a federal officer, as well as the status of Tinker Air Force Base as a federal enclave. Federal officer removal constitutes an exception to the general removal rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1446 which require all defendants to join in the removal petition. The exception is set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) which provides in part that:

(a) "A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office ...."

Id. (emphasis added). This statutory exception allows a federal officer independently to remove a case to federal court even though that officer is only one of several named defendants. The Congressional policy permitting federal officer removal could easily be frustrated by simply joining non-federal defendants unwilling to remove if consent of co-defendant(s) were required. Thus in Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir.1960), the Second circuit ruled that "[t]he 'general...