Akins v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 10 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:20cv346-MW-HTC |
| Parties | LEON J. AKINS, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON,[1] Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Leon Akins' (“Akins”) petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a judgment and sentence from the circuit court of Leon County, Florida. ECF Doc. 1. After considering the petition, the record, the State's Response, ECF Doc. 8 and Petitioner's Reply, ECF Doc. 18, the undersigned recommends the petition be DENIED without an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner was indicted on September 27, 2012, in case number 2012-CF-2887, for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, grand theft auto, and arson, arising out of the stabbing of two men, Willie Stephens and Bobby Bell. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 32. The pertinent evidence presented at the November 2014 trial is summarized below and is taken from the trial transcript, id. at 140-364; 8-2 at 1-174.
In the early morning hours of September 1, 2012, two men - Willie Stephens and Bobby Bell - were stabbed while in Stephens' trailer. Bell survived, but Stephens died after being stabbed thirty-six times. Neighbors heard the attack (but did not see it) and called police, who arrived just after neighbors saw Stephens' black truck, noted in the neighborhood for its sound system, drive off at a high rate of speed.
Bell testified he was asleep on the couch and was woken up by a loud banging on the door. Stephens answered the door and the person outside told Stephens he was “Marie's Son” but did not give a name. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 213. After some time, Bell heard Stephens fall back and a loud rumble, which caused Bell to get up off the couch. When he did, the assailant stabbed him in the left side, right side, and back of the head as Bell ran toward the door. As he left, Bell saw Stephens lying on the floor and realized he had also been stabbed.
When police arrived, they put an alert out for the black truck, and, around a half hour after the attack, police received a report of a black truck on fire on a dirt road. It was Stephens' truck, and police noticed the speakers had been removed from the truck before it was lit on fire by a rag stuck in the gas tank. Witness Keith Penn testified he spoke with Petitioner shortly after the murder, and Petitioner attempted to sell him some large automobile speakers. Penn also testified that Petitioner left his cell phone in Penn's car, and Penn returned the phone to Petitioner.[2] Id.
Witness Traci Ives testified she was at a friend's house in the neighborhood when Petitioner showed up with blood on his shirt and “said he had just did [sic] a murder last night.” Id. at 286. He also had blood on his pants. When someone at the home told Petitioner the police were going to be looking for him because Petitioner had killed Stephens, Petitioner stated, “he'll go to his funeral and piss all over his grave because the nigga owes him money.” Id. at 287. Ives also heard Petitioner have a conversation with police, promising them that he would come in the next day and speak with them. Id. at 288. Ives then left and called the police and told them where Petitioner was. Id.
Witness Victor Sanders testified that early in the morning of the murder, Petitioner called him to ask him to buy some speakers, but Sanders declined. Id. at 294-95. The prosecutor also elicited that, when previously interviewed, Sanders told them Petitioner was driving a black truck. Later, when Sanders was heading to work, he saw Petitioner walking down Glover Road, picked him up, and drove him to Magnolia Street. Id. at 298.
An officer testified that several hours after the murder, neighbors reported that someone was hiding under a pool liner in a nearby home. Police responded and found Petitioner hiding under the pool liner. He was searched and officers found identification and a cell phone on him. Id. at 307. He also made the following spontaneous statements to the arresting officer, Id. at 311. When the officer urged him to stop talking, Petitioner replied, Id.
Also, when Petitioner was arrested, Petitioner had a pair of blue jean shorts with him. Id. at 346. The police confiscated those shorts, and a DNA expert testified at trial that the shorts contained blood which matched the DNA of the victim with odds of one in 6.4 quadrillion. ECF Doc. 8-2 at 62. Additionally, the expert sampled DNA in other areas of the shorts to see who might have worn them. She found a major contributor of DNA that matched Petitioner with odds of 1 in 2.8 quintillion. Id. at 68.
Finally, Investigator Dilmore testified that the lead investigator, Investigator Wester, gave him Petitioner's cell phone and told him to examine the call logs and address book. Dilmore used a Cellebrite forensic tool to confirm the handset corresponded to the number they had for Petitioner. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 358-59. Also, Sgt. Corbitt testified he obtained (via a court order) phone records for Petitioner's cell phone number including call history and location history from Petitioner's provider. Sgt. Corbitt demonstrated to the jury how the location records confirmed that Petitioner's phone had been in the area of the murder, the area of the burned-out truck, and then back in the neighborhood near where Petitioner was found. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 363 to ECF Doc. 8-2 at 18.
Petitioner was found guilty on all counts and sentenced immediately after trial to life in prison.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a petitioner must file a habeas petition within one year of certain trigger dates. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The applicable trigger date here is the date Petitioner's judgment and conviction became final. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner filed a direct appeal (through counsel) to the First District Court of Appeals (“First DCA”), which affirmed, per curiam and without written opinion, on December 9, 2015. ECF Doc. 8-3 at 43; First DCA Case No.: 1D14-5552. He did not seek rehearing or review in the Florida or United States Supreme Court. ECF Doc. 1 at 3. The judgment and conviction, therefore, became final ninety (90) days later, i.e., on Tuesday, March 8, 2016.[3]
The one-year deadline is tolled by properly filed postconviction motions until the motions are fully resolved. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Nothing was pending from March 8, 2016, until Petitioner filed his 3.850 motion on December 9, 2016.
ECF Doc. 8-3 at 50. Thus, 275 days ran off the AEDPA clock before the filing of the 3.850 motion. That motion was continuously pending through amendment,[4]a denial,[5]an affirmance in part/remand in part in First DCA 1D17-4038,[6] an evidentiary hearing on one ground,[7]a denial after remand,[8]a second appeal in First DCA 1D19-0472, until the issuance of the First DCA's mandate affirming the denial on August 10, 2020. ECF Doc. 8-4 at 208. In the meantime, on July 2, 2020, Petitioner had filed his federal petition, which is therefore timely.
The AEDPA governs a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the AEDPA, relief may only be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court if the adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). “Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal principles set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court when the state court issued its decision. Id. A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of Petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
Also factual determinations by the state courts are “presumed to be correct, and the petitioner can rebut this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.” Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 930-31 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1130 n.58 (11th Cir. 2000)). The presumption of...
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